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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 4, October-December 1984

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5 June 1985

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 4, October-December 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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U.S. ASIAN POLICY SEEN AS THREAT TO FAR EAST'S STABILITY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 3-14

[Editorial: "The Threat to Peace and Security in the Far East"]

In recent years the Far East and the Pacific have been playing a growing role in the Pentagon's strategic plans. The USA has been persistently following a policy of turning the territories of its allies in the Far East—Japan and South Korea—into "advanced bases" of the Pentagon. It is precisely the military political bloc—Washington, Tokyo, Seoul—that is assigned the task of translating into reality the US intentions. The creation of a militarist triangle, according to its architects, must solve a number of problems, which are considered urgent by the present-day US ruling quarters.

Firstly, Washington is seeking to preserve and consolidate the socio-political status quo and check any progressive changes in that area. It is making great efforts to keep Tokyo and Seoul in its militaristic orbit, to prevent the strengthening of democratic tendencies in those countries, and to preserve a South Korean regime which is to the liking of the United States. As for Japan, it is assigned a leading military-political role in the region, which, according to Washington's designs, it will play in close cooperation with the USA.

Secondly, like everywhere else in the world, the United States is seeking to establish its domination in this region. In this context the strategic importance of the Far East and the Pacific region at large is increasing. From the viewpoint of US imperialism, this region is a suitable bridgehead for delivering a nuclear strike at the important economic and defence installations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Thirdly, the US ruling circles are banking on the active participation of their partners, primarily Japan and South Korea, in carrying out their far-reaching strategic designs in the region. As is known, under pressure from the USA, Tokyo has already agreed to increase its military budget and implement new military programmes. The regime in Seoul is continuing to follow in the wake of US foreign policy and today is one of the most pliant satellites of the United States in Asia. These strategic objectives are being implemented with the help of the so-called Reagan doctrine for Asia.

The main premise of the doctrine is that "the United States will continue to discharge its mission and duties as a Pacific power". Its main aim is to block the Soviet Union's eastern flanks, through the joint efforts of the USA and its allies.

THE PENTAGON'S ASIAN AMBITIONS

Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and a pillar of US foreign policy strategy in the 1970s, stated categorically that in recent years Americans waged four big wars in Asia and they learnt that their own security largely depended on the developments in the Pacific.

¹ *The Korea Herald*, Nov. 11, 1983.

US prosperity, he said, is closely linked with the economy of the Pacific. Raw materials from Asia feed the US economy.² This thesis is the quintessence of the American approach to Asia and the Pacific.

Early in the 1980s the US administration proclaimed Asia an "object of a global struggle against the Soviet threat". US strategists regard Northeast Asia and the Pacific as zones of Washington's "vital interests". The US Ambassador to Tokyo Mansfield described the significance of the Pacific to the USA in the following terms: "It is precisely this area that determines everything, and our future is bound up with it. We are here to stay."

Today, US geostrategic interests in Asia and the Pacific are affirmed not only by the White House. Certain scholars in the USA are also seeking to build some "scientific" basis for the Pentagon's global designs. Last June, the so-called independent research institute for "USA-Asia" held a conference on the subject of "The USA and Security in Asia: Economic and Political Aspects", which was attended by representatives from a number of countries, including Japan and South Korea. It is indicative that top officials from the US State Department and the Pentagon also took part in the sittings. The leading idea of the conference proved rather odious, boiling down to a series of trite assertions about the mounting "Soviet threat", the "resolve of the USA to fulfil its commitments in the region" and the need to set up a "second front" counterweighing the Soviet Union.

The USA has undertaken an unprecedentedly large-scale buildup of its military presence in Asia and the Pacific. The second largest (after Western Europe) grouping of US armed forces is stationed in the Asian-Pacific area. Annually over \$40 billion are allocated for its maintenance. The United States has concentrated over 300 military installations near the Far Eastern borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. There are 12 US naval and 12 airforce bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.³ About 200 US warships, including 7 aircraft carriers, 14 cruisers, 40 submarines and a great number of destroyers and landing vessels are plying the waters of that area. Up to 150,000 American servicemen are stationed in the Far East.⁴ At present the Pentagon is busy preparing the deployment of medium-range nuclear missile weapons in the Asian-Pacific region. As a first step the ships of the US Seventh Fleet will be equipped with 375 sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles. Let us note that at present there are already 400 nuclear warheads on the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet.

Thus, concentrated in the Asian-Pacific region is an immense amount of weapons including nuclear weaponry which heightens the risk of a nuclear missile war breaking out.

Caspar Weinberger, the US Defence Secretary, quite openly confirmed the Pentagon's ambitions in Asia, when he stated that US policy in Asia "may influence the global alignment of forces more essentially" than US efforts in other regions of the world. In implementation of its plans in Asia, the White House counts not only on its "traditional" allies (Japan, South Korea and others), but also on China. During his recent visit to the PRC, President Reagan made it unequivocally clear that the USA is ready for a "close partnership" with Peking on the basis of a "community of interests". Peking expressed solidarity with the US military buildup in the region. In fact the aim is to attach China to the US Asian policy which is aimed at encircling the Soviet Union and other socialist countries from the Eastern flank.

² See *American Foreign Relations, 1976. A Documentary Record*, Ed. by E. P. Adam, New York, 1978, p. 351.

³ See *Pravda*, April 15, 1983.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, May 24, 1983, Feb. 6, 1984.

The US ruling quarters describe Tokyo's role as follows: "Japan is not merely the cornerstone of our Asian policy but also our principal partner in the world arena." Proceeding from this premise, Washington is seeking to tie Japan even more to its militaristic line and to delegate to Japan a considerable part of the military functions in the Asian-Pacific region. In fact, the ruling quarters of the two countries regard the "security treaty" as a reliable foundation for the development in this vein of Japanese-US relations. Moreover, during President Reagan's visit to Tokyo in November 1983, agreement was reached that Japan would continue to play the role of an "unsinkable aircraft carrier". In the course of his talks with Y. Nakasone, the US President more than once urged him to make a greater contribution to ensuring the peace and security not only of Japan itself, but also of the entire Far East.⁵ Under pressure from Washington the Japanese armed forces have started patrolling sea lanes one thousand miles away from the Japanese Islands. In case of "emergency", measures will be taken, together with the US forces, to block the Tsugaru, Korea, and La Perouse international sea straits. According to the National Defence Agency (NDA) the main objective of such an operation is to lock Soviet warships inside the Sea of Japan.⁶ Premier Y. Nakasone stated in the spring of 1983 that Japan is "member of the community of Western countries, that the security of the West is indivisible, and that this problem should be treated on a global scale". Kyodo Tsushin Agency rightly assessed this statement as a sign that Japan was turning into an "associated member of NATO". Thus the idea of the "NATOisation" of Japan was officially declared.

The *Blue Paper on Diplomacy* (1983) pointed out that Japan should play a more active political part on the international arena. In this connection, a proposal was made to state clearly that Japan is a country belonging to the West and that it should take upon itself international responsibility corresponding to its status. The *Blue Paper* noted that the chief aim of Japanese diplomacy consisted in the developing of closer cooperation with the West, primarily with the United States. Simultaneously the *Blue Paper* stressed the importance to Japan of the Asian and the Pacific area. The document recommended that the Japanese government should "apply efforts towards strengthening Japan's military potential as a member of the Western alliance".

During the meeting of the leaders of the seven developed capitalist countries, held in Great Britain last June, Y. Nakasone reaffirmed the intention of his government to support Reagan's "crusade" against world socialism. While delivering a lecture in the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Japanese Premier stated that "the free world needs a common strategy to respond to the Soviet challenge". According to him, such a response is inconceivable without Western solidarity. This statement was followed by practical actions: Tokyo started consultations with NATO countries on the "global problems of security". This shows that Tokyo is being increasingly drawn into the dangerous US strategy and is becoming an active participant in Washington's aggressive schemes.

A committee on the "Problems of Ensuring the Security of Japan, the USA and the West European Countries" which has contacts with NATO was set up in the Japanese Parliament. Moreover, reports have been carried in the press that the Japanese government, too, has plans to establish a special body for maintaining contacts with NATO. In fact direct

⁵ *The Korea Herald*, Nov. 11, 1983.

⁶ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 16, 1983, p. 38.

contacts between the Japanese and the NATO military circles are becoming more active. Of late, the representatives of the NDA have been holding regular consultations with the officials from the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Japan's current government is working out large-scale plans for modernising the "self-defence forces". Ignoring the peace articles of the Japanese Constitution and contrary to them, the Nakasone Cabinet finds loopholes for the military buildup. Tokyo's military spending is growing from year to year. In 1981 it amounted to \$10.4 billion, while in 1984 the respective figure was \$12.7 billion. It is planned, by 1985, to increase the military budget by 8.5 per cent, the main part of it being assigned for the purchasing from the USA of 100 F-15 aircraft and 45 P-3C Orion anti-submarine planes.⁷ At present the Nakasone government is taking measures aimed at lifting restrictions imposed on military spending.

The Council for the National Defence of Japan recently approved a new programme of modernisation for the armed forces for the period from 1986 to 1990. During the next five years, principal attention will be devoted to their qualitative strengthening (today the ground forces, the airforce and the navy number 241,000 officers and men), to equipping them with modern military hardware and to preparing them for carrying out prolonged hostilities. It is planned to increase the number of ground-based divisions from 13 to 17, the number of warships by 33 per cent, and the number of F-15 aircraft—to 175.⁸

The United States vigorously encourages the NDA plans to build up Japan's military muscle. The US President is demanding that the Japanese share the burden of defensive efforts.⁹ Ambassador Mansfield has stated overtly that the United States wants Japan to make a greater contribution to its own defences. Tokyo has obediently carried out Washington's demands, and has increased the allocations for the maintenance of the US troops stationed in Japan. Ambassador Mansfield admits that the USA obtains subsidies for the maintenance of more than 48,000 American servicemen in Japan and uses military bases there free of charge.

The regular bilateral consultations on military issues, conducted within the context of the "security treaty" play an important part in the mechanism of US-Japanese relations. At one such meeting, held in June 1984 in Honolulu, the participants discussed a further acceleration of the aggressive preparations by the US and its Japanese allies in the Asian-Pacific region. According to Tokyo sources, the Nakasone government is becoming ever more active in coordinating combat operations with US armed forces "in case of war in the Far East". According to a top official from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Tokyo "has taken many steps towards meeting US wishes". The statement by S. Abe, Japanese Foreign Minister, to the effect that Tokyo "realises" the need for the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles in the Far East, in conformity with the "US global strategy", was one of these "steps". In this connection, there were press reports that the Japanese "self-defence forces" are ready for joint naval exercises with the US navy, whose warships have been equipped with Tomahawk nuclear missiles.

Military cooperation between Tokyo and Washington is becoming many-sided. Japanese ports have become most important points for the stationing of the ships of the US 7th Fleet, including the latest atomic aircraft carriers. Concrete plans are being elaborated, providing for the participation of Japan's naval forces in combat operations aimed at

⁷ See *Asia and Africa Today*, 1983, No. 3, p. 6 (in Russian); *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 19, 1984; *Pravda*, June 30, 1984.

⁸ *Kunroja*, 1984, No. 15, p. 63.

⁹ *The Korea Herald*, Nov. 11, 1983.

controlling international sea lanes. Old military bases are being modernised, and new ones are being built. For example, on Iwozima Island a strategic base is now constructed half-way between the Japanese Archipelago and US military installations on Guam. Since 1984 anti-submarine patrol planes have been carrying out exercises on a regular basis. Furthermore, in order to cater for the planned deployment of the most up-to-date fighter planes on the island a modern airfield has already been built. The construction of a powerful radar station is nearing completion, and depots for fuel, munitions and materiel have been established. Barracks have also been built and it is planned soon to set up a big naval port.

The NDA has been ever more active, in this or that form (either through direct participation, or by sending observers) in different joint military exercises with the US armed forces, including the Rimpac, Kangaroo naval exercises, and so on. For example, during the joint Japanese-US airforce exercises conducted annually on Okinawa, training is given in "repulsing attacks from the North", in "blocking strategic straits" and in "destroying submarines". In Japan in June 1984, joint staff exercises of the American and Japanese naval officers were held for the first time. In the course of the exercises a "battle for Japan" was imitated on the staff maps, as well as joint actions on the Pacific sea lanes and within the 1,000-mile zone round the Japanese Isles.

In autumn last year the northern army of the Japanese ground forces and the US 9th army held joint military exercises code-named Yamato. The "northern direction" of these military exercises attests to their anti-Soviet character.

The problems of improving combat coordination between the naval forces of the USA, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were worked on during the Rimpac multinational exercises. Over 80 warships, including *Carl Vinson* and *Enterprise* atomic aircraft carriers, whose aircraft are equipped with nuclear weapons, over 250 planes and more than 50,000 officers and men took part in Rimpac-84 exercises.¹⁰ It is known that 50 per cent more Japanese warships and aircraft participated in the exercises than was the case in 1982. The major objective of Rimpac-84 was to coordinate the actions of the Japanese navy with the US 7th Fleet and to gain experience for the "defence of sea lanes".

At the same time the USA is increasingly building up its military presence on the Japanese Islands. Today the Pentagon has 119 military bases and installations in Japan (the respective figure in 1982 was 116). US F-16 fighter-bombers equipped with nuclear weapons are dispatched to Japan. Preparations are almost completed on Misawa air base for the accommodation of 50 such aircraft. US warships in Japan are equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads.

Military and technical cooperation between Japan and the USA is expanding, in fact several hundred joint military projects are being feverishly worked upon. Japan has begun transferring the latest military technology to Washington and the manufacture of various types of weapons is already underway.

A committee for designing a base in outer space has begun to work in Japan. It was set up by the Mitsui Concern, to obtain government orders connected with Japan's participation in the building of a US orbital station which will be a major component in US plans for the militarisation of space. The USA cooperates actively with Japanese concerns in implementing the Pentagon's schemes. A meeting of US specialists with representatives of the NDA and the eight leading Japanese electronic companies was held in Tokyo in July 1984 to discuss specific de-

¹⁰ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 8, 1984.

tails concerning the deliveries of the latest military technology to the USA.

Recent years have seen quicker rates of development of the Japanese war industry. According to Western sources, Japan now manufactures missiles of its own. In 1982 the Japanese companies Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba and Nippon Electric produced missiles worth 100 billion yen and there are plans for manufacturing cruise missiles. According to the available data, Japan wants to have 400 cruise missiles of its own make by 1986. Moreover, the production of conventional armaments is also growing. In effect, with every passing year the militarisation of the Japanese economy is acquiring ever greater dimensions which is especially dangerous for the cause of peace.

Thus, Japan is becoming a major military power, and its role in the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militaristic triangle and in Washington's strategic designs is growing constantly. As a matter of fact, the Japanese Islands have been turned into a huge base for conducting military operations in Asia and for deploying the first-strike weapons targeted on the socialist countries. Present-day Tokyo's political strategy shows increasingly its readiness to follow in the wake of the US global nuclear strategy and its reckless policy in the Asian-Pacific region. "This", Konstantin Chernenko emphasised, "is a dangerous game. More than once Japanese militarism has displayed its expansionist, colonialist essence and more than once it has triggered war. Yet, the revanchist trumpets are again heard from Tokyo, territorial claims are raised. The attempts to repeat history—and this time in a more risky way, in the era of nuclear weapons—cannot but cause anxiety among many Asian states. They will bring no good to Japan either."¹¹ Those who make policy in Tokyo should not forget this.

THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME — A "US ALLY OF TREMENDOUS SIGNIFICANCE"

During his visit to Seoul in November 1983, President Reagan explaining the role of the Seoul regime in US strategic plans stated that the security of South Korea was of key significance for the situation in Northeast Asia as a whole and, in its turn was vital to the security of the United States.¹²

Basing themselves on such an analysis of the role of the Seoul regime in Pentagon's global preparations, the US ruling quarters are stepping up their military presence in South Korea, and promoting in every possible way the strengthening of their satellite in the south of the Korean Peninsula. Alleging there was a military threat from the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Pentagon set about the modernisation of its troops stationed in South Korea. The programme for the withdrawal of US troops from the south of Korea which existed in the mid-1970s has now been completely abandoned. On the contrary, the joint US-South Korean statement published as a result of President Reagan's visit to Seoul stressed that the United States would preserve its troops in South Korea and intensify their capabilities.¹³ The US expeditionary corps in this region possesses considerable potential equipped as it is with nuclear weapons and the latest military hardware.

Additionally, the US Administration has decided to increase its troops in South Korea by 2.5 thousand officers and men by the end of

¹¹ *Pravda*, May 24, 1984.

¹² *The Korea Herald*, Nov. 15, 1983.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

1985.¹⁴ At the close of 1984 it is planned to bring the number of F-16 fighter-bombers to 150.¹⁵ Preparations are under way for the deployment of cruise missiles and neutron weapons. It is becoming evident that South Korea is turning into a major region for the deployment of US forward-based nuclear systems in the Far East.

The study published in the United States and entitled "The Pacific Command: The Structure and Strategy of US Armed Forces in the Pacific" stresses that nuclear mines and the depots storing nuclear artillery shells and air bombs are the principle armaments at the disposal of the US ground forces stationed in South Korea. According to Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Foreign Minister, "South Korea is a huge base or, to be more precise, a network of bases for nuclear weapons."¹⁶ The US have at their disposal in South Korea around 40 military bases and over 40,000 servicemen. According to the well-informed South Korean magazine *Korea Observer*, early in the 1980s apart from the conventional weapons, US troops in South Korea had: 48 F-4 fighter-bombers, each carrying four atomic bombs; nuclear artillery, including 155- and 203 2-mm howitzers with the total number of 104 barrels and 208 nuclear charges; 144 surface-to-air missiles Nike Hercules with nuclear warheads; 4 missile surface-to-surface Honest John installations with 80 atomic charges and 2 Sergeant installations with 12 charges, as well as 50 atomic landmines. Altogether, in South Korea there are 352 systems and 686 nuclear charges with total capacity amounting to 222 kilotons.¹⁷ Early in 1982, the latest F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers also capable of carrying nuclear weapons were stationed in South Korea. In 1984 the US troops obtained the latest Stinger anti-aircraft guided missiles. US warships of the Seventh Fleet carrying nuclear weapons on board make regular calls to the South Korean ports of Pusan and Chinhe.

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and the possibility of their use both on the Korean Peninsula and outside presents an additional destabilising factor in this area of northeast Asia. As is known, during the years of the Korean war the high-ranking political and military leaders of the United States examined the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Korea and in China. At present the US leaders are making irresponsible statements, threatening to use nuclear weapons in Korea. The former Chief of Staff of the US Army stated quite openly that the US Armed Forces in South Korea can, if need be, use tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁸

The military build-up of the Seoul regime is under way. Washington annually provides Seoul with considerable sums for military purposes. In 1984, \$230 million were granted, while in 1985 this figure will rise to \$240 million. In 1985-1989 the USA plans to sell to Seoul military hardware worth \$8 billion, including F-16 aircraft and Hawk and Tow missiles.¹⁹ As a result of US credits, the South Korean army (700,000 officers and men comprising 20 infantry divisions, one motorised division and three divisions of the marines) obtained in 1983 90 launching pads for Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missiles, 144 Hawk missiles, and 14 Honest John tactical missiles. Moreover an agreement was concluded on 38 F-16 aircraft to be sold to Seoul in 1984-1985, and there

¹⁴ *The Korea Herald*, Dec. 18, 1983.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, April 3, 1983.

¹⁷ *Korea Observer*, 1981, Spring, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 48.

¹⁸ Quoted from *Pravda*, Jan. 23, 1983.

¹⁹ *Korea Newsreview*, Feb. 18, 1984.

is a contract for additional deliveries of 155-mm howitzers and A-10 attack aircraft.²⁰

With every passing year the military expenditures of the Seoul regime itself are increasing. They account for 6 per cent of the gross national product (the GNP of South Korea is \$75 billion), or 40 per cent of the state budget. The South Korean war industry continues to develop apace using US licenses. In 1983 3 corvettes were commissioned and in 1984 a destroyer. Since 1983 South Korea has assembled combat helicopters. It is planned to increase, within the next five years, the production of F-5E and F-5 aircraft. In addition, the US and South Korea are co-operating closely in manufacturing a new tank specifically designed for the mountainous terrain of the Far East.²¹

Unceasing tension on the Korean Peninsula is maintained by means of the provocative US-South Korean military exercises which are conducted five times a year.

The biggest of them—Team Spirit—was started in 1976. The 1984 military exercises were noticeable for their scope: 207,000 officers and men, including 140,000 South Koreans and 67,000 Americans took part in them.²² Let us note in passing that in 1976 46,000 servicemen took part in them, including 40,000 South Koreans and 6,000 Americans; in 1977—87,000 (64,000 and 13,000 respectively); in 1978—118,000 (85,000 and 33,000 respectively); in 1979—140,000 (100,000 and 40,000 respectively); in 1980—154,000 (100,000 and 54,000); and in 1981-1982—161,000 (100,000 and 61,000). Moreover, 36,000 officers and men, including the task force of the First Army Corps from the United States, the task force of the Ninth Army Corps from Japan, a brigade of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii, a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division from Guam, a brigade of the 3rd Marine Division of Okinawa, an aircraft carrier shock group, including the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier and other combat ships were dispatched to South Korea. B-52 strategic bombers, attack planes and fighters also took part in the exercises,²³ together with South Korean regular units and reserve detachments. According to Seoul sources, the main objective of the 1984 military exercises was to master offensive operations in the geographic conditions of the Korean Peninsula. Marine landing operations were trained, and the task of ensuring interaction between US and South Korean units and detachments was solved. The exercises were directed by the Commander of the US and South Korean Allied Armed forces. The exercises were carried out under simulated battle conditions. After the exercises were over, the Commander stated that they "demonstrated US readiness to defend South Korea". The "Team Spirit exercises were used by the Seoul regime to whip up tension in the Korean Peninsula. Chun Doo Hwan, head of South Korean administration, made militaristic speeches, calling for ensuring "absolute superiority over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and for a strengthening of military-political cooperation with the United States.

As soon as the Team Spirit-84 exercises were over, the new Milgon-84 US-Seoul exercises started in South Korea. While Team Spirit exercises were aimed against "external enemies", the Milgon exercises were spearheaded against "internal enemies". South Korean army and police together with US troops rehearsed the destruction of "terrorists", i. e., it was a rehearsal of punitive operations against South Korean people coming out for the democratisation of the country and the elimination of the current repressive regime.

²⁰ See *The Korea Herald*, Nov. 24, 1983.

²¹ *The Korea Herald*, Dec. 19, 1983.

²² *Nodon shinmun*, Jan. 16, 1984.

²³ See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, March 25, 1984; *Nodon shinmun*, Jan. 16, 1984; *The Korea Herald*, March 23, 1984.

The intensification of military-political cooperation between the USA and South Korea is discussed annually at the "consultative meeting on security matters". In 1984 such a meeting was held in Seoul with defence ministers participating in it. It was preceded by a session of the US-South Korean military committee attended by Chiefs of Staff, which preliminarily discussed and coordinated all problems submitted to the meeting. The joint communique reveals that the USA and South Korea have reiterated their militaristic designs. C. Weinberger, US Defense Secretary, stated that the American "nuclear umbrella" would continue to ensure the security of the Seoul regime.²⁴

The meeting also discussed the modernisation of the South Korean army. Furthermore, Washington pointed out that USA would work to improve the terms of the military credits given to South Korea.²⁵ Observers agree that both the Pentagon and the Seoul regime have a well greased military and political structure which is being increasingly joined by Tokyo as the third active partner of the US—Japan—South Korea military axis.

SEOUL — TOKYO : A "NEW ERA"

In recent years the United States has been making attempts, and not without success, to draw Japan into military and political cooperation with the South Korean regime, especially since the Japanese strategic concept assigns an important role to South Korea in "ensuring Japan's own security". In January 1983 Y. Nakasone stated in Seoul that "contacts between Japan and South Korea are indispensable for the security of East Asia and Japan itself". Basing themselves on this formula Japan and South Korea, according to political observers, are in favour of the implementation of the US concept of a "tripartite security pact", or the setting up of a military alliance in the Far East and the Pacific. The visits by the Prime Minister of Japan Y. Nakasone to Seoul and Washington in January 1983 marked a qualitatively new stage in US-Japanese-South Korean relations. According to Japanese press reports, Nakasone's trip to South Korea ushered in a "new era" in Japanese-South Korean relations.

Succumbing to US pressure, Japan agreed to grant to the Chun Doo Hwan regime loans on easy terms worth \$4 billion within seven years, beginning from 1983. As a result, a substantial part of the spending for building up South Korean military potential and maintaining US troops on its territory was shifted from the United States on to Japan.²⁶

South Korea and Japan have set up, and continue to improve, their mutual cooperation encompassing different political, economic and military fields. Annual conferences of foreign ministers are held. A decision was made at one such conference, in August 1983, to establish a "consultative diplomatic committee" which was to examine political problems. In addition, a working commission to develop bilateral cooperation in technology was set up.

The parliamentary council on security matters, set up in 1979, has an important part to play in South Korean-Japanese military political cooperation. During a regular meeting in Seoul, in June 1984, South Korean and Japanese representatives reiterated the "need for bilateral cooperation on security matters" and laid the blame for the aggravation of the situation in Korea and around it on the Soviet Union and the

²⁴ *The Korea Herald*, May 11, 1984.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ See *The Korea Herald*, Jan. 13, 1983; *Pravda*, March 1, 1983.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The MPs, however, kept silent about the true reasons for the growing tension in the region, i. e., the greater military preparations of the US, Japan and South Korea which pursue a coordinated militaristic policy in the Far East and on the Korean Peninsula.

The Seoul regime makes statements on the community of security problems of South Korea and Japan. Chun Doo Hwan claims that the two countries are "bound to a single strategic destiny". Under this pretext South Korea bends every effort towards strengthening allround ties with Tokyo. Seoul puts pressure on Japan to obtain from the latter the most up-to-date industrial double-purpose technology. The Japanese government willingly meets the demands voiced by the South Korean regime.

At the same time the two sides are going out of their way to conceal their military cooperation from the public but there are reports of the growing ties between the Defence Ministries of Seoul and Tokyo. The NDA annually sends to South Korea representatives of the Navy, Air Force and Ground Force headquarters to familiarise themselves with the bases and other military installations of the South Korean armed forces. NDA top ranking representatives visit South Korea on a regular basis to "get acquainted with the studies in the field of defence". There is increasing evidence of the interest displayed by Japanese military circles in organising joint military exercises in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, Japanese military observers usually attend the US—South Korean Team Spirit exercises.

In November 1983, the Japanese NDA sent to South Korea for the first time a big group of students from its Military Academy. They went to get acquainted with the training in the naval and airforce colleges of the Seoul army. This trip was made following the one undertaken in the autumn of 1981 by students of the South Korean military school to Japan's "Academy of Defence". Reports leaked in the press that the USA and Japan are planning to send Japanese armed forces to South Korea "in case of emergency".

Chun Doo Hwan's visit to Japan in September 1984 was primarily aimed at accelerating the setting up of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military political axis. Although voices were heard from Tokyo that the two sides exhibit "concern about peace and stability in Asia", in reality the two sides discussed the invigoration of militaristic ties between Japan and South Korea and the greater involvement of Tokyo and Seoul in implementing US imperial schemes in Asia and the Far East. As a result of the meeting between Nakasone and Chun Doo Hwan, an agreement on cooperation between Japanese and South Korean armed forces in blockading international straits and on the joint patrolling of sea lanes was signed. The visit of the Seoul dictator demonstrated that under pressure from Washington the formation of a new militaristic structure with the participation of the USA, Japan and South Korea is gathering momentum and nearing completion.

The efforts by the Soviet Union aimed at guaranteeing universal peace on Earth, include a set of measures which could gradually, step by step, solve the most burning and dangerous problems threatening the cause of peace today. In this context, the Far East and the Pacific area are of particular importance, since it was precisely there that during the postwar period the greatest number of armed conflicts and crisis situations occurred, conflicts which placed the peoples on the verge of a world

catastrophe. The situation in the Far East and the Pacific has certain peculiar features, namely: confrontation between the two socio-political systems as a general trend in the development of the international situation is accompanied by the considerable dissociation of the states in that region, which is a result of many years of colonial domination by the imperialist powers. This dissociation today has been artificially maintained and aggravated by neocolonialist ambitions of the imperialists.

Under such conditions, the question of ensuring a security which would be guaranteed and supported by the countries of the Asian-Pacific area themselves, taking due account of the legitimate interests of all countries concerned is most acute. The resolution of this question would enable all the states of the region and of the whole of Asia to settle their disputes and conflicts not by means of confrontation but at the negotiation table. The Soviet Union maintains that the countries of the region either on a multilateral or bilateral basis, and each of them separately, will not only contribute to the allround elaboration and implementation of the concepts of security, but will also, by their practical steps, promote the elimination of all obstacles on the road towards its realisation. First and foremost, this applies to the liquidation of the hotbeds of tension and mistrust which are really and potentially dangerous to the cause of peace in Northeast Asia and in the whole world.

The Soviet Union is an active proponent of improving the situation in Asia and the Pacific. It came out with the proposal that all countries concerned should hold negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East. The Soviet Union has also suggested that confidence-building measures be extended to the seas and oceans, specifically to those with the busiest sea routes. In March 1982 the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to reach an agreement on the mutual limitation of the activities of the navies belonging to the confronting military blocs, in particular on the withdrawal of missile-carrying submarines of the two sides from the present vast areas of combat patrolling and on the limiting of their operation to mutually agreed boundaries. In 1983, a proposal was advanced in Prague, at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states to conclude an agreement on the mutual non-use of military force and on maintaining relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty states and NATO countries. A proposal was also put forward which sought agreement on restricting the spread of the zone of action of the two blocs to other areas, including the Far East. Mention should be made here of the well-known Soviet initiative on curbing the naval activities and limiting the buildup of naval armaments.

The proposal put forward by Mongolia to conclude a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between Asian and Pacific states met with a positive worldwide response. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have also taken a constructive stand urging to achieve mutual understanding and normalisation of relations between the states of Southeast Asia, and to turn the latter into a zone of peace and stability.

The programme for the unification of the country proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is just part of a series of actions taken by DPRK to ensure peace and security in the region. The prolonged efforts of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the republic, as was pointed out at the 6th Congress of the WPK, are aimed at turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, a zone of peace.

This striving of the WPK was reaffirmed in the joint Declaration of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Socialist Party of Japan signed in Pyongyang as a result of the negotiations between delegations of the WPK and the SPJ. The Declaration proposes to set up a non-nuclear pea-

ceful zone in the area embracing the Korean Peninsula and Japan. The document stresses that in order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to withdraw all nuclear weapons and also to ban the elaboration, testing, manufacturing, owning, import, transfer, stockpiling and use of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. The two parties favoured the elimination of foreign military bases in that region, the pull out of foreign troops and the disbandment of the aggressive military blocs existing there.²⁷

The Soviet Union, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the other socialist countries clearly see the real threat emanating from the imperialist forces in the Far East and the Pacific. During the visit to the USSR of the Party and Government Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il. Sung it was stressed that the USSR and the DPRK will unswervingly pursue a policy of peace and international security, of firmly rebuffing the aggressive ambitions of imperialism, and will persistently and energetically work towards the settlement of international conflicts and crisis situations by peaceful political means.

The US attempts to open an "Eastern front" of struggle against the socialist states, and to create a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militaristic alliance and draw China into it or, as C. Weinberger put it, to turn a triangle into a "square", is just another manifestation of the aggressive character of the policy pursued by the present-day US administration and its accomplices in the region. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Konstantin Chernenko noted: "We are against such a geopolicy, against all kinds of 'spheres of influence' and 'zones of interests', against closed military groupings everywhere and in the Pacific in particular. The latter belongs to everyone, it can and must become an ocean of peace and goodneighbourliness which, rather than disunite nations, would bring them closer together."²⁸

The implementation of these proposals opens up real prospects for easing tensions in Asia, in the Far East and in the Pacific. Such an approach to international affairs is the only reasonable alternative to the militaristic strategy of Washington and its allies.

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²⁷ See *Nodon shinmun*, March 17, 1981; *Pravda*, March 20, 1981.

²⁸ *Pravda*, May 24, 1984.

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 15-24

[Article by A. S. Yermolayev]

The accelerated development of science and technology is one of the most significant features of Vietnam's advance along the socialist road. In a country where 95 per cent of the population was illiterate before the August Revolution of 1945, there are now some 300,000 people with a higher education and about 4,000 Candidates and Doctors of Sciences.¹

When it started to build socialism, Vietnam did not have any facilities worth mentioning for conducting scientific research. Only in 1959 did Vietnam begin to establish its national system to supervise science. Today there are 165 scientific organisations, including 83 research and 21 design institutes² in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In some specific fields Vietnamese scientists have attained world standards.

The Communist Party of Vietnam stresses that in a country which has not experienced capitalist development, using the scientific-technical revolution to solve problems of socialist construction is of decisive importance for economic and social progress and an important means of strengthening the new system and multiplying the people's gains. In recent years the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV CC) adopted a number of decisions defining the aims and tasks of scientific-technical development in the near future, formulating the principles of guiding and directing scientific-technical activity and outlining concrete measures for the utilisation and development of the scientific-technical potential in the country.

In resolving these problems, scientific-technical cooperation with countries of the socialist community, above all with the Soviet Union is considered to be of prime importance.³ Strengthening ties with scientists in socialist countries allows new Vietnamese science to master the accomplishments of world science more rapidly, to study the experience of the organisation and management of science more actively, to engage in joint development projects in which scientific partners are interested, and to train scientific personnel, including in those sectors and along those directions for which the development base is only now being established. Such cooperation allows these scientists to successfully counter the capitalist countries' boycott of the SRV. At the same time, scientific contacts with socialist countries enable Vietnamese scientists to acquaint the international scientific community with the successes achieved by Vietnamese science during the years of popular power.

The first scientific contacts between the Soviet Union and Vietnam were established as far back as the 1950s. The most pressing question at the

¹ See *Pravda*, March 8, 1984.

² See *Izvestia*, March 5, 1984; *Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1983, p. 134.

³ See *5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 166-167.

time was that of training personnel. The first group of Vietnamese students left for the USSR in 1951 at the height of the Vietnamese people's armed struggle against the French colonialists. Seeing the young people off, President Ho Chi Minh said: "The Party is sending you to the Soviet Union to study so that you will faithfully serve your people which needs food and clothing. For this reason you must acquire useful, practical knowledge. I, too, have been in the Soviet Union, and I know that there you will be surrounded by the love of Soviet friends..."⁴

The names of Vietnamese scientists who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1950s are now widely known. Among them are Nguyen Dinh Tu, a Doctor of Sciences (Physics and Mathematics), currently SRV Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, Nguyen Van Hieu, a Doctor of Sciences (Physics and Mathematics) and Foreign Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, now Chairman of the SRV National Research Centre, Le Xuan Thu, a Doctor of Sciences (Biology), now Director of the SRV Institute of Biology, and Professors Le Dui Thux, Pham Dong Dien, Nguyen Trinh Co and many others.

Since then, some 20,000 specialists with higher education, including more than 2,000 Candidates of Sciences and 70 Doctors of Sciences, have been trained in Soviet establishments of higher learning and research institutes.⁵ Many of them have become senior officials in the economy, others teach at institutions of higher education, while still others are conducting extensive research. For example, 30 per cent of the teaching staff at Hanoi University and the Hanoi Polytechnical Institute, including more than one half of the Candidates and Doctors of sciences, studied and defended their theses in the USSR.⁶ In all sectors of work entrusted to them, the scientists, engineers and technicians educated in the Soviet Union demonstrate a high level of knowledge, good scientific and organising abilities, and loyalty to their homeland and the ideals of socialism.

The number of Vietnamese specialists and scientists educated in the Soviet Union is growing every year. The range of directions along which Vietnamese scientists and technicians are trained in the USSR, as well as the share of specialists of the highest qualification undergoing advanced training and retraining in the USSR are also growing. Some 5,000 young people from Vietnam are now being trained within the system of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education alone. They attend lectures and practical classes in 150 educational establishments in 33 Soviet cities.⁷

By offering post-graduate and advance training courses, the scientific establishments of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Union Republic Academies of Science train highly skilled scientific personnel for Vietnam in a whole variety of specialities. Every year a large number of Vietnamese scientists defend theses to become Candidates of Sciences at Soviet academic institutions. Numerous party functionaries study at the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee and other Soviet educational establishments. Senior Vietnamese economic managers study in the USSR at the National Economy Academy and other educational centres of this type. Cooperation in the training of Vietnamese scientific personnel is becoming an increasingly systematic and planned phenomenon, one closely connected with the current and long-term requirements of the economy as a whole and science in particular.

Such forms of cooperation as sending prominent Soviet scientists to Vietnam, major specialists on various topics and themes of particular re-

⁴ *Vietnam*, 1982, No 11, p. 5.

⁵ See *Victory of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship and Allround Cooperation*, Hanoi, 1983, p. 99 (in Vietnamese).

⁶ See *Izvestia*, March 5, 1984.

⁷ See *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1981.

levance to Vietnam are becoming increasingly more effective in recent years due to the drastic growth of the scale of the training and retraining of specialists for various branches of the economy, science and technology in the SRV. One of the advantages of this kind of cooperation is that it enables Soviet scientists to conduct a dialogue with their colleagues which is more relevant to the conditions in which Vietnam now lives, a country that has recently emerged from a long stretch of war and is building the foundation of socialism without going through the capitalist stage of development. In the past three years alone Vietnam was visited by more than a hundred highly competent Soviet scientists—specialists in the most diverse branches of the national economy. They acquainted a large segment of Vietnam's party functionaries, economic managers and scientists with the CPSU's and the Soviet state's experience at various stages of socialist construction in the USSR.

Passing on experience in organising, managing, controlling, and planning research is another key direction of cooperation between Soviet and Vietnamese scientists. Many outstanding Soviet scientists have visited Vietnam over the years to share their experiences with Vietnamese colleagues and hold consultations on the most urgent questions of the development of modern science. Large numbers of Soviet specialists in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, philosophy, political ethnography, archeology, and so forth, visited Vietnam's scientific, economic, linguistics and research institutions and helped work out science programmes.

The Soviet Union helped create the material and technical base for Vietnamese science. The Hanoi Polytechnical Institute, the largest institution of higher education in the SRV, and the Hanoi Agricultural Institute were built and fitted with Soviet assistance.⁸

The construction of the SRV National Research Centre in Hanoi was a big event in the history of Soviet-Vietnamese scientific cooperation. Built with the assistance of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Centre is fitted with diverse scientific equipment. It employs a staff of several thousand researchers, engineers and technicians. It serves as a basis for the development of modern research in physics, mechanics, chemistry, biology, geology and mathematics in the country and maintains regular and close ties with the USSR Academy of Sciences.⁹

A nuclear reactor at the Dalat Centre of the SRV Nuclear Research Institute started operating in 1983. It, too, is a project of Soviet-Vietnamese scientific and technical cooperation. Commissioning the project, Vietnamese scientists won favourable conditions for conducting specialised research in medicine, biology, agriculture and other branches of the national economy.¹⁰ At present, preparations are under way, with Soviet assistance, for the construction of a number of other scientific and research facilities in various parts of the SRV.¹¹

The USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology, Soviet branch institutes and institutions of higher education regularly send the necessary scientific instruments, samples of products and materials, equipment, literature, teaching aids necessary for the conduct of research to the SRV as well as scientific-technical documentation used in designing and building economic projects there. Here is a very typical example. It is well known that a high standard of organisation of scientific-technical information plays an ever growing role in accelerating the development of science and technology. In accordance with a 1980 agreement, Soviet organisations help the SRV in the creation of a state system of scientific-technical information. An exhibition called

⁸ See *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1981.

⁹ See *Bulletin of the USSR Academy of Sciences*, 1980, No. 8, p. 70.

¹⁰ See *New Times*, 1983, No. 44, p. 18.

¹¹ See *Vietnam News*, 1981, No. 7.

"Scientific-Technical Information in the USSR" was held in Hanoi in November 1982. Many Vietnamese specialists visited it. After the exhibition closed, modern equipment, including copying machines and electronic computers, were handed over as a gift to the Vietnamese people.¹²

One of the major factors contributing to the success of the scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the SRV is that both sides constantly devote attention to the organisational aspect of scientific ties, to the development and perfection of the legal basis of mutual relations in this field. The first document regulating Soviet-Vietnamese scientific-technical contacts was signed on March 7, 1959. In accordance with this agreement, on scientific-technical cooperation, the signatories agreed to share experience in various fields, to provide each other with technical documentation and scientific information, and to send specialists to provide technical assistance and to study each other's achievements in science and technology. A Soviet-Vietnamese commission was formed in December 1972 to enact measures to promote cooperation. With the forming of the Inter-Governmental Soviet-Vietnamese Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the former was incorporated in it as a sub-commission.¹³ Twenty-five years of experience has shown that this agency effectively coordinates scientific-technical cooperation.

On May 26, 1961, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Vietnam State Science Committee signed an Agreement on Scientific Cooperation; this was an important step in strengthening Soviet-Vietnamese scientific ties. The signatories agreed to "cooperate by coordinating research in the most important problems, conducting joint studies on themes of mutual interest and rendering each other the necessary scientific assistance". The signatories also agreed "to facilitate the sharing of experience between analogous scientific institutions", "to render each other mutual assistance in the acquisition of materials, instruments, literature, photocopies and microfilms for scientific purposes", "to invite scientists from the other country to the most important conferences, meetings, congresses and other activities held with the participation of foreign scientists", "to give each other mutual support when joining international scientific organisations and to engage in cooperation through their respective representatives".¹⁴ Many problems of much importance for the economies of both countries are being solved on the basis of inter-departmental agreements.

A qualitatively new stage in Soviet-Vietnamese scientific-technical ties, as part of the entire range of relations between the two countries, began with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV in 1978. In order to accelerate socialist and communist construction and steadily increase the material and cultural living standards of the peoples of both countries, the signatories agreed to join efforts to strengthen and expand scientific-technical cooperation.¹⁵ With the signing of the Treaty, scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the SRV became even more purposeful, planned and stable. It encompasses an ever broader spectrum of topics and problems. Today Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in joint research, coordination and mutual consultations encompasses 165 topics directly related to many branches of the economies of the USSR and the SRV.¹⁶

Scientific-technical cooperation at present is characterised by the fact that it is ever more purposefully promoting the solution of the most com-

¹² See *Victory of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship and Allround Cooperation*, p. 107.

¹³ See *Soviet Union-Vietnam. 30 Years of Relations. 1950-1980*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 41, 265.

¹⁴ *Soviet Union and Vietnam. 30 Years of Relations*, p. 55.

¹⁵ See *Visit to the Soviet Union by the Party and Government Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 1-9 November 1978*. Moscow, 1978, p. 15.

¹⁶ See *Pravda*, March 8, 1984.

plex, key problems of the SRV's national economy and providing the scientific support for expanding Soviet-Vietnamese interaction. Soviet scientists constantly keep in mind the solution of scientific-technical problems connected with increasing the output and raising the quality of the SRV's export products, increasing the effectiveness of Soviet aid along the lines of economic cooperation, using production capacities existing in the SRV more efficiently and forming the main branches of the SRV's economy. Soviet and Vietnamese organisations pay prime attention to agriculture, land improvement, water conservation, energy, transportation, standardisation and metrology, and public health.

In agriculture, cooperation encompasses such problems as the application of chemicals, fodder production, plant protection, the creation of highly productive kinds of cereals, technical, vegetable and fodder crops, land use and management, the mechanisation of the cultivation and picking of cotton, silk worm-breeding and bee-keeping.

In 1982, the organisation of two Soviet-Vietnamese experimental selection centres in a suburb of Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, is a good example of the precise linkage of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation with the pressing scientific and practical tasks facing our two countries. As stated in the agreement concluded between the ministries of agriculture of the USSR and the SRV, these selection centres have been set up "to test and use the gene stock of cultivated plants in the selection of cereals, vegetables, technical and fodder crops suited for conditions of cultivation in the USSR and the SRV".¹⁷ The USSR provided these centres with the necessary equipment and sent biologists to the SRV. The two countries' biologists are to test about 10,000 different cereals. Research encompasses 70 various crops. A joint search is on for the most promising sorts and stable forms of new hybrids. Cooperation in plant protection is just as useful.¹⁸

Supplying the textile industry with domestically grown cotton of the standard required is another pressing task facing Vietnam's agriculture workers. Eventually, the country's goal is to forego imported cotton. Soviet cotton growers are giving much assistance to their colleagues in the solution of this problem which is quite complex, considering Vietnam's humid climate. In accordance with the agreement on cooperation in science and technology concluded between the USSR and the SRV, the Soviet Union sends soil specialists and selectionists to Vietnam, who, together with Vietnamese specialists, are drawing up plans for a major cotton-growing zone of about 120,000 hectares in the Gialay-Contum, Phuchanh and Thuanhai Provinces.¹⁹

Much attention is being devoted to Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in the solution of Vietnam's fuel and energy problem. In particular, this includes the construction of a big hydroelectric plant on the Black River, the Trian hydrostation near Ho Chi Minh City, the Phalai thermal power station, the extraction of oil and gas on the continental shelf in the south of the SRV, and coal deposits in the Quangminh basin. Soviet and Vietnamese scientists' cooperation is of great importance in realising this programme. Thus, Soviet and Vietnamese scientists are working on protecting installations and power-transmission lines from destructive storms. Organisations of the USSR Coal Industry Ministry are giving assistance to relevant Vietnamese organisations in working out the technology of working powerful sloping coal seams at Vietnamese mines

¹⁷ *Izvestia*, May 13, 1983.

¹⁸ See *Victory of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship and Allround Cooperation*, p. 103; *Izvestia*, May 13, 1983.

¹⁹ See *Vietnam*, 1983, No. 9.

and improving the transportation of the rock mass in quarries. Considering the special importance of maritime transportation for trade and economic ties between the USSR and the SRV, Soviet and Vietnamese organisations are working out a set of measures within the framework of scientific-technical cooperation intended to raise the efficiency of the merchant marine and ensure the technical maintenance and repair of ships.

Since the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is solving many problems related to the industrialisation of the country, Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in standardisation, quality control and metrology is of growing importance. It enhances the efficiency of social production and the quality of Vietnam's output, facilitates the intensification of scientific-technical cooperation and the creation of common basic standards. Work to unify standards is another important element of cooperation. This will make it possible to apply uniform standards to trade products, to increase the quality of these products and their deliveries, and to effectively solve problems of specialisation and co-production.

Vietnamese botanists and scientists from the Institute of Botany of the USSR Academy of Sciences are engaged in large-scale work on the problem "Vietnam's Flora", which is of much importance for fundamental science and the solution of the SRV's economic tasks. Joint studies with Vietnamese colleagues are being conducted by geologists and biologists of the Far Eastern Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with primary attention devoted to marine biology. Joint ecological field work is also being carried out on the territory of Vietnam.

The cooperation of Soviet and Vietnamese oceanographers is very promising. A joint comprehensive expedition has launched large-scale work in marine biology and oceanology. This programme includes a set of hydrophysical, geological, biological and meteorological research and studies of pollution of the seas. Much attention is being paid to the observation of sea currents. The results of these studies will promote the effective development of Vietnam's fisheries and industry.

Studies of marine resources are being conducted in accordance with the 1978 agreement between the two countries on cooperation in fishing, and recommendations are being worked out on the utilisation and preservation of these resources. Soviet and Vietnamese scientists take part in joint expeditions which yield valuable material on the biological composition of fish resources.²⁰

Geographers from scientific institutions of the two countries are working productively. With the aid of Soviet specialists, Vietnamese scientists are drawing up a geographical atlas of Vietnam. The compilation of maps of the country's remote areas was an important step in this extensive work. The latest survey equipment was used for this research, and surveying was done from both planes and satellites. Many maps of vegetation, land use, geological, geomorphological and other maps are being corrected by means of space research.

The contribution made by Soviet geologists to the establishment and development of the Vietnamese national geological service is well known. A geological map of Northern Vietnam on a scale of 1 : 500,000 has been drawn up in collaboration with Soviet specialists, and a search is on for many types of useful minerals and resources.²¹

Cooperation in tropical meteorology and the study of hurricanes has produced interesting results. The joint Soviet-Vietnamese laboratory that has been set up in Vietnam has modern equipment. MRL-6 meteorological radars and other radars are located in Haiphong, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City. The laboratory has at its disposal an Il-18 plane fitted out

²⁰ See *Izvestia*, June 3, 1982.

²¹ See *Vietnam News*, 1979, No. 1.

for research. Its flights help in the study of atmospheric phenomena over the sea where many typhoons originate.²²

Soviet and Vietnamese scientists studying problems of the atmosphere have been cooperating already for more than twenty years. Scientists from the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism, Ionosphere and Dissemination of Radio Waves of the USSR Academy of Sciences have supplied their Vietnamese colleagues with equipment for vertical probes of the ionosphere and equipment for radio beacon tracking of signals from earth satellites. Plans for cooperation envisage the creation of a comprehensive radiophysical laboratory in the SRV capable of conducting precise and regular observations of processes in the ionosphere. All this makes it possible to more thoroughly understand a whole number of physical problems and opens new prospects for the study of the condition of the way radio waves move in low latitudes.²³

Soviet chemists have a good working relationship with their Vietnamese colleagues. Thus, a group of scientists from the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences are working together with Vietnamese researchers on the "Tropicalisation of Materials and Mechanisms". Scientists from Soviet academic institutes are giving much assistance to their Vietnamese colleagues in the study of the aftermath of the use of toxic chemicals by the United States armed forces in Vietnam.²⁴ In particular, the results of this work were used at an international scientific symposium that was held in Ho Chi Minh City in 1983. At this symposium, scientists from 26 countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, France, the FRG and Japan, discussed the American army's large-scale use of chemicals which has led to such horrible consequences for the health of the local population and the environment.

Ties between Soviet and Vietnamese scientists effected within the framework of the multilateral cooperation among CMEA countries are becoming stronger. The General Agreement on the multilateral cooperation of scientists from socialist countries in assisting the accelerated development of science and technology in the SRV through 1990, signed in January 1981, helped enhance cooperation.²⁵ This document envisages measures to assist the SRV in providing its research centres with the necessary modern equipment and materials, in the training and retraining of scientific personnel, in conducting research and in setting up individual scientific installations.

In accordance with this agreement, the Soviet side takes part in fitting out four scientific-technical installations (the research institutes for the mechanisation of agriculture, coal and communications and the centre for testing farm machinery) and in solving scientific-technical problems in agriculture, medicine, health protection, geology, and atomic energy in Vietnam.

The SRV's participation in the Intercosmos programme opens up big possibilities for invigorating Vietnamese research in the peaceful uses of outer space. Within the framework of this programme, Vietnamese scientists conduct research in the astrophysics, biology, chemistry, meteorology, radio communications and geological prospecting.²⁶

A space flight by the joint Soviet-Vietnamese crew, consisting of V. Gorbatko and Pham Tuan, in 1980 was convincing evidence of the high level of interaction between the USSR and the SRV in science. Vast scientific data was collected during the flight. The results of this space mission were summed up at a scientific conference in Hanoi in

²² See *Pravda*, Jan. 3, 1984.

²³ See *Izvestia*, Nov. 23, 1982.

²⁴ See *20th Century and the World*, 1983, No. 7.

²⁵ See A. Voronin, I. Ognetov. *Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1981, p. 95.

²⁶ See *Vietnam News*, 1980, No. 8.

May 1982. Representatives of the USSR, the GDR, Bulgaria and the SRV made 26 reports. The speakers noted the great practical importance of the information gathered during the flight about our planet, its water, timber and mineral resources.²⁷

Cooperation between Soviet and Vietnamese social scientists, united by their common methodological and ideological approach to the phenomena being studied, is becoming ever stronger. These scientists concentrate their attention on the study of key problems in the theory and practice of socialist construction. This concerns, first of all, studies of the principles of socialism, the transition from small production to large-scale socialist production, the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolution in production relations, ideology and culture, and in science and technology. Questions of socialist industrialisation, the collectivisation of agriculture, the organisation and management of the national economy and questions of party building should hold an important place in scholars' studies. A whole range of studies is to be conducted in the fields of history, archeology, linguistics, ethnography, literature and art.²⁸ Soviet and Vietnamese scholars see their most important task in exposing and criticising "theories" and views held by modern bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, opportunists of the right- and "left"-wing type that are alien to Marxism-Leninism.

Social scientists of both countries have started joint studies of problems of philosophy, history, sociology, ethnography, philology, literature, economics, and the state and law. The joint writing of monographs is becoming more and more common. Joint works have already been published on the role of the working class in the Vietnamese revolution, on the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam, on problems of the transition to socialism bypassing capitalist development. Joint works have also been published criticising the policy and ideology of neo-colonialism and studying the socio-economic problems of postwar Vietnam. Linguists have achieved important results in their cooperation. They have described four languages of the peoples of Vietnam which had not been studied previously, compiled dictionaries of these languages, and gathered folklore materials. *The Traditional and the New in the Literatures of Southeast Asia*, the first joint Soviet-Vietnamese study of questions of philology, was published in the SRV in 1982. Studies of other topical problems have also begun.

Such forms of cooperation as holding bilateral scientific conferences and symposiums are being used more and more frequently. For instance, the contribution made by Soviet and Vietnamese scientists to the planning and actual implementation of the task of the participation of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas in the USSR's trade and economic cooperation with Vietnam. The results of the scientific symposiums held in Khabarovsk in October 1980 and in Ho Chi Minh City in November 1982 attracted the attention of the scientific public and state agencies in the USSR and the SRV. This was reflected in the Long-Term Programme for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, signed during the visit of a Soviet Party and Government delegation to Vietnam in 1983.²⁹

The experience of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in science and technology convincingly shows that Soviet and Vietnamese scientists have

²⁷ See *Victory of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship and All-Round-Cooperation*, p. 101.

²⁸ See *IV Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1977, p. 79.

²⁹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 4; *New Times*, 1983, No. 41, p. 31.

created a good foundation for the solution of ever greater problems. It was stressed in the long-term programme for economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the SRV that our countries would create the necessary conditions for the accelerated development of science and technology in the SRV. Soviet organisations will provide assistance in fitting Vietnamese institutes and laboratories with the necessary equipment and materials. The exchange of specialists will be conducted on a large scale. The signatories found it necessary to deepen cooperation in joint research of mutual interest.

Guided as they are by the long-term programme, various ministries, agencies and organisations of our countries have started coordinating on problems and topics of forthcoming work. Thus, Soviet and Vietnamese scientists are cooperating in drawing up the master plan for the development and siting of Vietnam's productive forces and the perfection of the organisation of scientific-technical progress. Joint studies are being conducted by a number of sectoral ministries which are actively participating in bilateral cooperation.³⁰

The growing scope and qualitative level of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in science and technology have set the goals of tapping new reserves for the further stable growth of these ties and new possibilities for making them even more flexible, prompt and effective. The successful achievement of these goals would facilitate the more rapid implementation of the latest scientific-technical accomplishments in socialist construction in Vietnam and open up new opportunities for the development of science and technology in the SRV, the creation of its own reliable scientific-technical base and for the transition to more active forms of joining the scientific and technical revolution in progress.

The further development of direct ties between sectoral ministries and agencies can play a positive role in this. Such development would speed up the solution of many organisational matters, facilitate specialisation and cooperation in research and in the introduction of the results of this work in practice, enhance the development of stable long-term and mutually advantageous ties of an intra-sectoral nature and increase the responsibility of the ministries in question for the introduction of the achievements of science and technology in production. Evidently, the time has come in Soviet-Vietnamese scientific-technical relations to expand joint studies and to show greater daring in the creation of joint collectives and laboratories. It is also important to further consolidate the contractual principles of cooperation to precisely determine the obligations of cooperating organisations.

The more extensive involvement of the scientific potential of Soviet and Vietnamese universities and other establishments of higher education into joint development and research closely connected with economic tasks could also be of considerable importance. These possibilities become more obvious if we recall that direct ties presently exist between 22 Vietnamese establishments of higher education and 23 Soviet ones.³¹

The experience of interaction in the social sciences accumulated by a number of socialist countries shows that such measures as the establishment of a comprehensive commission, for instance, could facilitate the perfection of the cooperation of Soviet and Vietnamese social scientists and the raising of the level of coordination of their joint studies. The tasks of such a commission would include the drawing up of long-term plans of topical research by the two countries, control over their fulfilment, analysis of the state of research into individual key problems of mutual interest, the preparation of monographs, scientific reports and the organisation of conferences on problems of major interest, assistance

³⁰ See *Izvestia*, March 5, 1984.

³¹ See *Victory of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship and All-Round Cooperation*, p. 93.

ce in the training of social scientists, the sharing of experience in the organisation of research and scientific activity, assistance in reviewing and publishing works by Soviet and Vietnamese scientists in the USSR and the SRV.

Deepening scientific-technical ties, linking them still closer to the tasks of socialist and communist construction in our countries as formulated by the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the 5th Congress of the CPV, Soviet and Vietnamese scientists are fully resolved to perfect the forms and methods of their interaction and to increase its effectiveness. The experience accumulated in the USSR and the SRV convincingly shows that scientific-technical cooperation is becoming greater in scope and will further serve as one of the cardinal factors to promote the successful fulfilment of the programme for Vietnam's socio-economic development.

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FINANCIAL, POLITICAL AIMS OF PRC-JAPAN 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP'

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[Article by Professor D. V. Petrov, doctor of historical sciences: "Japanese-Chinese Relations: Problems and Trends"]

The six years since the signing of the Japanese-Chinese "treaty of peace and friendship" on August 12, 1978 have witnessed a rapid development of relations between Japan and the PRC in all spheres: political ties have expanded drastically, the volume of trade has increased, firm contacts in the field of culture, art, sport and tourism have been established. The Japanese press now often writes about the "special nature" of Sino-Japanese relations, stressing the importance the Japanese foreign policy attaches to China, and at the same time the growing rapprochement of China towards Japan unequalled in scope by any other capitalist country.

The Chinese and Japanese leaders have also repeatedly noted the exceptionally close friendly relations between the two countries. "Sino-Japanese relations are at their height today",¹ declared the Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe. During a conversation with journalists after a dinner in his residence in honour of Prime Minister Nakasone who visited Peking together with his family, the General Secretary of the CPC CC Hu Yaobang quoted with deep satisfaction the words of the Japanese guest: "Relations between Japan and China have successfully developed and now reached a new stage when souls become one".²

"China and Japan do not have any urgent outstanding issues," stressed Liu Shuqing, head of the Asia Department of the Chinese foreign ministry. "As we advance along the road of friendship and cooperation it becomes wider and wider."³

Such laudatory assessments of the present state of Sino-Japanese relations testify to the important place they occupy in the foreign policy of both countries.

RELATIONS INSIDE THE WASHINGTON-TOKYO-PEKING TRIANGLE

The end of 1983 and beginning of 1984 were marked by an unprecedented scale of activities in the foreign policies of China, the United States and Japan, resulting in a noticeable rapprochement between all sides in the Washington-Tokyo-Peking triangle.

One of the main reasons behind this process was the drastic aggravation of the international situation after the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe were frustrated by the United States in November 1983, the Washington's intention to spread the arms race to the Asian-Pacific region, to change the balance of forces in that region through Japan's increasing role in its strategic military system, and to draw closer to China with the aim of playing the "Chinese card" in relations with the USSR.

¹ *Sankei shimbun*, 13 March, 1984.

² *Renmin ribao*, March 25, 1984.

³ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 21, 1983.

These aims underlied a series of Washington's foreign policy actions which the State Department described as President Reagan's "new doctrine" providing for a shift of priorities in America's foreign policy from Western Europe to Asia and the Pacific. Special attention is devoted in this respect to relations with China, so as to bring it closer in one form or another to military alliances linking the United States with Japan and South Korea. Noting the "growing recognition among leading political figures of the importance of Japan, China and the Korean peninsula for the United States", the State Department stressed Washington's crucial task of "consolidating this part of the world to turn it into a bulwark preventing the spread of Soviet influence."⁴

Vigorous steps to strengthen and expand the military alliance with Japan were taken within the framework of Reagan's "new doctrine". Possibilities of further building up Japan's military potential and expanding its contribution to the military strategic system of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region were studied in close interaction with trade, economic and political problems during visits to Tokyo by President Reagan (November 9-12, 1983), Vice President Bush (May 8-10, 1984) and Secretary of Defence Weinberger (May 11-12, 1984) and also during the visit to Washington by Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abe (January 26-February 2, 1984).

In their desire to restrain the sway of protectionist sentiment in the US and the attempts to use trade differences with Japan as tool in the election campaign, representatives of the Japanese government came out with assurances of their invariable readiness to give full support to the US policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and increasing international tension.

As new steps were taken to strengthen their military-political alliance the United States and Japan focused particular attention on relations with China on the basis of the 1979 communique after talks between Prime Minister Ohira and President Carter which envisaged a close coordination of the positions of both countries in their relations with Peking.⁵

Despite the certain differences in the forms and methods of their rapprochement with China the aims of both countries fully coincide. By developing trade and economic ties, and also by granting China the latest equipment and technology, including those for military uses, they strive to draw it into the orbit of the world capitalist economy, impede the process of socialist construction and tear China farther away from the socialist community. In the military and political aspects priority is given to preventing the improvement of China's relations with the Soviet Union and drawing it into the general imperialist strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. "President Reagan is alarmed that relations between China and the Soviet Union may improve"⁶, the Japanese press stressed, pointing to the primary goal in the policies of both countries.

The extremely intensive exchange of visits in recent time is evidence of the interest the United States and Japan show in developing relations with China and also of the Chinese leaders' readiness to maintain closer ties with these countries.

A series of talks was held between the Chinese and American leadership. After visits to Peking by the US Secretary of State Shultz (February 1983), Secretary of Trade Baldrige (May 1983), Secretary of Defence Weinberger (September 1983) and the trip to Washington by the PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian (October 1983), the United States

⁴ *Mainichi Daily News*, Jan. 1, 1984.

⁵ See *Japanese Foreign Policy Review*, Tokyo, 1980, No. 24, p. 395.

⁶ *Japan Times*, Jan. 15, 1984.

was visited by the Premier of the PRC's State Council Zhao Ziyang (January 6-16, 1984). The discussion of a wide range of questions of bilateral relations and key international problems was continued during President Reagan's visit to the PRC (April 26-30, 1984). Problems related to launching practical US-Chinese cooperation in the military field were discussed during the visit of the PRC Defence Minister Zhang Aiping to the United States (June 11-27, 1984).

Results of these meetings showed that Washington had succeeded in securing the Chinese leaders' support of its positions on a number of important issues. Deng Xiaoping, for instance, directly told Reagan that China had nothing against the buildup of armaments by the United States and that it always supported these measures of the US government.⁷ Such pronouncements showed that during talks with Reagan the PRC leaders "in their assessment of the situation in the world put an equation mark between the imperialist, militaristic policy of the United States and the peaceloving, essentially anti-war policy of the countries of the socialist community".⁸

The development of ties with the United States was formalised during Zhao Ziyang's and Reagan's visits in agreements and protocols on cooperation in the field of industry and technology, management of science and technology in industry, cooperation in the field of scientific and technical information, in utilising nuclear energy, on the development of cultural ties and on the abolition of the dual taxation of American companies operating in China.

Much prominence was given to the agreement on arms sales to China in force since November 1983 on the basis of new export control regulations, providing for a radical easing of restrictions on the delivery to the PRC of military technology and double-purpose high-technology from the USA. The number of licences issued by the US Department of Trade for the export of such products to the PRC increased from 1,500 (\$ 469 million) in 1981 to 3,300 (\$ 1.2 billion) in 1983. At least 3,600 licences worth about \$ 2 billion are expected to be granted in 1984.⁹

All these agreements will permit China's trade and economic ties with the United States to grow and this surely will have an effect on political relations. In one of his speeches in the United States Zhao Ziyang stressed that it is impossible to isolate economic relations completely from political considerations and that the development of Sino-American economic ties will promote the development of political relations between the two countries.¹⁰

The development of US-Chinese ties is also supplemented to a considerable extent by rapprochement on another side of the triangle, that is between Japan and the PRC. From the viewpoint of ensuring the country's peace and security, Japan's ruling circles regard it necessary to establish and develop friendly relations with one of its closest neighbours, the PRC. Japanese monopolies hope to turn China into an important market for their manufactured goods, a source of long-lasting deliveries of raw materials and fuel and a would-be recipient of Japanese capital, given that no changes will occur in the Chinese "open doors" policy. By coordinating positions on a number of international issues Tokyo would like to avert a possible clash in the struggle for influence in Asia and to strengthen its positions in the world.

But the primary goal of Japan's policy is to prevent a possible improvement of relations between China and the Soviet Union, achieving in

⁷ *Washington Post*, April 29, 1984.

⁸ *Izvestia*, May 4, 1984.

⁹ In *Japan Times*, Jan. 1, 1984.

¹⁰ *Mainichi Daily News*, Jan. 13, 1984.

this way the class aims of world imperialism. Referring to a statement by Japanese foreign ministry spokesmen the press wrote that "at present one of the aims of Japan's policy in respect of the PRC is to impede a normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations".¹¹ It is to this task that all the steps taken by Japan both in the political and economic spheres are ultimately subordinated.

When formulating the basic principles underlying relations with China the former Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda directly pointed to the need to proceed from the political aims of capitalist countries in dealing with questions related to economic aid to China. The West must show a positive approach to cooperation with Peking in modernising China's economy and thus incorporate it into the economic structure of the Western world, Sonoda stated at the meeting of the heads of government of the "Seven" leading imperialist powers in Ottawa in July 1981. Japan he stressed takes a lead in these efforts.¹²

The government's position is in full agreement with the views of Japan's business circles. I. Inayama, the President of the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), the leading organisation of monopoly capital, also expressed the prevailing attitude of big capital when he wrote that "for Japan economic cooperation with China is not just an economic issue. The problems of developing economic cooperation," he stressed, "should be regarded in connection with talks between the 'Soviet sphere' and the 'free economy sphere', in which China should also be included".¹³

The Japanese financial oligarchy thus directly ties in the economic relations with China with political aims and often shows readiness to forego immediate profit for the sake of the long-term tasks of separating China from the world socialist community. It aims at drawing it as deeply as possible into the world capitalist economy, confident that this will make it possible to bring pressure on the PRC's political line.

Special emphasis is laid here on attempts to encourage the PRC's rapprochement with the United States within the framework of the Peking-Washington-Tokyo triangle. Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party noted in its official mouthpiece that Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Peking in March 1984 was "directed at intensifying cooperation between Japan, the United States and China".¹⁴ Commenting on this admission, Japan's opposition stressed that "underlying the visit is the strategic plan of winning China over to the side of the Western alliance in accordance with the policy of President Reagan's administration".¹⁵

THE NATURE OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONS"

China's "special" relations with Japan find their expression in the extremely ramified mechanism of contacts and ties, which ensures a rapid solution of the emerging problems and a high degree of mutual confidence. It is likewise embodied in the wide scope of trade and economic ties, in the commonality of positions on a wide range of international problems and, lastly, in the evident readiness of both countries to preserve and develop friendly ties "for ever".

China and Japan have very close contacts on the government level. Meetings of the top leaders of both countries are held regularly. During the six years since the signing of the "treaty of peace and friendship"

¹¹ *Akahata*, March 23, 1984.

¹² *Daily Yomiuri*, March 25, 1984.

¹³ *Keidanren geppo*, 1979, No. 2.

¹⁴ *Jiyu shimpo*, Jan. 24, 1984.

¹⁵ *Akahata*, March 23, 1984.

Japan has been visited by the Premiers of the PRC State Council Hua Guofeng (May 27-June 1, 1980) and Zhao Ziyang (May 31-June 5, 1982) and the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Hu Yaobang (November 23-30, 1983). Visits were also made by Deputy Premiers of the PRC State Council Deng Xiaoping (October 22-29, 1978 and February 6-8, 1979), Gu Mu (September 2-13, 1979), Yui Qiuli (April 1-15, 1980) Huang Hua (December 15-16, 1981) and Li Peng (August 30-September 11, 1984). Talks in Tokyo by the PRC Defence Minister Zhang Aiping (July 7-10, 1984) were also important.

In the same period China was visited by the Japanese Premiers Ohira (December 5-9, 1979), Suzuki (September 26-October 1, 1982) and Nakasone (March 23-26, 1984) and also by Secretary General of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party Nikaido (February 18-21, 1983).

Such intensive exchange of visits at summit level demonstrates the importance both countries attach to their bilateral relations.

Beginning in 1980 conferences of ministers with 6-7 top executive officials of leading ministries and agencies taking part from each side are held regularly in addition to the summit meetings. Japanese delegations are usually headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs and those from the PRC by Deputy Premier of the State Council. Such conferences were held on December 3-5, 1980 (Peking), December 15-16, 1981 (Tokyo) and September 4-6, 1983 (Peking) and provided an opportunity to thoroughly discuss the broadest spectrum of political and economic questions and to adopt appropriate decisions. China does not hold such meetings with any other country while Japan holds them only with the United States and even then on a less regular basis.

In addition, agreements have been concluded on the holding, on a permanent basis, in Peking and Tokyo alternating between themselves, of annual consultations between ministers of foreign affairs, top officials of the State Planning Committee of the PRC and the Economic Planning Board (Agency) of Japan, between the State Economic Committee of the PRC and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry of Japan. Regular working ties have also been established virtually between all the leading ministries of the two countries.

Constant contacts on the local level between representatives of the political leadership and economic organisations of individual Chinese provinces and Japanese prefectures are also of much importance. They make it possible to diversify all types of ties and to exercise them on a large scale; 57 cities in China and Japan had proclaimed themselves twin cities by the end of 1983.

The formation of a relatively firm material basis as a result of the high level of development of trade and economic ties is another salient feature of Sino-Japanese relations. Japan has left behind the other developed capitalist countries in terms of the scale, the degree of diversification, multiplicity of forms, the number of industries involved and the geography of infiltration of the Chinese economy.

The biggest monopolies that dream of conquering the Chinese market, exert a substantial influence on the Japanese government's positions. On the other hand, the striving of Japan's ruling circles to attain major political goals and, first of all, to impede the development of China's ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries using the economic levers largely determines their approach to trade and economic relations with China and makes them unique and different in many respects from relations with other countries.

The volume of Sino-Japanese trade is growing at a high rate. Despite a certain slump in 1982 it grew 190 per cent in the period from 1977 to 1983 and reached \$ 10 billion.¹⁶ As a result Japan became not only

¹⁶ See *Economic Statistical Yearbook*, 1983, Tokyo, 1984, p. 236.

China's biggest trade partner, but also an indispensable one. China's trade with Japan exceeds the trade turnover with the United States, the FRG, Britain, France, and Italy taken together and in 1983 it accounted for 43.8 per cent of the overall trade with developed capitalist countries. This figure will be much bigger if we count re-export through Hong Kong.

Such a rapid development of trade turnover became possible largely due to the extensive support that Japanese companies get from the state. The two waves of China's cancellation of the earlier concluded contracts (in February-March 1979 and in the spring of 1980) brought Japanese companies the loss of about \$ 1.5 billion and spread serious doubts among the country's business circles about China as a reliable trade partner. Although the damage was largely compensated in subsequent years by the renewal of the contracts, the granting of new government-financed orders to the firms involved, and other measures, Japanese companies became extremely wary about trade and economic ties with the PRC and especially about making investments in the creation of their branches or joint enterprises in the PRC. According to Chinese data, of 188 joint companies founded by late 1983, Japanese capital joined only 13 of them.

In this connection, during his meeting with Nakasone in Peking on March 26, 1984 Deng Xiaoping urged to take every measure to encourage the influx of private capital to China and expressed hope that "not hundreds, but thousands of Japanese industrialists will invest their capital in China's economy".¹⁷

In addition to the credit of 300 billion yen (\$ 1.3 billion) that China was granted in 1979-1983 Nakasone promised during his visit to Peking to grant in 1984-1990 another credit worth 470 billion yen (\$ 2.130 billion) on easy terms at a 3.5 per cent interest rate. This credit is expected to be used to finance seven major projects, including the modernisation of railways, the expansion of sea ports, the building of hydropower stations and the development of the telephone network in Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou.¹⁸

The purpose of this powerful state support is to pave the way for Japanese export to the PRC, stimulate private capital to engage in even more daring operations in the Chinese market and to create a basis for expanding the positions of Japanese monopolies in the Chinese economy. In the long-term context, it is directed at binding China as closely as possible within the world capitalist economy so as to have the possibility of exerting pressure on its political course.

The same aims are pursued by the rapidly expanding participation of Japanese banks not only in financing but also in consultation services embracing whole branches of production; 15 Japanese banks have opened their offices in the PRC as compared to five US and five French banks. Altogether, 48 Japanese banks maintain business relations with China.

Various forms of scientific and technical assistance both from individual enterprises and branches of the economy are growing in importance. Thus, an agreement with the "Nippon seitetsu" company on technical assistance in the training of personnel for the Baoshan steel works was signed early in 1983. In 1984 alone Japan received and trained 1,000 Chinese technical specialists, and starting with June 1985 it will send to the PRC 300 of its engineers for an 8-month training course. China will pay 20 billion yen (about \$ 100 million) for this aid.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Asahi shimbun*, March 27, 1984.

¹⁸ In *Daily Yomiuri*, March 25, 1984.

¹⁹ In *Japan Economic Journal*, March 20, 1983.

The agreement signed in Tokyo on May 28, 1980 on scientific and technical cooperation is also important from the viewpoint of implementing the programme of "four modernisations". It provides for assistance rendered by both governments to the exchange of scientists and technical specialists, the organisation of conferences and symposiums, the joint research undertakings and exchange of scientific and technical information.

On the basis of this agreement a large number of contracts were signed in 1981-1983 under which Japanese specialists will be delegated to the enterprises that are to be modernised to work out modern forms of organising production, quality control, labour management and material incentives, raising labour productivity, etc. More Chinese specialists undergo training at Japanese higher education establishments or directly at enterprises.

China is also showing much interest in using the Japanese experience in the development of nuclear power generation. An unofficial agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed in Peking on September 3, 1981 by representatives of the PRC government and the Atomic Industrial Forum of Japan which unites virtually all the leading companies and research centres involved in nuclear energy production. The agreement envisaged an exchange of information, joint research into radio isotopes and the training in Japan of Chinese specialists for work at nuclear power stations.

However, the absence of an inter-state agreement remained a serious obstacle in the way to developing cooperation. In March 1984, following the lengthy talks, an accord was finally reached on almost all the key points. China undertook to utilise the imported equipment and materials only for peaceful purposes and also consented de facto to allow Japanese experts to inspect atomic power stations by way of "friendly visits".²⁰

Without waiting for an official agreement the Japanese government approved the delivery to the PRC by Mitsubishi Jukogyo of pumps and other components for a 450,000 kw-power-generating unit to be installed at the atomic power station under construction near Shanghai.

At the same time the Japanese leadership took steps to exploit China's interest in getting equipment from Japan and ensure thereby permanent deliveries of uranium from the PRC in exchange. An agreement on cooperation in uranium prospecting in Yunan province was signed in Peking on May 18, 1984, pioneering the foreign capital access to studying uranium deposits in China.

The Japanese ruling circles and private capital attach much importance to using economic, scientific and technical assistance, including the training of personnel, as an opportunity for ideological indoctrination of Chinese industrial and office workers to convince them of the acceptability and need to introduce capitalist methods of management. Through higher wages at mixed enterprises the Japanese monopolies are trying to introduce paternalistic ideas of the unity of the interests of labour and capital, and thereby undermine the mainstay of the socialist consciousness in the Chinese working people employed at these enterprises.

Thus, on the initiative of Fujian Hitachi Television, the Japanese company that produces TVs jointly with the Chinese, all its employees wear uniforms, a company anthem has been composed and a special magazine is published. Other Japanese methods of "boosting workers' morale" are also being introduced. *Japan Economic Journal*, a mouthpiece of Japan's business circles, noted with satisfaction the "exceptio-

²⁰ *Japan Times*, March 17, 1984.

nally great loyalty of workers" at this plant and expressed the view that Fujian Hitachi was a "model" for new mixed enterprises.²¹

IN DISREGARD OF THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA

The "special nature" of Sino-Japanese relations manifests itself increasingly in the high degree of commonality of positions on a number of key international problems. Thus, similar or very close views on the problems of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and on the defensive measures taken by the Soviet Union in the Far East were expressed in the course of the summit talks in Tokyo and Peking, and support was voiced by both sides for the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Japan's representatives worked hard to make China approve their position on the so-called "military threat" posed by the Soviet Union. In his attempts to justify the policy of Japan's militarisation and the further strengthening of military cooperation with the United States, Prime Minister Nakasone repeatedly stressed the danger of "the growing Soviet military threat in the Far East" in connection with the deployment of SS-20 missiles.²² China actually supported this position. Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian of the PRC declared that "China and Japan are most concerned over the Soviet Union's continuous boosting of the number of SS-20 missiles in the Far East". According to him, an agreement was reached in the course of talks with his Japanese opposite number Abe, intended to request a drastic reduction of the SS-20 missiles in the Far East and their immediate liquidation by the Soviet Union. They also agreed "to maintain contacts and exchange information on this matter".²³

During his meeting with Nakasone in Peking Deng Xiaoping confirmed that "the buildup of Soviet military might in Asia is an object of China's and Japan's common concern".²⁴ But he failed to mention that the Soviet measures are essentially defensive and that it is the United States, which is spiralling the nuclear arms race, and is really responsible for the mounting tension in the Far East.

Japan's ruling circles also responded with great satisfaction to China's support for their unlawful and groundless claims to the islands of the Smaller Kuril Chain. When visiting Hokkaido Wu Xueqian declared that "China resolutely supports Japan's demand for the return of the four northern islands".²⁵

Both sides mutually supported the course towards beefing up military potentials, which is a major aspect of rapprochement between China and Japan in military-political field. Hu Yaobang stated that "Japan's need to possess an impressive potential for self-defence is quite understandable".²⁶ He expressed hope that Japan would continue to develop as a great power possessing a sufficient defence potential.²⁷

In the Japanese foreign ministry these statements are viewed as evidence of China's understanding "of the principles underlying Japan's efforts to increase its defence capability".²⁸

On the other hand, such statements by the Chinese leaders cannot

²¹ *Japan Economic Journal*, Feb. 21, 1984.

²² *In Japan Times*, Nov. 25, 1983.

²³ *Asahi shimbun*, Nov. 28, 1983.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, March 25, 1984.

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 27, 1983.

²⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 2, 1983.

²⁷ *Japan Times*, Nov. 27, 1983.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

but alarm the Japanese progressive forces which view them as an outright encouragement of the militaristic ambitions of the country's ruling circles.

Japanese representatives for that matter, did not condemn the PRC leadership's strategy of modernising the armed forces, the intensive development of nuclear arms and delivery vehicles, the refusal to stop nuclear weapon tests and accede to international treaties and agreements directed at limiting the nuclear arms race.

Lastly, the fourth specificity of the PRC's rapprochement with Japan is the readiness displayed by both countries to spare no effort in developing long-term friendly ties regardless of changes in the internal political situation, in the international situation and in the relations of each of the two countries with third states.

Addressing the Japanese parliament Hu Yaobang expressed confidence that "even if differences of views arise between us in the future, China and Japan will be able to deepen their friendship and cooperation".²⁹

Nakasone in his turn told a group of Chinese journalists before his visit to Peking that "in no storms whatsoever must we allow any slackening of friendship and cooperation between Japan and China".³⁰

The agreement to create a "Sino-Japanese Committee of Friendship in the 21st Century" was another demonstration of the determination of both sides to regard the development of friendly ties as a paramount task not only in the current period but also in the next century. The Committee will work out measures aimed at further developing cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields.

China's rapprochement with Japan on the basis of "special relations" cannot but influence the political situation in the Asian-Pacific region. It takes place first of all within the framework of the relations of both countries with the United States. Although Japan primarily seeks to attain its own aims in the inter-imperialist struggle for political and economic influence on the PRC, it strives at the same time to maximally safeguard the interests of the imperialist camp as a whole as it attempts to drive a wedge between China and the world socialist community. So the rapprochement between the two countries serves the interests of world imperialism, strengthens the positions of the United States and Japan in the Far East, and gives them a chance to play the "Chinese card" in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

The establishment of "special relations" between China and Japan creates new obstacles in the way to creating a lasting system of peace and security in Asia.

During his talks with Nakasone on November 24, 1983 Hu Yaobang stated that "full accord" exists between Japan and China "concerning efforts directed at achieving stability in the Asia-Pacific region".³¹ But neither he nor Nakasone had set forth any concrete proposals that could really promote a stronger peace. Tokyo contends that the strengthening of its military alliance with the United States and the non-stop buildup of its military might is virtually Japan's "contribution" to the cause of stability in Asia. China is continuing its efforts directed at modernising the world's biggest army and developing its nuclear potential, impedes the normalisation of the situation around Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and whips up tensions in relations with socialist Vietnam, including even armed provocations on the border. Politically, it strives to build an anti-Soviet coalition under the false motto of "struggle against hegemonism".

²⁹ *Asahi shimbun*, Nov. 26, 1983.

³⁰ *Asahi shimbun*, March 17, 1984.

³¹ *Asahi shimbun*, Nov. 25, 1983.

At the same time Tokyo and Peking oppose the working out and adoption of confidence-building measures, the declaration of principles of non-use of force in relations between states in the region, and also other Soviet proposals directed at easing tension and establishing lasting peace in Asia.

Coupled with the approval of buildup of US military might in Asia and the Pacific, the support given by both Japan and China to the course of increasing military potential invariably leads to a further deterioration of the explosive situation in that region.

During the summit talks in Tokyo and Peking, Nakasone stressed "the need for cooperation between China and Japan" in establishing peace in Korea and Hu Yaobang "indirectly approved this idea".³² But neither of the two leaders said anything about the basis on which this "cooperation" is envisaged.

The refusal to take concrete steps to liquidate first of all the sources of tension in the Korean peninsula signifies the intention to substitute these steps with back-stage manoeuvring ultimately designed to perpetuate in one form or another the division of Korea.

Sino-Japanese rapprochement creates additional difficulties for settling the situation in Southeast Asia. Although there are some differences in China's and Japan's evaluation of the situation in Indochina, both states proceed from fundamentally identical positions in their approach to the problem of Kampuchea. They refuse to recognise the lawful government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, support counter-revolutionary elements and incite armed raids by Pol Pot gangs from the territory of Thailand.

Japan hinders the development of a dialogue between Vietnam and ASEAN countries, pursuing a policy of economic sanctions against the SRV. Hu Yaobang expressed full satisfaction with Japan's position and found it even necessary, as the Chinese press reported, "to express gratitude to Nakasone for Japan's policy in respect of Vietnam".³³

The PRC's and Japan's concerted actions are directed not at the speediest settlement of the situation in Indochina but at isolating socialist Vietnam, at frustrating talks between Vietnam and ASEAN countries, and retaining the seat of tension in Indochina. The newspaper *Nhan Dan* of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam condemned the agreement reached by the PRC and Japan leadership, "a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the Far East and Southeast Asia, in Asia and the Pacific region".³⁴

Therefore, the establishment of "special relations" between the PRC and Japan leads to a further destabilisation of the situation in the Asian-Pacific region. Contrary to widely publicised declarations of the two countries these "special relations" contradict the tasks of ensuring lasting peace and security in that area, undermine the existing balance of forces there and objectively serve the interests of world imperialism.

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³² *Asahi shimbun*, Nov. 25, 1983.

³³ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 25, 1983.

³⁴ *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 1, 1983.

PRC'S MODERNIZATION SEEN TO REQUIRE FOREIGN CAPITAL, KNOWHOW

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 35-44

[Article by S. A. Manezhev, candidate of economic sciences: "Foreign Entrepreneurial Capital in the PRC Economy"]

The involvement of foreign entrepreneurial capital in the economy of the People's Republic of China is an important and basically new direction in its foreign economic policy. "Now that China is implementing socialist modernisation", writes *Honqi*, "large investment resources are needed. The country's economic base is weak, however, and investment resources are scarce... To save time, to speed up economic development, and to augment our ability to rely on our own strength, it is useful and necessary to turn to foreign capital within appropriate proportions."¹

A deep technological gap between China and the industrialised countries is a no lesser obstacle in its drive to implement the 1978 modernisation programme. As *Renmin ribao* admitted on 5 August 1982, as little as 5 per cent of the means of production manufactured in China correspond to world standards of the 1970s. In this context, a stable and dynamic economic growth is hampered not only by the absolute shortage of domestic accumulation, but also by the lack of a corresponding form of production for them, which cannot be provided without bringing in foreign high technology and knowhow. All this was behind China's sharply increased interest in foreign capital in the late 1970s, which was regarded as an important channel for acquiring modern high technology, knowhow and managerial experience, sparing China considerable foreign currency expenditures and a growing foreign debt. Article 18 of the Constitution of the PRC, adopted at the 5th Session of the 5th National People's Congress, says: "The People's Republic of China allows foreign enterprises and other economic organisations or individuals to invest capital in China in accordance with the laws of the PRC, to implement economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other economic organisations in various forms."²

Between 1979 and 1983, more than 75 legislative acts relating to foreign economic relations were adopted in China, including some 40 acts directly concerning foreign investment.

The flow of foreign capital is stimulated by setting up and legalising the activities of so-called special economic zones, following the example of many developing countries which are making wide use of "duty-free zones," "free-enterprise zones," "export-processing zones", etc. This involves setting up closed economic zones near seaports or air terminals. Foreign companies and jointly-owned enterprises may import industrial raw materials and semi-finished products on a duty-free basis, process them at their enterprises in China and then export manufactured goods on the same duty-free basis. A series of legislative acts regulating taxation, land rent, registration procedure for enterprises in special zones, etc., have been adopted in the PRC since July 1979, when subsequent to the PRC State Council's decision, the first such zones began to appear

¹ *Honqi*, № 2, 1983, p. 48.

² *Renmin ribao*, 5 Dec. 1982.

near Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (Guangdong Province), and Xiamen (Fujian Province). All this is in order to virtually ensure a "favourable investment climate" for foreign investors so that China's capital investment terms are better not only than those in the donor-country, but also than those in neighbouring countries and territories which may rival China as recipients of foreign capital.

China maintains a flexible policy in attracting foreign investment, combining incentives with controls and limits. All in all, however (as Table 1 indicates), China's legal and economic terms for foreign entrepreneurial investment are in keeping with the average level in international practice.

Yet the scale of foreign investment in China remains moderate. In 1983, the sum of utilised foreign capital totalled \$900 million, i. e. 1.3 per cent of the total volume of capital investment in China's economy.³ A larger portion of foreign capital comes to China through the traditional channels of her special economic relations with foreign-based Chinese businessmen. According to available statistics, in 1983, some two thirds of the foreign capital to be invested in China's economy on the basis of signed agreements came from companies owned by foreign Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong, Aomen (Macao), Singapore, etc.⁴ They are estimated to account for 90 per cent of the contracts for building projects in special economic zones with foreign capital.⁵ Investors from leading imperialist countries still play a much lesser role in foreign capital investment in China.

There are several reasons for this. First of all, although China continues to adopt new legislative acts concerning the activities of foreign investors, many legal problems (which are important from the investors' point of view) remain unsettled. These include the guaranteed right of ownership of invested capital, guaranteed net profit, dual tax exemption, rights and duties of Chinese and foreign personnel, and investment security and guaranteed compensation in the event of foreign capital alienation. Potential investors are also cautious because the profitable operation of joint ventures in China is often hampered by the shortage of energy resources, transport facilities and skilled labour, which plague China's economy. And last but not least, businessmen from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe know from their own experience that in China they will have to face tighter governmental controls and centralisation than those existing in most former colonial and semi-colonial countries using foreign capital, and this compels them to be on guard. According to *China Business Review*, a magazine published by the National American-Chinese Trade Promotion Committee, US investors are mostly put off by China's cumbersome multi-stage approval system for investment projects which is expensive and time-consuming. They also complain of the lack of freedom in choosing partners and doing business in the PRC.⁶

Given all that, US authoritative experts dealing with investment feasibility assessments believe that through 1987 China will hold a modest position on the priority list of Western investors. Due to its less favourable domestic political situation, the PRC stands ninth in the list of

³ Calculated on the basis of the sum-total of government capital investment and investments made by individual enterprises and jointly-owned ventures, equalling 136.900 million yuan in 1983 (see *Renmin ribao*, 30 April 1984).

⁴ Based on figures from Ma Hong *Xiandai zhongguo jingji shidian*, Peking, 1982, p. 384; *Guoji mayoi*, № 7, 1983, p. 7; Guidebook on Trading with the People's Republic of China p. 125; *China Business Review*, № 5, 1983, p. 16.

⁵ See *Dagong bao*, 25 February 1982, 25 November 1982; *Asiaweek*, 6 August 1982, p. 123; *International Business Week*, 5 March 1984, p. 47.

⁶ See *China Business Review*, № 5, 1983, pp. 26, 27, 38.

Table 1

**Comparison of Terms of Foreign Capital Investments in China
and Some Other Countries and Territories in Asian and Pacific-Ocean Region**

Country	Allowed Participation of Foreign Capital in Joint Ventures (per cent)	Income Tax (per cent)	Period of Partial or Total Tax Exemption (Years)	Amortisation Rate for Industrial Equipment (per cent)	Personal Income tax at Annual Earnings of \$35-40 thousand (per cent)	Average Monthly Wage of Medium-Skilled Worker in Industry (\$)	Working Week in Industry (hours)
China	25-100	33 for Joint Ventures; 20-40 for Foreign Ventures; 15 for Ventures in Special Economic Zones	3-5	10-20; in some cases over 20	40.9 41.5	35 ¹	48 ²
Hong Kong	Unlimited	16.5	—	10-30	15 15	343	60-70
Singapore	Unlimited	20-40	5-10	5—13.3; in some cases up to 33.1	21.2 22.8	378	47-49
South Korea	50	20-40	5	8.5-11	31.5 31.5	491	50-60
Malaysia	75	45-50	2-5	10-15 in some cases up to 21	27.8 30	183	45-50
Philippines	40	25-40	—	8.5-17	51.3 53.5	99	45-50
Indonesia	49	20-45	2-6	25	26.4 26.4	117	45-50
Thailand	49 for some ventures, unlimited, for others	35-45	3-8	8.5-10.5	34.2 37.4	152	47-51

Notes: ¹For state-owned industrial enterprises. According to Art. 8 of "The Regulation for Labour Legislation at Joint Enterprises" wages and salaries there are from 20 to 50 per cent higher (see *Zhongguo touzi zhinan*, Hong Kong 1982, p. 205). ²For state-owned industrial enterprises. Overtime work for additional remuneration is provided for at enterprises in special economic zones (see *Renmin ribao*, 11 January 1983).

Sources: *Zhongguo touzi zhinan*, Hong Kong, 1982, pp. 46, 47, 126; *Shijie jingji daobao*, 21 March 1983; *Dagong bao*, 10 December 1981; *China Trade Report*, May 1982, pp. 6-7; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 May 1979, pp. 78-80; 13 August 1982, pp. 70-84; *Business Asia*, 22 July 1983, p. 229; A. G. Frank, *Crisis in the Third World*, New York, 1981, pp. 100-101, 168-170; *Pakistan & Gulf Economist*, 19-25 November 1983, p. 41.

13 countries in the Asian and Pacific-Ocean region surveyed, leaving behind only the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Pakistan. From the point of view of economic feasibility, China ranks even lower: thirteenth out of 15 countries, surpassing only India and Pakistan.⁷ So, the large-scale participation of major imperialist investors in financing and supplying China's economic modernisation drive is contingent on China's readiness to make considerable concessions to Western political and economic interests.

⁷ Estimated by Frost and Sullivan Inc. and Business International Corporation (USA). Source: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 March 1982, p. 56.

There are indications that China will not exclude this possibility. Specifically, a series of new economic advantages have been granted foreign businessmen within one and a half years alone (from November 1982 to April 1984). These include major benefits, such as reduced technology transfer income taxes for foreign-owned enterprises (from 20 per cent to 10); custom-duty and trade-and-industrial tax exemption for machinery and equipment imported to China for building joint ventures; longer periods for the total or partial income tax exemption of joint enterprises (from 3 years to 5); increased (in some cases up to 80 per cent) share of joint-venture products sold on China's domestic market; permission to build 100 per cent foreign-owned enterprises throughout the territory of Fujian and Guangdong Provinces and in Peking, Shanghai and Tianjin (earlier this was only allowed in special economic zones); and the expansion of the Zhuhai and Xiamen special economic zones.

Foreign entrepreneurs have shown special interest in China's recent decision to open 14 coastal towns and the Island of Hainan to foreign capital. In his report to the 2nd Session of the 6th National People's Congress, Zhao Ziyang, Chairman of the State Council, noted that in those regions the PRC would have "to expand the terms of reference regarding the examination and approval of tenders for building projects using foreign capital and advanced foreign technology and to simplify the entry and exit procedure for foreign businessmen. Besides, it will be necessary to allow foreign businessmen there to establish enterprises totally with their own resources and to duly extend the term of co-ownership of joint enterprises using Chinese and foreign capital... The aforesaid ports and four special economic zones form one line on the sea coast, thus making an advance strip which we have opened for the outside world."⁸ All this shows that a trend towards steadily liberalising China's investment legislation has become an important feature of its "open" foreign economic policy.

Thus, real possibilities emerge for the active involvement of foreign capital in the economic structure of the PRC. Yet, like any other country seeking foreign capital investments, China is not interested in the flow of foreign money in general. Rather, China wants it in certain forms and in certain spheres which are most important domestically. Experience shows, however, that granting ever greater economic advantages to foreign investors, in fact, weakens the position of the Chinese side in establishing joint enterprises and limits its potential to regulate foreign investors' activities in China's national interests. As a result, the impact of foreign capital on China's economic development takes on a dual, contradictory character.

By 1984, the sum of foreign capital investments in more than 2,100 enterprises on Chinese territory totalled some \$6,500 million, with \$2,700 million of the investments actually realised.⁹ Special economic zones are increasingly expanding their operations in the south. Specifically, by early 1984 the Shenzhen zone alone has signed contracts for building projects providing for various forms of foreign participation to the tune of \$1,800 million.¹⁰ Such zones are concentrating nearly 50 per

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, 2 June 1984.

⁹ Based on figures from *Guoji maoyi*, № 7, 1983, p. 55; *Renmin ribao*, 30 April 1984; *China Daily*, 8 February 1984, 26 March 1984.

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, 29 March, 1983.

cent of China's foreign investments, and this makes them important centers of foreign enterprise on Chinese territory.

Enterprises financed by foreign capital are characterised by high construction rates and profit-making ability. In the Shenzhen special economic zone, for instance, the stage of construction is 50-60 per cent shorter than that in China's building industry.¹¹ Projects involving foreign capital also register higher labor productivity organisation and production efficiency. The China Schindler Company, established jointly by a Chinese construction engineering plant and Schindler (Switzerland) with its Hong Kong sister-company is highly indicative. During its first year of operation (prior to the retooling of the China Schindler plants in Peking and Shanghai), the joint venture succeeded in reducing the product unit cost by 12 per cent, increasing the output in physical terms by 25 per cent and raising labour productivity by 25 per cent by improving the organisation of production alone.¹² According to Chinese press reports, the use of Western high technology at some joint ventures in the electronics, chemical, and textile industries made it possible to increase labour productivity from 6 to 10 times in a two or three year period, as compared with similar state enterprises, and to considerably raise the quality and range of products.¹³

According to Chinese economists, the use of each \$100 million of foreign investments in China's industry generally ensures an annual commodity increment evaluated at 300-400 million yuan and a simultaneous increase in exports totalling \$100 million.¹⁴ These figures show that a 1-yuan increase of the output of net product at industrial enterprises financed by foreign capital requires 50 per cent of investment as compared with state-owned plants in China. This prompts the following conclusion: joint enterprise activities may have a stimulating effect on production efficiency in some Chinese industries.

With this in mind, China plans to use foreign capital in tackling its major economic problems, such as implementing the reconstruction and modernisation program for existing enterprises and coping with shortages in the country's fuel and energy supply. Characteristically, at the International Conference on Investment in the PRC's Economy in Guangzhou (June 1982) the Chinese offered 130 bilateral projects for foreign investment, of which 17 (with foreign investment capital totalling \$298 million) are new projects, whereas the remaining 113 (amounting to \$991 million) are old enterprises to be reconstructed and modernised. Basically, these are relatively small projects requiring investments in the range of \$5-15 million and foreign participation from 8 to 100 per cent.¹⁵ Retooling is to be effected primarily in China's main industrial centres, in the export-oriented light and textile industries, engineering, the electronics industry, and in industrial raw-material production. In Shanghai, for example, almost 1,700 industrial enterprises (over 20 per cent of the city's total) are to be thus retooled on foreign capital between 1980 and 1985.

China also pins great hopes on foreign capital investments in tapping her fuel and energy resources, primarily oil on the continental shelf. According to 23 contracts concluded by the PRC with 29 companies from the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and other countries in 1980-1983, foreign investments in developing oil deposits on 90,000 sq. km. of

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, 6 May 1983.

¹² Based on figures from *Dagong bao*, 9 July 1981; *China Trade Report*, October 1981, p. 8.

¹³ See *Guoji maoyi*, № 2, 1982, p. 7; *Renmin ribao*, 15 January 1983; *China Reconstructs*, July 1983, p. 20.

¹⁴ See *Shehui kaxue*, 1982, № 2, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ Based on figures from *Zhongguo duiwai maoyi*, № 4, 1982, pp. 16-17, 22-23.

China's shelf amount to \$2.000 million, including \$776 million already spent by foreign investors on prospecting and exploration. It is estimated that further participation of Western oil companies in developing the oil-rich regions of China's continental shelf may attract up to \$20,000 million in foreign investment as early as 1990, thus increasing China's seabed oil production to 50 million tons annually, which will amount to almost half of her total today oil output.

There have been adopted extensive cooperation programmes in the coal industry, too. China's material, technical and financial resources make it possible to commission new mines with a combined annual production of 10 million tons of coal on the average. This means that unless China drastically changes the scale and level of mine construction, by 1990 she will be at least 110 million tons of coal short of the planned target, and in the year 2000 this shortage will jump to 210 million tons. Given that, China plans to use \$5,000 million in foreign capital investment for building 23 coal industry projects in 9 coal basins, which will produce 130 million tons of coal annually. In 1983, talks were held with major imperialist corporations, such as Mitsui Mining Co. (Japan), British Shell Coal International Ltd. (UK), Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Bechtel International and Fluor Corporation (USA), concerning the construction of coal mining projects with annual production of up to 40 million tons of coal.

In general, assessments and forecasts have appeared in China which state that during the 1980s China will be able to absorb some \$40-50,000 million of foreign capital, while by the year 2000 this figure may reach \$200,000 million.¹⁶ The Chinese thus tend to rely heavily on foreign enterprise as a factor contributing to the modernisation of the national economy. In practice, however, the attainment of this goal is already hampered by a number of other factors stemming primarily from the terms of foreign investment in the Chinese economy.

Joint ventures in China may take various forms depending on the degree and character of foreign participation. As has been repeatedly pointed out in Chinese press, economically, it is most feasible to establish joint-stock companies, involving the legalisation of joining the assets of the parties concerned, joint production management, and risk and profits sharing.¹⁷ In doing so, the Chinese may, within the framework of an investment agreement, make comprehensive use of the foreign partner's resources, technology, management techniques and marketing methods. The community of the parties' interests during a lengthy (up to 30 years) period ensures the continuous renewal and improvement of technology and production methods. Specifically, the agreement on establishing the aforementioned China Schindler Company provides for continuous (20 years) supplies of production knowhow as regards the making of cargo-handling equipment, which means that China will receive tens of thousands of technical documents free of charge. Characteristically, China's investment legislation provides most favourable terms primarily for such joint ventures.

The Chinese make no secret that they intend to give top priority to this form of cooperation involving close contacts and mutual responsibilities at all stages of construction work and the operation of joint enterprises. Joint-stock companies account for 65 per cent of the projects offered by China for foreign investment agreements at the International Conference on Investments in the PRC Economy in Guangzhou.¹⁸ Yet the

¹⁶ See *Shijie jingji*, № 8, 1982, p. 24; *Jingji wenti tansuo*, № 8, 1983, p. 18.

¹⁷ See *Nanfang ribao*, 14 March 1980; *Shijie jingji daobao*, 22 November 1982; *Renmin ribao*, 14 May 1983.

¹⁸ Based on figures from *Zhongguo duiwai maoyi*, № 4, 1982, pp. 16-17, 22-23.

reaction of foreign business to such overtures is somewhat restrained. Joint-stock companies account for as little as 5 per cent of the contracts for foreign-financed ventures in China. The overwhelming part of foreign money comes to China on other terms, not so attractive to the Chinese.

Table 2 shows that investments in goods-payback projects (when the supply of equipment and assembly lines is paid for with the product manufactured through the use of this equipment) account for three times as much money as that transferred for establishing joint-stock companies. China's foreign partners say that goods-payback projects are mostly small (\$10,000-\$20,000), the equipment payback period does not exceed 2 or 3 years, while foreign participation is generally confined to technical assistance and consultations at the initial stage.¹⁹

Some 30 per cent of foreign investments falls on agreements on the joint development of oil-fields. In early 1982, China announced an international tender for developing the oil-rich regions of its continental shelf of 150,000 sq. km. The Chinese have offered a standard contract stipulating that the financing of oil-prospecting for 5-7 years as General Contractor gives the foreign company involved (if successful) the right to direct access to the oilfield, its profit being a part of the oil pumped out jointly during a period from 15 to 30 years.²⁰ According to Chinese press reports, the "success coefficient" (i. e., the share of productive drills on the shelf of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Bohai) comes to 58 per cent, which is twice as high as that in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region as a whole.²¹ This explains why foreign monopolies are increasingly interested in exploiting China's oil resources.

Yet agreements on production cooperation (sometimes referred to as "contract" joint enterprises) account for the bulk of foreign investments in China. The operation of such projects in Chinese industry is varied, ranging from ordinary sub-contractor dealings to more complex forms of specialisation involving the joint manufacture of final products by dividing the production of separate units and parts between partner enterprises. In transferring licenses and knowhow for making the parts and components requested, foreign companies receive profit in the form of regular deductions for the use of technology amounting to 2-6 per cent (in some cases up to 9 per cent) of the cost of manufactured goods (but never less than the sum stipulated beforehand, which allows them to

Table 2

Structure of Foreign Entrepreneurial Investments in the PRC (by year end)

Forms of Foreign Investments	1982		1983	
	Contract Sum-Total (in \$ million)	Share (per cent)	Contract Sum-Total (in \$ million)	Share (per cent)
Total	4,958	100	6,520	100
including:				
Joint Ventures	141	3	341	5
Goods-Payback Projects	725	15	905	14
Agreements on the Joint Development of Seabed Oil Deposits	999	20	1,999	31
Agreements on Production Cooperative ("Contract" Joint Enterprises)	2,720	55	2,926	45
Others	367	7	369	5

Sources:

1982 — *Guoji maoyi*, No 7, 1983, p. 55.

1983 — Preliminary estimates based on figures from *China Daily*, 8 February 1984; 13 February 1984; 26 March 1984.

¹⁹ *China Business Review*, № 2, 1981, p. 24; № 6, 1983, pp. 38-39.

²⁰ See *China Business Review*, № 5, 1982, pp. 35-36.

²¹ See *Beijing Review*, 23 April 1984, p. 8; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 August 1983, p. 42.

escape the risk of possible failure. Normally, the terms of such agreements do not exceed 7-10 years, though in some cases they may be limited by the period of production of one unit of the end product (as was the case, for instance, when the PRC Ministry of Metallurgical Industry concluded an agreement with the American company Allis-Chalmers for the manufacture of an ore crusher at the Yongping Copper Mine).

In general, by early 1984 there were 992 "contract" enterprises in China, which provided for foreign participation amounting to \$2,900 million.²² Foreign investors spend some \$3 million on the average to establish one "contract" enterprise, which is 60 per cent more than that required to launch a joint-stock company. Quantitatively, "contract" enterprises thus become a major lever for enhancing China's economic potential through cooperation with foreign investment capital. However (i. e., bearing in mind the qualitative characteristics of economic resources coming to China through "contract" enterprises), this form of cooperation markedly limits the role of foreign capital in modernising the Chinese economy.

To begin with, most production cooperation agreements provide for rather tight limitations for the transfer of high technology to China. Specifically, the Chinese partner cannot share the technological information it receives with other enterprises on Chinese territory. In the event of leasing complete technological lines to the Chinese, it is not allowed to use them for any other purposes, except those stipulated in the contract. When the latter expires, the foreign partner has the right to remove the equipment which belongs to him. As a result, this form of cooperation significantly restricts the area of technological progress, confining it to the enterprise which has signed the cooperation agreement.

It is mainly the Chinese who run the economic risk, and this greatly reduces the foreign partner's real interest in the successful transfer of technology. Experience shows that in the event that China proves incapable of organising the production of certain parts licensed by a Western partner in time, this partner easily makes up for ensuing losses in license payments by increasing the supply of similar components to China correspondingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that the terms of many "contract" enterprises do not provide for any specific share of the Chinese partner in making parts and units of the end product, assigning it the role of assembly man. This is, in fact, the way the Harbin, Shanghai, and Peking electric engineering plants are "jointly producing" steam boilers and 300 and 600-megawatt-capacity turbo-generators in cooperation with the US companies Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering.

When, however, more equitable relations are established between partners and China is allowed more access to foreign technology, the division of labour, as a rule, takes on traditional forms. The Chinese are normally made responsible for making supports for machine tools, or other units, which are made of pig iron, steel casting or forging and require low-accuracy machining and are rather labour-intensive. In such cases, the transfer of technology boils down to giving over production flow-charts and critical parts, and effecting regular quality check-ups, and often leaves the Chinese partner without any new technical knowledge or skills (as was the case when the Houston-based Baker Marine Co. and the Dalian Shipyard agreed to jointly produce sea drilling platforms). Most "contract" enterprises in Chinese industry are assigned the role of ordinary sub-contractors catering for individual orders from foreign corporations and specialising in making various simple but labour-intensive products, such as metal castings, springs, shock absorbers, hydraulic jacks and pumps. The value of such contracts is low, their terms are

²² Based on figures from *Jingji ribao*, 30 April. 1983.

short, and the results (as regards access to high technology) are meagre. Moreover, interrupted production cycles continuously press China to import complementary parts and units and critical industrial materials, making "contract" enterprises technologically dependent on foreign investors.

Of course, China does make some efforts to reshape foreign business activities so that they cater better to its real economic needs. And this warrants attention. In May 1983, for example, the all-China working conference on the uses of foreign capital resolved "to create a new situation in the use of foreign investment" by shifting the centre of gravity to establishing joint-stock companies in the PRC. To this end the participants approved a large-scale programme of measures to liberalise the legal status of such companies.

As a result, in 1983 some changes were made in the structural composition of foreign investments. During that year the establishment of 105 joint-stock companies was approved, as against 83 such ventures in 1980-1982. The volume of foreign capital thus involved has reached \$200 million, or 300 per cent higher than the average level in 1980-1982.²³

A closer examination of a number of 1983 investment projects indicates, however, a marked departure from the earlier practice of establishing joint-stock companies, which deprives China of many advantages. Take, for instance, the agreement between American Squibb & Sons Co. and the Shanghai Pharmaceutical Plant on establishing, on an equal-share basis, an enterprise to produce drugs under the label "Shanghai Squibb". An expensive computer system (costing \$1 million) for the automatic control of production is a key element in the technology to be transferred to China. Controlling equal shares of the stock capital, the partners, it would seem, should have equal rights in using the equipment installed. Yet the agreement contains a special clause providing that for the duration of the operation of the joint company (15 years) American personnel will have exclusive access to the computer. Moreover, the agreement says that the main objective of the joint company is a minimum 20 per cent rate of profit and authorises the Americans to terminate it and repatriate the investments in the event they do not receive \$1.2 million in net profits during the course of the first three years of operation.²⁴

This brings up a number of negative factors involved in establishing joint-stock companies, which are typical of the "contract" enterprises. These include some elements of limited business activity, a loss of confidence in the partners' community of interests, and the foreign investor's explicit desire to shift the main burden of the risk onto Chinese shoulders. A certain pattern can be recognised in this: quantitative indices of such cooperation are growing against a background of simultaneously decreasing qualitative characteristics, which only point to China's limited potential to regulate the activities of foreign investors in national economic interests.

Yet the need for such regulation is particularly evident when one analyses the sectoral structure of foreign investments. Maximum profit has always been the chief incentive for entrepreneurs to invest abroad. In China, as in many other countries, branches of the non-material production sphere are most lucrative in this respect: they do not require huge investments and have a quick yield. Specifically, the Shijingshan tourist centre (Zhuhai special zone) ensures foreign investors a 50 per cent rate of profit, whereas the corresponding figure for the most efficient cooperation projects in industry does not exceed 20-22 per cent. Given this, a large portion (some 50 per cent) of foreign capital is invested in non-

²³ Based on figures from *Guoji maoyi*, No 7, 1983, p. 55; *China Daily*, 19 February 1984.

²⁴ See *China Trade Report*, November 1983, pp. 6-7.

productive branches, such as foreign tourism, trade, the service industry, and public utilities. It is here where the most capital-intensive cooperation projects are concentrated, including those on a joint-stock-company basis. Among them: the Changcheng Hotel (\$35 million foreign capital), the Palace Hotel (\$30 million), the International Grand Hotel (\$30 million), and housing and hotel projects built within the framework of production cooperation in the Shenzhen (\$820 million) and Zhuhai (\$1,030 million) special economic zones.

The disproportionate involvement of foreign money by non-productive projects reduces its stimulating effect on modernising the material production sphere. Even the joint prospecting for and oil extraction, field of cooperation vital for both sides, absorbs as little as a third of the foreign capital coming to China. As regards the key branches of the processing industry, which are important for technical progress, they account for merely 20 per cent of foreign investment. Here, too, the branch orientation is determined by the interests of foreign investors, rather than by China's real economic needs. Specifically, the goods-payback agreements are estimated to account for half of the foreign investments in China's processing industry, of which 50 per cent is absorbed by the textile and clothing industry, 25 per cent by other branches of the light industry, and another 25 per cent by the food, chemical and engineering industries.²⁵ This differs considerably from the sectoral structure of foreign investments offered by the Chinese and gives little attention to the development of money-making branches as the building-materials industry and metallurgy. As a result, China is dragged ever more deeply into the international capitalist division of labour, where it is, for the most part, like most other recipients of foreign capital, assigned a secondary role as a producer of raw materials and labour-intensive industrial goods.

Foreign investors intend to reap high profits in China mainly through the use of abundant and cheap labour in technologically simple processes. As a result, industrial cooperation projects in China are, as a rule, small and technologically unsophisticated. In the Shenzhen special zone, for example, foreign investors spend \$194,000 on the average to establish industrial project, which is 93 per cent less than is normally required build a trading project and almost 95 per cent less than spent in a joint venture in the tourism. The overwhelming majority of such industrial projects do not go beyond the framework of narrow specialisation within an incomplete technological cycle, and the Chinese are confined to assembling various export articles from the customer's parts and units or to pre-processing raw materials also intended for export. The current sectoral structure of foreign investments in China and their material and technical potential are not consonant with the major objectives of the PRC's economic modernisation programme. They tie up the economic potential of the special zones in a few industries in the donor-countries, encouraging the establishment of production enclaves on Chinese territory, which, to a great extent are excluded from the national reproduction process.

To sum up, the facts show that the role of foreign entrepreneurial capital in China's economy is inherently contradictory. The recourse to badly needed foreign material, technical and financial resources intended to stimulate the economy and create a potential for China's greater economic independence, in reality primarily involves the establishment and expansion of such forms and methods of cooperation which often assign the PRC a subordinate role. This questions China's plans to make use of foreign capital to enhance its own self-sufficiency.

²⁵ See *Guidebook on Trading with the People's Republic of China*, p. 126.

U.S.-PRC MILITARY COOPERATION, CONTRADICTIONS EXAMINED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 84 (signed to press 23 Nov 84) pp 49-58

[Article by V. I. Petukhov and G. I. Ragulin: "U.S.-PRC Military Ties"]

[Text] While hatching plans to establish U.S. hegemony in the world by altering the global balance of forces to their advantage, U.S. ruling circles are making a special effort to involve China, in parallel with their allies and close partners, in the sphere of U.S. imperialism's military-strategic activity.

Washington makes no secret of the fact that Reagan, as the NEW YORK TIMES put it, "has based his so-called China policy on considerations of political strategy, including confrontation with the Soviet Union."¹ Special emphasis was placed on this consideration, as the main condition for developing American-Chinese cooperation, in the Republican Party's election platform, adopted by the August 1984 Dallas convention. The document in question indicates that the further normalization of relations with the PRC must be based on mutual interest in opposing the Soviet Union. While refraining from direct support for Reagan's bellicose anti-Soviet course, the Chinese leaders nonetheless second his claims that the United States and China share many "coincident and parallel interests." Both sides declare that they have laid the foundations for a stable and long-term development of mutual relations. Be that as it may, the PRC and the United States, while playing down the contradictions existing between them, are striving to galvanize all aspects of their mutual relations and consolidate the front of their partnership on many important international problems.

It is not surprising that the recent general stepping up of PRC-U.S. relations has also boosted to a certain extent the development of their mutual relations and cooperation in the military sphere, to which both sides are paying greater attention. The U.S. administration and military leadership make no secret of their desire to expand military ties with the PRC to limits which, although preventing the PRC from really becoming considerably stronger, nevertheless ensure the two countries' close cooperation in the immediate future. Addressing the U.S. Congress, official Pentagon spokesman J. Kelly emphasized that the administration's objective is to establish stable military exchanges with Beijing to help establish a "global balance of forces" in the U.S. favor.²

During hearings in a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, P. Wolfowitz, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, noted in particular that due to the development of relations with China, Washington now has no need to consider the China factor when elaborating programs to ensure U.S. security and, consequently, no need to set aside forces and facilities to "counterbalance" the Chinese threat. In Wolfowitz' words, Beijing desires cooperation with U.S. allies in East Asia and is consolidating its economic ties with capitalist countries.³ In its military-strategic planning, the Pentagon is now constantly treating the China factor as favorable to U.S. interests. In its document "The Operational Situation in 1984," the U.S. Defense Department notes that "the PRC indirectly helps U.S. security on both regional and global scales by serving as a counterbalance to the USSR's military might in Asia." The "Defense Guidelines for Fiscal 1984-1988," prepared by the Pentagon, provide for "comprehensive support for military operations by China in the event of war."

Many Americans, especially members of the business community, are clearly attracted by the potential results of military cooperation with China. The Chinese army, being the largest in the world (over 4 million strong) but technically backward and inadequately equipped at the same time, could be a profitable "aid" project for the U.S. military industry. Washington specialists (and especially Paul Kreisberg, former deputy director of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff) claim that China's combat equipment basically consists of an arsenal of 1950's weapons; it undoubtedly needs modernization.⁴ They suggest that China cannot implement the technical modernization of its army through its own resources, without resorting to imports of advanced equipment and technology and without availing itself of the developed countries' experience in the most diverse spheres of technological progress. The U.S. stance on military deliveries by Western states to China is, of course, decisively significant, because not a single decision by COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Control of Exports to Socialist Countries] (the NATO body monitoring such deliveries to socialist countries) can be made without Washington's approval.

On the administration's instructions, the U.S. military establishment prepared a report on the eve of the 1980 Beijing visit by then Secretary of Defense H. Brown which examined the possibility of assisting in the modernization of China's armed forces by supplying it with weapons and equipment worth up to 63 billion dollars. These Pentagon expectations failed to materialize, however. Last year U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT published Pentagon and CIA reports according to which the Chinese army's modernization must include the acquisition of at least 8,600 modern tanks, 10,000 military vehicles, 16,000-18,000 heavy trucks, 6,000 air-to-air missile launch installations, 240 modern fighter planes and other equipment.⁵ The bosses of the U.S. military industry hope that the main bulk of the profits from deliveries of these products to China will flow into their pockets.

But the issue concerns not just profits. The involvement of Americans in the PRC's armed forces and military industry could, so they suppose, tie China solidly to the U.S. military machine and facilitate even further the two countries' close cooperation on an anti-Soviet basis. Given the vast role

played by the army in China, this could lead to a sharply stepped-up American influence on PRC policy, both domestic and foreign. These are the calculations which guide the advocates of helping China's arms buildup (we would, however, stipulate that opponents of this help do exist within U.S. ruling circles).

China, of course, has its own calculations and plans. At present it is definitely relying on U.S. help to build up its military-industrial potential and modernize its armed forces, and simultaneously on support from Washington and its allies for the plans to expand Chinese influence in Asia. As regards the purely military aspect of the issue, it is possible to single out four basic trends in the PRC leadership's plans and practical actions.

First, it is aiming at acquiring U.S. military technology and sharing its experience in the arms production sphere. The importation of the latest technology is seen as an important means of military and military-technical modernization.

Second, Beijing is trying to involve the Americans in the direct re-equipping of its armed forces. It is hoping to acquire U.S. "dual purpose" technology and materials; in other words, those meant for both peaceful and military purposes, as well as small quantities of combat and auxiliary military equipment to be used mainly as models for the development of similar products of its own. Great importance is attached to the importation of basic materials for the Chinese military industry, including specialized steels, aviation alloys and others. In addition to this, according to numerous reports in the foreign press, Beijing is making attempts to reach an agreement with U.S. companies to set up joint enterprises for the production of combat equipment and weapons, calculating on thus benefiting from the technology used by the Americans.

Third, the PRC leadership is interested in the broad development of scientific and technical cooperation with the United States, in which a dominant position would be occupied by problems linked with the buildup of military potential and especially the development of nuclear missile production. Chinese scientists maintain intensive contacts with major U.S. scientific centers engaged in nuclear physics and aerospace research. Great hopes are pinned on the cooperation agreement concluded in the sphere of nuclear power utilization, which could give the PRC access to U.S. technology and experimental research in this sphere.

Fourth and last, Beijing is also trying to maintain such aspects of purely military cooperation as consultations between the two countries' military departments, studies of U.S. experience in military planning, reciprocal visits by military leaders, U.S. help in training the Chinese army's officer corps and technical specialists, and exchanges of intelligence. In particular, according to Western news sources, two American bases have been set up on Chinese territory (in the Xinjiang-Uighur Atuonomous Region), equipped with electronic installations for intelligence data-gathering against the USSR, Afghanistan and India. It is reported that they have taken over the functions carried out previously by U.S. intelligence from Iran's territory. The bases employ specialists supplying information to the CIA.⁶ American researcher

D. Pearson, who published an article containing numerous data refuting the Reagan Administration's version of the incident involving the South Korean aircraft shot down on 31 August 1983 in the region of Sakhalin Island, mentions that the base in the Xinjiang-Uighur region was one of the reconnaissance stations used by the CIA to monitor the flights by Soviet aircraft over Sakhalin during the incident in question.⁷

Over the last few years, and for only a brief period after the Reagan administration came to power in 1981, there was a drop in the level of American-Chinese cooperation. After Washington took steps to activate relations with the PRC and an agreement was reached in August 1982 on the gradual reduction of U.S. military aid to the Taiwan regime, the question of reviving Sino-American military ties appeared on the agenda once more. This question was raised in one way or another by both countries' representatives during the numerous talks at the governmental level between the end of 1982 and the recent past.

In June 1983 the U.S. President allowed U.S. firms to sell computers and other "dual-purpose" equipment to the PRC. But, as the U.S. press noted, the Chinese side publicly expressed its dissatisfaction with what Washington was offering--it was, apparently, "second-rate" equipment. PRC Defense Minister Zhang Aiping openly declared: "We must know that whatever we can buy abroad will not be the most advanced technology. And if we were to rely solely on imported weapons, we would hardly be able to achieve the modernization of our national defense and avoid control by outside forces."⁸

A desire to boost the development of ties and cooperation in the military sphere could be observed on both sides in connection with the U.S. visit by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, in January 1984, and the visit to China by U.S. President R. Reagan in April of the same year. An important role in this respect was assigned to the exchange of visits by the two countries' defense ministers--C. Weinberger and Zhang Aiping.

The U.S. defense secretary, who visited Beijing in September 1982, declared during talks there the U.S. administration's willingness to help develop military cooperation and discuss the possibility of arms sales to the PRC (it is curious that this mission was assigned to a figure who is known in official Washington circles as one of the opponents of sales of the latest weapons and technology to China). The Weinberger visit, as it was noted in Washington, "laid the foundations for new military exchanges and cooperation programs in the military technology sphere on a selective basis." According to reports in the London FINANCIAL TIMES, Weinberger informed Beijing that Washington "has agreed to expand the framework of exports to China, allowing sales of more up-to-date technological equipment to Beijing, including equipment that may be used for military purposes."⁹

During Weinberger's visit the two sides agreed to exchange delegations of specialists in military training and logistic support for troops (such delegations from the PRC visited the United States in April and May). The China trip by J. Williams, chief of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, in October 1982, the meeting between PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and

CIA Director W. Casey in the same month, and the contacts and reciprocal visits by U.S. and Chinese officials connected with intelligence, indicated a stepping up of the exchange of secret military information by the two sides.

Zhang Aiping's visit to Washington took place in June 1984, soon after the visit to China by President Reagan who, during the talks, backed the bombastic phraseology about the two countries' friendship and cooperation with frank assurances of U.S. readiness to supply China with weapons. At the end of April Secretary of State Shultz told correspondents that talks on arms sales were "progressing at a fast pace."¹⁰ A Pentagon delegation arrived in Beijing on the eve of the Reagan visit to study China's requirements in the military sphere. Even before that (in February-March), a Chinese delegation spent a month in the United States, studying the possibility of acquiring various combat equipment and weapons there. The Chinese representatives visited military plants in 14 U.S. cities, where they talked directly with contractors about conditions for the purchase of their products.¹¹ The delegation drew up and presented the Americans with a list of products in which Beijing was interested (to replace the old list of requirements presented in 1980 during Gang Biao's visit).

The foreign press noted that the discussion of specific aspects of cooperation, which the U.S. side reduced to such issues as the supply of antitank systems to China and help in modernizing its artillery and anti-air defense, "will continue at technical levels, and the relevant agreements will possibly be reached in the future." In the meantime, the United States provisionally agreed to sell China "Hawk" air defense missiles, various types of antitank weapons and technology for the manufacture of artillery shells.¹² Promises were also made to China to supply electronic equipment for F-5 jet interceptor aircraft and train Chinese airmen in the use of this equipment on U.S. bases (the specific details of this program have not yet been agreed upon, but it will probably envisage the relocation of one or two Chinese F-8 squadrons in the United States, the installation of electronic instruments in the aircraft and their subsequent use to train Chinese airmen).¹³

On the whole, the U.S. press described the "unofficial agreements" as evidence of the "most significant strengthening of U.S.-Chinese military ties in history."¹⁴

Judging by reports in the foreign press, the Chinese representatives did not manage to achieve the satisfaction of most of their demands for American deliveries of military technology and weapons of the types in which the PRC military leadership is interested. "The Chinese were skeptical as to whether we were prepared to permit the sale of equipment and technology in the spheres and at the technical levels needed to satisfy their needs and requirements," J. Kelly, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, noted in his statement to Congress. "We reached an agreement to continue the dialogue at staff levels with a view to making a start on some kind of specific cooperation programs.... The most suitable spheres for such joint programs and antitank and air defense weapons." It was further declared that "all requests by the Chinese, just as those by anyone else, will be examined individually in each case" (earlier, in April, Secretary of State Shultz explained: "The question

of what we can sell and what is not for sale is being reviewed by the departments involved").

In other words, the U.S. administration continues to maintain the system of restrictions, whose purpose is to prevent deliveries to China of some types of equipment and technology of special interest to it, using the excuse of "U.S. security interests." Reagan has unambiguously warned Beijing that any further concessions by the American side would depend on China's support for U.S. foreign policy. "Our policy on the issue of technology transfer," the President declared in Beijing, "will continue to be determined by considerations of the general development of our relations and the line of expanding cooperation between our countries."¹⁵

Nonetheless, both sides continue the accelerated quest for possibilities to intensify military cooperation. A large delegation of aerospace industry leaders and U.S. Government officials, headed by presidential adviser C. Fuller, visited China in July. The delegation included representatives of the largest companies involved in the manufacture of both civilian and military aviation technology--Lockheed, Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell-Douglas and others. While in Beijing they held talks on expanding the exports of their products to China, including helicopters, jet aircraft, navigation and airfield equipment and direct radio broadcasting satellites. There were also discussions of U.S. help in modernizing the PRC air force.

In the second half of August, John Lehman made an 8-day official visit to China for the first time ever by a U.S. Secretary of the Navy. He was received by Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang and conducted talks with representatives of the PRC's naval command. Lehman visited naval bases in Dalian, Shanghai and Qingdao, where he was given an opportunity to inspect Chinese warships and study their equipment. The Western press views the results of this visit as an important step toward bilateral military cooperation on a broader scale.

The question of permitting American warships to call at Chinese ports was prominent on the agenda of Lehman's talks with the Chinese leaders, the WASHINGTON POST remarked, citing well-informed diplomatic sources. The Chinese leaders supposedly consented "for the first time in more than 30 years" to grant this U.S. request in token of the expansion of bilateral military cooperation. In turn, Lehman stated his country's readiness to help China in modernizing its navy. The sides discussed the question of the delivery of American naval technology to the PRC and agreed on various forms of cooperation between the navies of the two countries, including the further exchange of visits and the holding of talks on the level of the naval command.¹⁶

As we can see, military ties and cooperation are being developed along all lines despite Washington's recurrent outright anti-Chinese actions with which Beijing is forced to put up. The talk about "accord" and "strategic interaction" between the United States and PRC did not prevent the Reagan team, when approving the Republican Party's campaign platform, from reaffirming its sympathy for, and actual allied ties with, the Taiwan regime. It was said, in part, that guaranteeing Taiwan's freedom remained one of the key elements

of U.S. politics and that the United States was ready to help Taiwan defend its freedom. It appears that in order to test the principled position of Beijing on this issue it was exactly at the time of Zhang Aiping's visit to Washington that the U.S. Government announced its intention to provide Taiwan with a number of military transport planes of the latest modification (in 1984 the Reagan administration decided to increase arms deliveries to Taiwan to 800 million dollars although, by the terms of a Beijing-Washington agreement, their level should not exceed 600 million dollars a year).

During Zhang Aiping's stay in the United States the American Government decided to postpone and not to submit to Congress for ratification the agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy, which was initialled by the sides in Beijing during Reagan's visit there. This came more as a surprise to the Chinese side since this agreement was treated in Washington as almost the main result of the President's visit.¹⁷ According to the American press, the main reason for the delay was that the agreement contained no commitment on the part of the PRC not to transfer American nuclear technology to third countries, while, in the opinion of congressmen, such a commitment is necessary, especially in light of the fact that the PRC has not signed the 1968 international Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (besides, there have been reports of participation by Chinese specialists in Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear arms). The U.S. Government made an effort to reach an agreement with the Chinese side so as to clarify its stand on this matter and make it easier for the agreement to be approved by Congress, but Beijing expressed dissatisfaction with the American side's complication of the matter by creating "unnecessary new problems"¹⁸ and refused to furnish a substantive answer.

It was also reported that the Chinese side repeatedly asked the United States to grant the PRC long-term credit at low rates of interest or on the same terms as those provided for other developing countries. During his visit to Washington, Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, also raised the question of changing the American law on aid to foreign states, which deprives China of the right to obtain such aid from the United States because of its allegiance to the socialist countries.¹⁹ Reagan promised to tackle these questions, but no practical measures were taken to change the situation in the PRC's favor.

To all appearances, a struggle is continuing in Washington's ruling circles over questions of policy toward China and, above all, over the question of military cooperation with it and of assisting in the buildup of its military-economic potential. No clear-cut, long-term policy has taken shape in this sphere yet. "The Republican administration," B. Garrett, a specialist on military-strategic problems, points out, "remains divided by deep contradictions on the question of U.S. global strategy with regard to the Soviet Union and the role which might be allocated in it to China."²⁰ Reagan, who makes statements about friendship and "strategic partnership" with China, has to act with a certain degree of caution: He is forced to consider a whole series of factors which complicate matters.

First, U.S. ruling circles--even though they support the use of China as one of the main means of exerting pressure on the USSR--nevertheless realize that

arming China could boomerang against America's long-term interests in the future, especially in Asia. The PRC-U.S. contradictions have merely been damped down, not eliminated by any means. The hope that the strengthening of relations with China might divert its attention from Taiwan and help to resolve this question in the United States' favor can hardly be considered valid or realistic: In the long run the Sino-American dispute over Taiwan will probably flare up again. It is the U.S. belief that China cannot be regarded, in the final analysis, as a reliable U.S. partner and that it is not safe to arm it. In 1980 (under the Carter Administration), noting the "rapid rapprochement" between the United States and the PRC, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke openly admitted that Americans were having to think about "how China will decide to use its increased might and influence" and "what the realization of the Chinese potential might foretoken," "whether the Chinese will return to the opinion that others must recognize their central role and superiority in the hierarchy of countries" and "whether a rich and powerful China will be an expansionist power."²¹ Reagan himself shared these views, advising "caution." "I do not want," he said after he was elected, "to act so hastily that on one fine day the weapons we provide them with will be used against us."²²

Second, materials are being published in the United States which confirm that not only China's public but also a segment of its leading cadres are opposed to too much of a tilt toward the United States in government policy and advocate overcoming the confrontation with the Soviet Union. The real possibility of change and, still more, of a reorientation of PRC policy prompts the Reagan administration to display caution in assisting in the arming of China.

Third, assisting the arming of China contradicts U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which remains an object of special concern and protection on the part of the Reagan administration. It is characteristic that while verbally confirming the principle of a "united China," Washington refuses to recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and upholds its constant policy of consolidating the "two Chinas" situation. It is partly for this reason, in the opinion of certain Washington press organs, that Beijing is cautious about concluding deals to acquire American weapons, fearing "lest American officials, who put relations with Taiwan to the fore, might take advantage of such deals with a view to making further deliveries of military equipment and hardware to Taiwan."²³

On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the U.S. policy of developing military cooperation with the PRC is also being voiced by members of the Taiwan regime and by influential U.S. conservatives (above all, the pro-Taiwan group, which has close links with the President). Reagan was forced, particularly on the threshold of the presidential election, to consider the feelings of conservative circles, which are the chief mainstay of his policy.

Fourth, the U.S. administration cannot fail to take note of the fact that many U.S. allies and U.S.-oriented countries, particularly Japan and the ASEAN states, are voicing dissatisfaction with the U.S. line of arming China and are having a corresponding influence on the Reagan administration. Representatives of the aforementioned states have stated more than once in

connection with Reagan's trip to China that when Washington developed cooperation with China, it was wrong to believe that it could direct Chinese might against the Soviet Union. The PRC, they have pointed out, could use that might against Southeast Asia. According to the U.S. press, during Secretary of State Shultz' tour of the Southeast Asian countries in July 1984, the heads of government of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore reminded him that a "China in receipt of U.S. aid could bring it nothing but trouble in the future if it starts to extend its power southward."²⁴ The Japanese military establishment has also repeatedly opposed Washington's decision to allow arms supplies to China, stressing that such decisions are being made "without sufficient analysis of the consequences of this step in the future."²⁵

It is noteworthy that Assistant Defense Secretary Kelly, addressing Congress, was forced to broach this question in order to forestall criticism of the administration. "The systems in respect of which we are most likely to agree to cooperate," he said, "are defensive in nature and should not provoke alarm among our friends and allies in this region.... The effect on other friendly countries in the region and the threat of destabilizing relations with the Soviet Union are perhaps among the most important considerations we are taking into account in elaborating our policy on arms sales" (at the same time Kelly pointed out that "it is necessary to display caution, considering the possibility of some other Chinese orientation in the future").

Fifth, on the commercial level the U.S. military-industrial complex cannot count on big deals with China, since it is not now in a position to make mass purchases and prefers to acquire small consignments of hardware, mainly to copy, and chiefly technology with which it could produce the necessary armaments itself. The U.S. credits granted to it are virtually unused, since they are being provided at high interest rates and this does not suit the Chinese, who are afraid of getting into debt.

All of this forces the White House to some extent to go back on the assurances and promises made to the Chinese side and to maneuver on questions of military aid to the PRC. The hope was that the visit to Beijing and the practical measures resulting from it would strengthen Reagan's position, but the re-emerging friction in Chinese-American relations threatens to cancel the publicized results of the visit. There is no doubt that the "strategic partnership" based on the temporary and selfish calculations of each side and subject to the influence of the constant deep conflicts between them can be neither lasting nor promising. The general interest of imperialist circles in exploiting the "China factor" does not in itself lead to full cooperation between the United States and its allies and China, just as Beijing's interest in their help does not in itself prevent conflicts of interest between that country and the policy of the capitalist powers. Nonetheless, at the present stage of PRC-U.S. relations the trend toward cooperation aimed against third countries is being displayed with increasing clarity.

At the present time it is difficult to assess the state of Chinese-American military ties fully and accurately. The Western press calls these ties a "sphere of shady cooperation," to which the PRC leadership prefers not to draw public attention in order to conceal the real situation from the public.²⁶

Let us note that the Chinese newspapers said nothing about the month-long U.S. visit by an influential PRC military delegation (led by Zhang Ping and He Ping). Nor was it reported that during Zhang Aiping's U.S. visit, President Reagan, according to some reports, allegedly signed a document granting China the right to receive military hardware and credits within the framework of programs for the sale of military equipment to foreign states.²⁷ Zhang Aiping specially requested the U.S. representatives "not to disclose the contents of the accord on bilateral military cooperation"²⁸ and to "carry as little news as possible" of his visit.²⁹ Western news sources ascribe the PRC leadership's caution as regards publication of such reports to its desire to preserve China's aura as a nonaligned power of the Third World.

Obviously, Beijing cannot fail to take account of the fact that in the developing countries and especially in the socialist countries the PRC's military ties with the leading, most aggressive power in the imperialist camp are regarded as a factor increasing the threat to peace and security in Asia. In this connection it must be recalled that the root of Chinese-American military cooperation was the events in Indochina and Afghanistan, where Beijing and Washington discovered grounds for "parallel actions" against the people of those countries for the first time. At the present stage of the partnership between China and the United States, the SRV, Cambodia, Afghanistan and also India and other PRC neighbors continue to remain the target of subversive actions coordinated by the partners. Washington is interested in maintaining constant enmity and confrontation between the PRC and its neighbors and this is the aim of its declaration of readiness for military cooperation.

The Chinese leadership likes to underline the "self-sufficiency and independence" of its policy line. But a great deal of what it does in the foreign policy arena accords badly with such a line. This applies primarily to Beijing's compromising stance vis-a-vis U.S. tutelage--hostile to China--over the Taiwan regime and the U.S. failure to recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, which is a humiliation for the Chinese people's national dignity. But is it really in the PRC's interest to support the U.S. arms race, justify the Reagan administration's militarist course and show solidarity with the militarization of Japan, now being accelerated by Washington? Or finally to tacitly approve the plans for the new military bloc linking the United States, Japan and South Korea, which is being put together and which is aimed not only against the DPRK and the other socialist countries but ultimately against China itself? All of this is obviously a concession to the West in the hope of its help and assistance.

It is perfectly understandable that broad segments of the Asian countries' public are suspicious of the desire of the United States and the West in general to step up the PRC-U.S. partnership and, in particular, the expansion of military cooperation by these countries.

FOOTNOTES

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SOCIAL ORIENTATION OF CHINESE, RUSSIAN PEASANTRY COMPARED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 54-70

[Article by A. S. Mugruzin, candidate of economic sciences: "Socioeconomic Features of the Chinese Peasantry (A Comparative Analysis of the Semifeudal Chinese and Petty Bourgeois Russian Peasantry)"]

The peasantry, that class of small producers tilling the land, has traversed a tremendous road in history—from primitive society right through to socialism. While retaining some common features in different historical epochs, the peasantry acquires specific features, determined by the dominant relations in a given socio-economic formation.¹ In this connection there arises the question of what types of peasantry are characteristic of different historical epochs.

The methodological basis of the typological approach to the peasantry is elaborated in the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and above all in the theory of formations which describes the various historically determined types of society. For, depending on the type of society, the stage of development of its productive forces and its superstructure, the economic organisation, the essence of relations within the peasant households and the direction and essence of their economic and social ties, etc. are changed or modified.² The theory of ground rent worked out in Marx's *Capital* shows us the material basis of the economic and social changes taking place within the heart of feudalism during the transition to capitalism.

V. I. Lenin studied the theoretical problems of the disintegration of feudalism and the coming into being of the capitalist mode of production basing himself on the concrete example of Russia. He investigated in detail the influence of the capitalist market on agricultural production, described the process of social stratification going on within the peasantry, the new types of rural population, etc. Proceeding from the premise that the agrarian-peasant question was the "core" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, V. I. Lenin elaborated the agrarian programme and the fundamentals of the agrarian policy of a social democratic party. He also worked out the plan for setting up cooperatives, a key component of the building of socialism in the USSR.³

The multiplicity of types of peasantry has acquired special importance, it being one of the problems encountered by the developing countries. A study of the developing countries has brought to light a picture of amazing diversity, a whole range of social formations in these countries, with diversity of economic and social levels of the peasantry. It turned out that many customary definitions in respect of the peasantry

¹ See, for instance *Economic Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1975, pp. 299-300.

² See *Ibid.*; *Agrarian Structures of Oriental Countries. Genesis, Evolution and Social Transformations*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 6-10.

³ *Economic Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 2, pp. 346-348.

in these countries "do not work" or "work" inadequately.⁴ For instance, the use of the terms "poor peasant", "middle peasant" or "rich peasant" can lead to misunderstanding and errors, because we involuntarily invest them with that content we have become accustomed to, applying those types of peasantry to a society that is in the process of rapid capitalist transformation. The high rates of pauperisation of the peasantry are taken for its social differentiation, leading to conclusions about the acuteness of class antagonisms in the countryside and the peasantry's readiness for an agrarian revolution. The same can be said about the "commodity economy": the indicators showing the produce that finds its way to the market, can be taken for the level of commodity output of peasant households, leading to such an exaggeration of the petty bourgeois transformation of the peasantry, that the greater part of the latter will be viewed as a "petty bourgeois mass".⁵

In Soviet literature the problem of the types of peasantry has still not been adequately studied.⁶ We will attempt to show the difference between the petty bourgeois and traditional (feudal) peasantry of the Eastern type by comparing the Russian and Chinese peasantry. It is said that truth is learned in comparison. As for our reader, of all the possible comparisons the Russian prototype is best known to him.

The study in Soviet literature of the Chinese (and more broadly—Oriental) peasantry from Marxist positions is a separate, important, and complex theme, requiring a special investigation, and cannot be dealt

⁴ V. G. Rastyannikov, From the Editor. In the book *Agrarian Structures of Oriental Countries*, pp. 3-5.

⁵ Such conclusions are rarely encountered in "pure form" and one usually comes across complex logical formations. As an example, I would cite the position of the most experienced researcher A. I. Levkovsky who counts virtually the entire peasantry in developing countries as part of the petty bourgeois mass. See his book *The Social Structure of Developing Countries. Problems of the Multi-Structural, Transitional Society*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 87-119.

The insufficient study of the question of types of peasantry and the criteria differentiating them leads to the assertion that supposedly in all socialist countries after the agrarian reforms the small commodity form of production has become the numerically predominant one. This allegedly determined the similarity of the socio-economic development of the countryside during the transitional period in all socialist countries. See *Economic Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 2, p. 304.

It is considered that after the completion of the agrarian reform in China "the small commodity private peasant farms... became the most widespread form of the rural economy". See: *The PRC's Agriculture, 1949-1974*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 29-31.

⁶ Soviet authors note the dependence of the state of the peasantry on the type of society, and underline the prime importance of determining the question "about what social community, with its peasantry, is implied". (See V. G. Rastyannikov. *Ibid.*). The expression "type of peasantry" is occasionally used, but the authors do not explain it in detail, probably because they think it is of secondary importance. See *The Foreign East and Our Times*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1980, p. 110 and further.

Sometimes the authors approach the problem very closely: "The present social nature (of the peasantry—A. M.) is determined by the nature of the rural environment and the dominant social relations within it, which in most countries remain traditional... by its social nature the many-faced traditional peasantry differs in many ways from the peasantry of bourgeois society". It follows from this, that it is precisely here that one must look for the roots of the distinctions in the political behaviour of the peasantry, but the authors immediately lose sight of the problems and pass over to other questions. See *Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress*, Moscow, 1983, p. 316.

The absence of the typological approach to the peasantry is especially felt in those cases when attempts are made to classify the developing countries. See N. A. Dlin, *Specificities of the Socio-Economic Development of Non-Socialist Countries in Asia*, Moscow, 1978.

The problem of the types of peasantry is "hovering in the air" and is already being studied, but so far only in its ethnographical and comparative social aspects. See: A. V. Gordon, *Questions of Typology of Peasant Societies in Asia*, Moscow, 1980; Zh. D. Smirenskaya, *The Peasantry in Asian Countries: Social Consciousness and Social Struggle (a Comparative Regional Study)*, Moscow, 1979.

with within the framework of the present article.⁷ The problem of the types of peasantry is a complex one in many respects and requires the summing up of the results of the studies of the states of the peasantry in various countries conducted by scores and hundreds of Soviet researchers.

We encounter an early attempt at a typological approach to the Oriental peasantry in a book by R. A. Ulyanovsky that contains an interesting comparison of the results of the agrarian evolution in India and Russia.⁸ He rightly noted that in contradistinction to Germany and Russia of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the agrarian system in India "does not know the corvée system of agriculture" and for this reason it "lacks the historically formed basis for the 'Prussian' road of development of the landlord system of agriculture". As a result, Ulyanovsky says further, "the social conditions in Indian agriculture... turned out to be scores of times less favourable for the penetration of capitalism into agriculture (assisted as it was by the big landowners).⁹ He follows this with an important conclusion: "... the colonial-imperialist monopoly itself is the primary cause impeding the possibility of a successful 'Prussian' bourgeois road for India's agricultural development".¹⁰ In these words one can perceive the basis of the concept worked out in recent years of a dependent development and conservative capitalist evolution (V. V. Krylov and others), one that qualitatively differs both from the "American" and the "Prussian" roads of development of capitalism in agriculture.¹¹ It should be borne in mind, of course, that the theoretical formulations of the 1920s and 1930s were based on clearly insufficient factual material. As it has already been said, it is only the tremendous expansion of the scope of Oriental studies that makes it possible to draw new, much more accurate conclusions.

In contemporary times, the type of peasantry that existed in China differed from that in Russia. This had important historical repercussions that manifested themselves in the extent and different forms of participation of the peasantry in the revolution, and in the actual agrarian-peasant policy that had to be pursued, in order to win over the peasantry.

⁷ The general formulation, by the Comintern and the Communist Party of China of the peasant question in China is the subject of the historiographical analysis *The Peasantry in the Chinese Revolution* by V. I. Glunin and A. S. Mugruzin in the book *The Revolutionary Process in the East. History and Our Times*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 11-120. This part of the book was written by V. I. Glunin. See also *The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in a National-Colonial Revolution Based on the Example of China. A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1934; M. A. Cheshkov, "An Analysis of the Social Structure in Colonial Countries Contained in Comintern Documents (1920-1927)", in the book *The Comintern and the East. The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 192-216. Among the major works of Soviet Sinologists mention should be made of the following: L. P. Delyusin, *The Struggle by the Communist Party of China to Solve the Agrarian Question*, Moscow, 1964; L. P. Delyusin, *The Agrarian-Peasant Question in the CPC's Policy (1921-1928)*, Moscow, 1972; S. A. Kostyayeva, *Peasant Associations in China (1920s)*, Moscow, 1978; A. M. Grigoryev, *The Revolutionary Movement in China in 1927-1931 (Problems of Strategy and Tactics)*, Moscow, 1980. Problems of the socioeconomic transformation of the agrarian system in China are taken up in the following monographs: O. Y. Nepomnin, *An Economic History of China, 1894-1914*, Moscow, 1980; A. V. Meliksetov, *The Socio-Economic Policy of the Guomindang in China, 1927-1949*, Moscow, 1977; A. S. Mugruzin, *Agrarian Relations in China in the 1920s-1940s*, Moscow, 1970.

⁸ U. Roslavlev, *Agrarian Crisis in India*, Moscow, 1932, pp. 63-64.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62, 63.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹¹ *The Foreign Orient and Our Times*, Moscow, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 35 and further.

A petty bourgeois type of peasantry with its groups of rural population formed in Russia late in the 19th and early in the 20th centuries. The petty bourgeois character of the Russian peasantry clearly revealed itself firstly in the demand for the liquidation of big landownership because it was an obsolete form that had exhausted its possibilities of progressive development, and then, secondly, after the victory of the 1917 October Revolution, in the demand for a free market, so that it would realise its possibilities as a producer of commodities. The voluntary cooperation in production by such a peasantry was possible only on the basis of new machine technology ensuring a qualitative growth of labour productivity, combined with preparatory measures to collectivise turnover, by organising a network of supply, marketing and banking cooperatives (Lenin's cooperative plan).

Before the victory of the revolution in China the overwhelming majority of Chinese peasants were of the feudal traditional Oriental type. This type, formed in the course of China's historical development, under conditions characterized by a huge population, a shortage of land, limited efficiency of manual implements, a high intensity of work and extremely small size of peasant farms. In many respects there are fundamental differences between the traditional and petty bourgeois peasantry, because they are products of different historical epochs.

In Russia, where the decomposition of the feudal peasantry had reached an extreme state and the bourgeois-democratic revolution had ripened, the demand for land became the main slogan of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. That this was the crux of the agrarian question was clearly shown not only by the peasantry's behaviour, in "putting on pressure from below", in seizing landed estates and raiding the manors of big landowners in 1905-1906 and 1917, but also by the thousands of resolutions of peasant meetings, their petitions and mandates.

In China, however, with the exception of individual instances which, moreover, were by no means simple, things were completely different. In fact a study of the content of the peasants' demands brings one to the conclusion that the question of land was not raised in any practical way by the peasantry. The actual demands of the peasantry in contemporary historical period were very diverse and uncoordinated and depended on purely local conditions. The different behaviour of the Russian and Chinese peasantry in the revolution testifies to the cardinal distinction between their socio-political "countenances".

My analysis of the main differences between the traditional and petty bourgeois peasantry is based on a comparison of the Chinese and Russian peasantry. Let us begin with a brief economic description. In 1913 the rural population in Russia numbered 130,700,000, the grain harvest was 86 million tons or 658 kilograms per capita of the rural population.¹² In China in 1952, when agricultural production was said to have been fully restored and even exceeded somewhat the highest level achieved in old China, the output of food crops amounted to 163.9 million tons (including soya and potato crops estimated on a 4 to 1 basis), the rural population numbered 503.2 million and thus production per capita of the rural population was 325.7 kilograms,¹³ or about a half of tsarist Russia's level.

The level of grain production, that is, the most important foodstuff can be regarded, especially in the case of China, as a key indicator of

¹² Estimated on the basis of *Central Statistical Board of the USSR. National Economy of the USSR in 1978. Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1979, p. 7, 194.

¹³ Estimated on the basis of *Chinese Agricultural Yearbook*, 1980, Peking, 1981, pp. 4, 5, 34; *Chinese Statistical Yearbook*, 1981, Peking, 1982, pp. 89, 105, 132, 143.

Gr ups of regions	Average annual per capita production, kgs	Number of districts and towns	Rural population, per cent	Gross production, per cent
1 } A	900	107	3.0	8.5
2 } A	625	145	5.7	10.8
3 } A	450	257	11.1	14.8
4 } B	350	523	24.4	25.4
5 } C	250	834	41.4	32.6
6 } C	150	343	14.4	7.9
			19.8	34.1
			55.8	40.5

the possible level of commodity production in agriculture. The closer the level of production is to the level of its consumption the greater is the part of the population that is engaged in the production of the main means of life (and first of all food). And conversely, the higher the level of production of food, the more it

exceeds the level of consumption by those engaged in its production, the higher, under equal conditions, are the possibilities of the specialisation of agriculture and the drawing of new masses of the rural population into industrial occupations.

There are statistics for 1952 showing the level of per capita production of grain in China (by groups of regions) in kilograms.¹⁴

As we see from the Table the 1st, 2nd and 3rd groups of regions (regions A) had a level of production exceeding the average for the country; the 4th group had a level of production that was average for the country (regions B), while the 5th and 6th groups of regions had a level of production that was below the average figure for the country (regions C). Judging by the table those areas producing 350 kgs of grain per capita, were areas having an average level of production. Is this much or little? Our economists estimate that the minimum consumption under Chinese conditions is set at 250 kgs per capita.¹⁵

The remainder shows how much in real terms could be set aside without detriment to the rural economy—in the average (regions B) about 50 kgs per capita of the rural population (less than 15 per cent of the gross output). Living in regions C were 55.8 per cent of the rural population who by the level of production of their staple foodstuff—grain—could only manage to feed themselves. This included 14.4 per cent of the rural population who experienced an acute shortage of bread. About 20 per cent of the rural population had surplus grain and could sell it on the market (although less than half of them had large surpluses).

In 1952 the level of production was not significantly different to that of old China, and for this reason the table can be used to illustrate the production possibilities of the peasantry for previous years (there are no such statistics for old China). In old China there were big differences between the incomes of various groups of the peasantry and within these groups because of the non-uniform nature of feudal exploitation (tax, rent, trade and usury). For this reason, the possible sphere of free peasant commodity production was cut at least by a half, there was also a corresponding reduction in the size of the petty bourgeois strata of the peasantry.

It may therefore be supposed when due account is taken of the yoke of feudal exploitation that more than 55.8 per cent of the peasants (more

¹⁴ See Lee Chenzhui, *Essay on the History of the Agricultural Tax in the PRC*, Peking, 1959, p. 134 (in Chinese).

¹⁵ These figures were given to the author by L. D. Boni. See also Y. Y. Yashnov, *China's Agriculture in Figures*, Harbin, 1933, p. 45. In 1952 the consumption of grain by the rural population amounted to 237 kgs per capita. Marketable grain amounted to 20.9 million tons out of 163.9 million tons, or 12.8 per cent of the gross output. See L. D. Boni, "Mechanism of Extracting Marketable Grain in the PRC (1950s)", in *China: State and Society. Collection of Articles*, Moscow, 1977, p. 277 and sources named in footnote 8. These average figures are directly related to regions B.

than two thirds of the total) could not become commodity producers, their sole task being to feed themselves. And in Chinese conditions this was the traditional type of peasantry.

The level of farm production in tsarist Russia is usually considered to be low, but it turns out to be high as compared to the level in China. The Russian toiling peasantry had surpluses and sold them on the market. The peasantry adjusted itself to the demands of the market and had practical knowledge of trade, of urban life, etc. More than 800,000 reaping machines, 27,000 steam-powered threshing machines and other sorts of equipment were used in Russia's agriculture before the World War I.¹⁶

Modern farm machinery was totally absent in China. The forced links of the peasants with the market totally deprived the market of its "enlightening" and "educating" significance. The world outlook of peasants was limited to the village and its affairs, the peasants did not know the life of the cities and had no idea of the importance of events in the world beyond their village.

Thus the conclusion can be drawn that the Chinese peasantry, traditional in its majority, was a significantly more backward productive force than the Russian petty bourgeois peasantry, in terms of economic potential, and that this alone limited the possibilities of its petty bourgeois transformation. The modest possibilities of the production sphere were largely eliminated by the system of pre-capitalist feudal exploitation.

Let us turn to a comparison of the exploitation of the peasantry in the two countries. In Russia, the role of the state as an exploiter of the peasantry was secondary, the prime role being played by the landlord system. The rate of state tax was roughly equal to that in China, but usually because of the higher productivity of labour such taxation left the average peasant with some kind of surplus. It was precisely among the state peasants that economic development was manifest, that ties with the market grew and progressive changes were observed.

The position of serfs was fundamentally different: the rate of exploitation by the landlord (mostly obligatory labour and quitrent) was much higher than the rate of state tax paid by state peasants. Marketable produce was sent to the market by the landlords while most of the peasant households stuck to semi-natural economy and led a hand-to-mouth existence. In areas where serfdom was predominant, the peasantry groaned under the heavy yoke of exploitation, and as a result progressive economic changes were insignificant and class polarisation was retarded.

When serfdom was abolished in 1861, the former serfs were forced to buy land, the system of payment by work remained, and consequently the remains of feudalism made themselves felt for a long time, condemning the former serf areas to slow rates of development. Despite all this the development of capitalism in serf areas became noticeably faster after 1861.

The disintegration of feudalism in Russia in the middle and the end of the 19th century manifested itself among other things also in the decline of the system of landed estates and the appearance of a strong and numerous small-scale commodity sector. The peasants were acquiring economic independence, losing interest in the commune and viewed their attachment to the estate as a burden. From among the small-scale commodity producers there grew up a small-scale capitalist sector. As for the feudal landed estates, they too began to evolve along capitalist lines. Consequently, the more or less homogeneous peasant mass, within which there had existed only property distinctions, began to stratify into classes.

¹⁶ See I. I. Mintz, *History of the Great October Revolution*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1977, p. 53.

The decomposition of the traditional peasantry into a petty bourgeois one, was nearing its completion in Russia, as a result of the accelerating development of the small-scale commodity and small-scale capitalist sectors. New strata of rural population began forming out of the once uniform peasant mass. The Russian *kulak* was not just a rich peasant but also a rural exploiter who had turned into an entrepreneur, into a capitalist farmer. The middle peasant was not so much a peasant of average income as a synonym of a firmly established farmer, the owner of his means of production, a petty bourgeois in his economic essence and psychology. Hence the poor Russian peasant was by no means just a semi-ruined one but also, essentially, a semi-proletarian earning a considerable part, if not most of his means of livelihood by selling his labour¹⁷.

Relations of a capitalist type in Russia were formed mostly through the market, even though they were complicated by feudal leftovers which, as is known, slowed down the development of the rural economy. Not only the produce of agricultural enterprises of the capitalist type, i. e., those landed estates that had undergone a capitalist transformation, and the growing small-scale capitalist sector, but also the surpluses of the middle peasant households, were sold on the market. The labour market was becoming more important for the parcelled peasantry since it was getting a growing share of its earnings by selling its labour.

By the late 19th and early 20th centuries the economic system of the Russian countryside was already orientated to the market and its requirements. As a result, the peasantry rapidly became stratified and turned into a petty bourgeois mass. The play of market prices enabled the peasants to make a profit, although losses were not infrequent either. The ties of the Russian peasants with the market were relatively free and direct. In any case, the markets in Russia were not so ubiquitously controlled by the landlords and local monopolists as they were in China.

The expansion of the market reflected the division of labour and the specialisation of agricultural production which was to the advantage of the peasantry as a whole. All the ties of the peasant households with the world at large were realised through the market, and the importance of these ties was growing. Since most produce especially intended for sale and the surplus produce of households were sent to the market, anti-market sentiments, which were so widespread among poor peasants in China, were not observed and could not have been observed among Russian peasants.¹⁸ A rupture of market ties would have hurled the Russian countryside several decades back, would have caused the spread of the natural economy and deprived the peasantry of the obvious advantages offered by the division of labour and specialisation.

Traditional ties were undergoing rapid erosion in Russia, especially in the commune, the most important of the traditional entities—their place being gradually taken by class ties established on the basis of the realisation of the community of interests. The commune became the arena for the struggle of these new forces and as a result disintegrated and lost its importance. New organisations—political parties—were active in the cities but their representatives also penetrated into the countryside, where they recruited new supporters. Even when this did not happen (or happened on a very small scale), because of the gradual and consistent change of their situation, the peasants were prepared for the acceptance of new notions and ideas.

In China right up to 1949 the state was the prime exploiter of the peasantry, although its role was noticeably declining. In traditional

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 172-187.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, pp. 329-365, Vol. 33, pp. 467-475.

China's agrarian system, state institutions played the role of a structure-forming element. Along with the usual functions of external and internal social protection, they also performed such key production and social functions as the organisation of large-scale public works, the management of the biggest irrigation systems and road networks, and the creation and management of reserve food stocks, etc.

In traditional China, these institutions operated along with a ramified network of local bodies that carried out production and social functions, and were financed from the profits derived from "public" lands. In modern and contemporary times these lands were plundered and there was a decline in the "quality" of the functioning of the traditional social structures because of the egoism of the landlords and the rural elite which were becoming more avaricious.

By the beginning of the 20th century all this traditional system of ensuring a normal functioning of the production sphere had totally collapsed; the system of social insurance was inactive, since the public granaries were empty, the irrigation installations and canals were in disrepair and becoming quite useless, the rural communities were plundered by soldiers and *tufes* (local bandits), while corruption was rampant among government officials and tax collectors.

After losing its regulatory and organising functions the state apparatus after the fall of the monarchy loyally served its new masters—the militarists. The traditional system of taxation became the economic basis of the militaristic regimes which increased taxation to the maximum level. However, state exploitation continued to remain the main form of exploitation for most peasants. The medieval state tax system became the main obstacle for the productive forces in agriculture: it slowed down both the property stratification of the peasants, and the development of the landlord system. The growth of landed estates was the most noticeable new phenomenon.

The growth of landlord economy was connected with the collapse of the traditional functions of the state and the development of commodity production. The landlord system, especially in Central and Southern China, moved to the fore and began to play a structure-forming role, wresting it out of the hands of the local state bodies. There was a growth of the economic strength and political activity of the class of landlords and there appeared signs of a split in their ranks, resulting in the formation of the Northern and Southern camps. The noticeable participation of sections of the landlord class in the revolutions of 1911 and 1925-1927 can be explained only by the political passiveness of the peasantry.¹⁹

All the positive changes in the landlord system boiled down to the slow process of the conservative capitalist evolution of the landlords.²⁰ The main factor in this evolution was the turning of the land rent in kind that was levied by them into a commodity. This however did not entail any changes whatsoever in the essence of relations between the landlord and the tenant, except for the traditional intensification of exploitation in conditions of surplus labour and the growing rivalry among the peasants for the right to lease land.

¹⁹ See A. S. Mugruzin, "Forms of Exploitation of the Peasantry in Medieval China", *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1983, No. 5, pp. 42-52.

²⁰ The concept of the conservative capitalist evolution of agrarian relations in developing countries, worked out by Soviet researchers in recent years (although conjectures were voiced earlier) is of special importance for our subject-matter because it rationally explains the striking contradiction between the maximum market orientation of peasant produce in the given economic conditions and the extremely archaic socio-class state of the peasantry. Failure to take this circumstance into account resulted in mistakes in assessing the level of development of capitalism in the countryside and the extent of the petty bourgeois nature of the peasant mass (see also footnotes Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11).

In the opinion of progressive Russian economists, the marketability of Russian agriculture was artificial, and attained at the price of the undernourishment of the peasantry. What can be said in this case about the Chinese peasantry? Hunger in the Chinese countryside was a "normal" thing, as was the death from starvation, of the poorest part of the peasantry. So for the poor peasants the aim of production was not nourishment but, correctly, survival.

More than a half of the produce of peasant households reached the market, despite the purely self-consumption orientation of peasant production. But this "marketability" of production was a fiction because the greater part of the foodstuffs sold was then bought back by the peasants: they sold their produce to make urgent payments and then, using the money derived from handicrafts and the sale of their labour bought it back. Far from all such "trade operations" were successful for them: price fluctuations and the sale of their food produce at other markets, made it difficult for them to buy back their foodstuffs.

The high number of market sales, it would seem, should have generated petty bourgeois sentiments among the peasantry and increased its interest in ties with the market. In reality, however, they testified to an opposite effect. The high "commodity rate" caused by unbearable tax and rent (imposed by the landlords), exploitation, created forced ties with the market which generated anti-market sentiments. I have already mentioned the nature of such "trade". In fact, the market engendered relations characteristic of pre-capitalist exploitation. It was only that small part of the comparatively well-to-do peasantry, that had relatively free ties with the market, which became interested in the market and turned into petty bourgeoisie, although this process was slower than in Russia because it encountered numerous obstacles.

Despite its extremely low level of production, the Chinese peasantry was subjected to great, actually unbearable feudal exploitation, leading to the loss of means of production by ever broader sections of the peasantry. The bulk of the peasantry was subjected to the process of pauperisation, resulting in a growth of the number of paupers. However, far from all of them turned into proletarians or semi-proletarians. The process of pauperisation encompassed also the middle sections of the peasantry, producing a strata of "not-well-off middle peasants" who could not become economically independent and whose position was extremely unstable. The emerging strata of rich peasants developed extremely slowly towards becoming a class of rural entrepreneurs preferring the old semi-feudal methods of exploitation—usury, the leasing of land, etc.²¹

The pauperisation of the peasantry did not facilitate in any way the forming of new strata of the rural population because the process of property differentiation brought with it changes mostly within the limits of the traditional social stratification. A rich peasant, provided he escaped ruin, evolved in the direction of a landlord. Only a small part of the ruined peasants became proletarians or semiproletarians. As for the small strata of farm labourers, they were engulfed by the huge mass of paupers and lumpens.

In China the stratification of the peasantry into a petty bourgeoisie and rural semi-proletariat was greatly slowed down by the country's semi-colonial position and the almost unceasing militaristic wars. The periods of calm in the country usually brought about an upsurge of economic activity, and expansion of commodity circulation. This encouraged the peasants to switch to the cultivation of profitable market crops, which in its turn expanded the labour market and the possibilities of

²¹ See: A. S. Mugruzin, "On the Revolutionary Potential of the Chinese Peasantry", in *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1981, No. 6, p. 40 and further.

seasonal work. The militaristic wars severed economic ties between the regions, impeded trade, cut down possibilities of seasonal work and generated in the peasantry the tendency towards natural economy. The replacement of one dominant trend by an opposite trend of no lesser strength, and the situation of instability, generated in the mass of the peasantry contradictory strivings, and deprived it of the possibility of understanding its objective situation and interests. The operation of diametrically opposite tendencies prevented some strata of the peasantry from rising to the next stage of social evolution or even from consolidating itself on the one it had attained. Thus, the poor peasants in China had difficulty in maintaining their position as semi-proletarians. These tendencies perpetuated the traditional stages of consciousness. More than that, traditional ties became even more important for consolidating one's position.

A division into "all the haves" and "all the have nots" was observed in the Chinese countryside but it had nothing to do with class division. The greater part of the "toiling peasantry" was in alliance with the rural upper strata. The weightiest part of the poor peasantry in terms of production also was attracted to the richer strata. As a result, an alliance of the "toiling peasantry" with the most active (and "revolutionary") part of the rural population—the paupers, was extremely complicated, and most often simply prevented by division.

In the Chinese countryside the traditional corporative organisations remained the most important social force: clans, communes, religious societies, secret associations ("hueidans"), etc. Usually organisations of this type, encompassed all sections of the rural population and representatives of the rural upper strata often headed them.²²

The intensification of exploitation resulted in the pauperisation of the peasantry, the growing instability of large sections of the peasantry and its need of external support. The dependence of the peasants on the landlords was due mostly to the need to have land; they depended on the rich peasants for the supply of draught animals and other means of production, while their dependence on the merchants and usurers was due to their need to borrow money. The known statistics on the growing number of tenants are a sign of pauperisation and evidence of the peasantry's growing dependence on the landlords for the renting of land.

The growing economic instability increased, in the eyes of the peasants, the value of traditional corporative organisations which to a certain extent could give them support and protection. This increased the viability of many traditional organisations, and strengthened traditional notions and views. The intensification of exploitation forced peasants to conclude that the current changes were unfavourable, because they were caused by departure from ancient rules and norms, and consequently, that traditions were valuable and that it was necessary to fight to preserve them. The longing for the "lost" justice was the root cause of the reactionary movement for medieval, traditional feudal socialism. The growing influence of the village upper strata on the peasantry, manifested itself in their increased role in corporative organisations, and in the greater potential they had for manipulating the peasant movement for their own purposes. In fact many events in the "Red Spears" movement²³ and the fierce struggle within and between the peasant alliances of supporters and opponents of the CPC during the years of the revolution of 1925-1927 serves as examples of this. In periods of similar social

²² See V. I. Glunin, A. S. Mugruzin, "The Peasantry in the Chinese Revolution". In the book *The Revolutionary Process in the Orient. History and Our Times*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 138-139.

²³ See A. S. Kostyayeva, *Peasant Alliances in China*, Moscow, 1978.

upheavals, the danger of reactionary, in particular pro-monarchy actions of the part of peasantry became real.

Along with the growing influence of the rural upper strata in corporative organisations, there could also be observed a certain tension within the latter in connection with the intensification of exploitation. It became possible to polarise their composition, to split them and to win them over from within. The attempts at direct confrontation with the traditional organisations were the worst. The striving to sever traditional ties, without offering, what would be in the eyes of the peasants a worthy replacement, was tantamount to an encroachment on sacred village traditions. What was needed was a lengthy period of calm, without tense social struggle, without the need to make an immediate choice. What was needed were moderate tactics on a national scale in order to get closer to the peasants, to establish regular ties with them, without "scaring" them with extremes and without insulting their beliefs and prejudices.

So it is clear that the social and economic crisis generated in the peasants, above all a desire to "return" to the old patriarchal order by means of purging of government officials, the restoration of a strong central government to control officials, the introduction of "order" and the observation of the traditional norms of tax and rent exploitation. This was the "minimum programme" that the upper strata in the countryside could promise the peasantry and were even able to fulfil it to a certain extent. But the village poor, very numerous in China, also had their "maximum programme", which was based on vague ideas of absolute property equality, a system of social insurance and support, ruling out the danger of ruination, etc.

The traditional corporative organisations in the countryside were by no means falling apart or losing their importance. Usually, they set themselves the aim of protecting group interests, and giving assistance to their members on the basis of reciprocity. These organisations were in accord with the level of consciousness of the peasants and their principal task—to protect their traditional rights, to stop ruination, and to return to the traditional patriarchal relations.

Under these conditions, the new organisations could not replace the old, traditional ones at once. The peasant associations, supposedly intended to be mass organisations of the toiling peasantry, in reality turned out to be traditional organisations (of the *hueidan* type), with a changed "signboard" continued to struggle for their narrow, group interests. The entire history of these organisations, is firstly, history of the extremely complex and lengthy work to limit and uproot the influence of the rural elite inside the peasant associations and, secondly, a history of the endless strife between the individual groups of peasants, with the struggle of the first type, mingling in all sorts of combinations with the struggle of the second type.

In many parts of Central and Southern China there existed a division into "locals" and "outsiders" which, like those divisions between clans, communities, and secret societies, was characterised by its prolonged fending and frequent bloody clashes and massacres. Sometimes revolutionary events, so to say, provoked the peasants to such a "settling of accounts". More often than not when one side taking part in such clashes between traditional organisations included more poor peasants than the other, then their struggle was taken for a type of class struggle, resulting in observers mistaking the passion and ruthlessness of this struggle for a manifestation of class sentiment and of the acuteness of class antagonisms. Quite often the struggle of the corporative groups of the rural population assumed "modern" forms: thus, secret societies formally proclaimed themselves to be peasant alliances in order to con-

duct struggles, either within the peasant associations themselves, or between these peasant associations and some corporative organisation. Because of the vague boundaries between social groups and the weakness of class differentiation, the delimitation between the belligerent sides often took place, so to say in whole "lumps", that included corporative groups *en masse*, and frequently as a result of chance causes: some clan would entirely take a given side for the sole reason that one of its members had already been fighting for that side.²⁴

It can be concluded that in the social plane, the Chinese countryside, before the victory of the 1949 revolution was organised differently to the Russian countryside before 1917. It was more divided and separated, the village organisations were weak and incapable of playing the role of anti-landlord bodies. Moreover the traditional Chinese peasantry's social organisation was way behind that of the Russian petty-bourgeois peasantry.

All the above-mentioned economic and social differences between the Russian and Chinese peasantry resulted in their behaving quite differently in revolutionary events. These differences can be summed up as follows: whereas the Russian peasantry was aware of its class antagonism with landlords and became a "class for itself", the Chinese peasantry was not aware of this antagonism, and still remained a "class within itself", a peasantry of the traditional type.

En masse, the Russian peasantry had not yet freed itself (or had freed itself only partly) from the corporative bonds, but it was already prepared for the acceptance of new concepts and, consequently, a new social organisation as well. As a result of the strengthening of the new structures, their contradictions with the landlord system manifested themselves ever more sharply, and class antagonism flared up between the entire peasantry and the class of landlords.

During the revolution of February 1917, for instance, the Russian peasantry did not wait for new legislation, they began to attack the landed estates, to take away all their means of production and to burn down the manors. Most of the means of production fell into the hands of the richer peasants. In the countryside power rapidly passed into new hands—usually to committees and councils elected at general meetings. These were run by the richest peasants, and it appeared that the "toiling peasantry" had voluntarily surrendered power to the economically strongest and most influential part of the peasantry, i. e., to the *kulaks*.²⁵

In China there did not exist any united front against the landlords, the countryside was criss-crossed by feudal corporative barriers and the "toiling peasantry" was divided socially. The demands of the peasantry, when they were made, were fractional and contradictory, their content was determined by local conditions, and was often limited to demands for smaller taxes and levies, only occasionally did they demand lower land rent, etc. The low level of social and economic development, the absence of knowledge about life outside the villages and the failure to understand it—all this made the peasantry totally unable to adequately express their needs. Their demands and interests were always expressed by others and always in their "own manner". However the weakness of the leadership of the peasant movement (its organisers strove only to "raise" it and often "followed in the wake" of the peasants) had one positive outcome for historians: the voice of the poor sounded clearer than ever before, in the resolutions adopted by the peasant associations in the 1920s and 1930s. In later years, the mirror reflecting the content of the peasant movement increasingly distorted the picture.

²⁴ See V. I. Glunin, A. S. Mugruzin. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

²⁵ I. I. Mints, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 758-759.

But even in these unique materials characterising the peasantry, we will find little relevant to its main demand—the lowering of taxes and levies. As has already been said, its cardinal demand was essentially the reduction of the amount of product taken away as tax to a minimum because as a result of the extremely low level of production the peasantry had no surplus product. This can be ascertained by an analysis of their position, but even so in the texts of the demands of the peasant associations, we find nothing that would directly or even indirectly testify to this.

In the 1920s the most urgent demand of the entire peasantry was the abolition of the militaristic taxes and levies. They deprived the well-to-do peasants of possible profits and even many landlords were prepared to forego a part of the land rent they received for the sake of a greater stability of the situation. The reduction of taxes would have facilitated the capitalist evolution both of landlords and of rich peasants, and would also have somewhat improved the lot of the other sections of the peasantry.

The unity of the entire population of the Chinese countryside (including not only peasants but also a greater part of the local landlords) in their actions against taxation, and officialdom, was a tradition with a long history. This is explained by the peculiarity of the country's socio-economic development—the existence of land rent as a tax in medieval China which subsequently ceased to accord with the new economic conditions. The heavy taxes and especially the irregular levies imposed by the military authorities incensed the peasantry, and were the main cause of the spontaneous peasant movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s.²⁶

The “demands of the peasantry”, encountered in the literature devoted to the events of 1925-1927, were recorded not by peasants, but by urban revolutionaries, who wrote them down as they deemed necessary and correct. These were not the resolutions of peasant meetings as was the case in Russia, but the creation of the organisers of the peasant movement. Of course, the CPC functionaries tried to determine the sentiments and needs of the peasants, but when putting them down on paper they involuntarily confused the terms “peasant association” and “peasantry”, “demands of the peasant association” and “demands of the peasantry”, thus greatly exaggerating the importance of the associations and distorting the real demands of the peasantry.

The identified differences between the petty bourgeois and traditional peasantry were not always properly taken into account in the CPC's agrarian programme and policy for the countryside.

My thesis about the traditional nature of the main mass of the Chinese peasantry can be illustrated by the example of the position and role of the paupers in the revolution. That stratum of pauper peasants which had lost their means of production, and had to rely on occasional jobs for their livelihood and were therefore prone to lumpenism to one extent or another, was the only force ready for immediate “revolutionary” action in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The paupers were in dire straits because of the low demand for hired labour. They were also subjected to social discrimination, and were separated from the rest of the village community by a wall of mistrust and fear. This, the most easily roused part of the rural population was capable of the most extreme actions. The paupers were the most reliable and active participants in all peasant actions. Paupers joined the armies of the militarists and the bands of robbers who plundered and killed peasants. But they could have been also easily used as a shock force—they could be recruited into the revo-

²⁶ See *Society and State in China*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 189-192.

lutionary army, organised and enlightened, and their destructive energy could be directed towards revolutionary goals.²⁷

The policy of utilising paupers (who were viewed as rural proletarians and semi-proletarians) generated its own problems. The extreme egalitarianism of the paupers ranged them against the main mass of the "toiling peasantry", pushing the latter into the enemy's camp, and leading to the political and social isolation of the paupers. The social isolation of the paupers (and the CPC) was the main cause of the instability of the "Soviet" areas, and of the CPC's defeat during the "first civil revolutionary war" of 1927-1936.²⁸

To achieve the unity of the entire peasantry against the landlords, it was necessary to pursue a policy which took into account and coordinated the contradictory interests of individual sections of the peasantry. This required the establishment of a reliable barrier against the rampant egalitarianism of the paupers, the reliable and rigid control and direction from above of the entire agrarian movement by the authorities and the political leadership. Such was the policy generally pursued in the period from 1937 to 1949.

Given the conditions in the Chinese countryside, it was extremely difficult to secure the support of the paupers while at the same time ensuring the interests of the middle strata of the peasantry. There were no big landed estates in the countryside. Moreover the possessions of the landlords in the backward areas (where the revolutionary bases were usually located) were not big and landlords' lands were distributed among tenants. So it was extremely difficult to meet the needs of the paupers without affecting the interests of the other sections of the peasantry, for quite obviously the interests of the middle peasant and even more so those of the rich peasant were not in accord with the paupers' interests.

At the same time if one consistently observed the interests of the middle peasant (and tried according to the Russian model to neutralise the rich peasants) then the poor peasantry would have had nothing to gain. But the paupers and poor peasants were the political and social support of the CPC, and to risk losing this support, would have been tantamount to dooming oneself to failure. The correct agrarian policy of the CPC had to pass between the "Scylla" of the "leftist" policy of the rampant egalitarianism of the paupers, and the "Charybdis" of the "rightist" policy, of too literally observing the interests of the middle peasants to the detriment of the pressing needs of the poor.

Both extremes were dangerous. The correct policy was to take into account both the interests of the paupers, who provided men for the People's Liberation Army, and those of the middle peasant layers which bore the brunt of the tax burden and were moving towards a policy of supporting the authority of the CPC. In other words, the correct policy included an obligatory element of social compromise and a coordination of the interests of the poor and the paupers, with those of the middle peasants, against the landlords and rich peasants (in Chinese conditions the policy of neutralising the rich peasants was unsuccessful).

The CPC's policy vacillated between the striving to satisfy the poor and the striving to expand its social base—by observing the interests of the middle peasantry. At tense moments of struggle against the Guomindang, this policy moved "to the left", since the CPC pressed for the most effective possible support of the poor. In tranquil periods, the CPC's agrarian policy tended to shift "to the right", since the party wanted to strengthen relations with the middle peasantry on the basis of such mea-

²⁷ See *Society and State in China*, pp. 199, 201, 202.

²⁸ See *The Revolutionary Process in the Orient*, pp. 147-150.

asures as bringing the system of taxation into order. The policy of preserving the landlord property system, and the rich peasant households, of observing the interests of the middle peasant blocked the road to the egalitarian tendencies of the poor. During such periods, the poor stood to gain little and their support for the CPC cooled correspondingly.

The real demands (needs) of the "toiling peasantry" were as follows: a) a normalisation of relations with the state by bringing into order the levying of taxes, b) the purge of the rural administration, i. e., the appointment of honest, non-corrupt officials who would observe both the interests of the authorities and the interests of the peasants, c) the standardisation of exploitation by landlords and assistance in the struggle against *tuhao* and *leshen*²⁹, d) assistance to be given by the authorities in forming production cooperatives of small peasant households.

The latter point seems unexpected. It is necessary to realise that the parcel and small peasant households, and they formed the overwhelming majority, had to rely on something bigger as a structural basis. As it has already been noted, they were not economically independent and could not be commodity producers. In traditional medieval China it was mostly the state institutions that played the structure-forming role and in later times it was the landed estates. This role could also have been played by a state sector giving guidance to the peasant cooperative movement as well. This required the observance of an obligatory condition—organising work by the state sector, which first had to come into being and be similarly organised itself.

As can be seen, from the list of the real pressing needs of the "toiling peasantry" of that time, the Guomindang authorities had failed to satisfy even a single one of these needs, and this predetermined that the peasantry would favour the CPC, despite errors in the latter's agrarian programme and practical policy in respect of the peasantry.

Chinese literature shows a preference to precisely characterise separate layers: rich peasants are rural bourgeoisie, the middle peasants are petty bourgeoisie, while the poor peasants and farm labourers, or some 70 per cent of the rural population, were the "rural semi-proletariat".³⁰ Proceeding from this understanding, the "rural semi-proletariat" was expected quickly to join the struggle for land, under the leadership of the CPC. But the firm alliance with the peasantry was achieved by satisfying "secondary" needs, while the attempts to conduct an agrarian revolution which, seemingly, "accorded with the age-old aspirations of the peasantry", resulted in the social isolation of the CPC, and brought the danger of defeat in the civil war with the Guomindang. The road to victory lay not through the agrarian revolution. In fact even agrarian transformations could only be carried out after the victory of the revolution with the decisive support which was to be provided from above, in a calm situation and with the observance of a whole number of conditions.

The lengthy experience of the CPC's work with the peasantry showed: a) that a direct agrarian revolution with a rapid dismantling of the feudal social structure was impossible; b) it was necessary to find ways of approaching the bulk of the peasant mass, by means of satisfying its most urgent needs, which appeared to be of only secondary importance. To this end, it was necessary by taking into account the differences and contradictions within the peasantry, and by working out measures to diminish them, to harmonise relations in the interests of the struggle against the rural upper strata, and so wrest from it power over the main mass of the peasantry, and shatter the fetters of traditional patriarchal

²⁹ Categories of the most vicious exploiters of peasants, literally "local exploiters" and "wicked *shenshi*").

³⁰ See Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1953, pp. 166-168.

ties; c) the goal of such work with the peasantry could be attained only after a very lengthy period, it could not be accomplished at a single go, just by issuing slogans, no matter how "revolutionary" and "attractive"; d) assistance and guidance from above was an obligatory condition of a successful struggle by the peasants. The peasants themselves could not unite their forces, neither could they determine the direction of the main blow and achieve victory.

The grain monopoly, introduced in 1953 after the agrarian reform, was received by the peasantry very calmly—for in striking contrast with Russia, the peasantry did not demand a free market.

The "socialist transformation" of agriculture and the organisation of agricultural cooperatives of the highest type were carried out in 1955-1956 very quickly and in a relatively orderly manner. The establishment of cooperatives, which according to plans, was to span a period of ten-to-fifteen years, was carried out in a single sweep; whereas the preparatory measures to organise on cooperative terms commodity turnover and credit, had only just been launched and embraced only a minority of peasants. Creation of cooperatives did not encounter the resistance of any big groups of peasants, and was carried out on the scale of such a huge country as China, within the shortest possible period of time.³¹

This was followed, already in 1958, by a lightning campaign to set up rural people's communes—an obvious attempt to socialise the work and daily life of the peasants. Both these "revolutionary" movements—the socialist transformation of agriculture in 1955-1956, and the organisation of communes in 1958—were spread to the cities, where they accelerated the transformation of branches of the state capitalist sector of the economy and generated a movement for communes in cities. All this bears evidence precisely to the fact that in China we do not encounter a petty bourgeois type of peasantry. The calm attitude adopted to the introduction of the grain monopoly, showed that most peasants were not and could not be commodity producers. The peaceful acceptance of the creation of production cooperatives showed that most households had not attained the stage of economic independence, and that they needed support and help from outside, and further that precisely production cooperatives were the most effective means of such outside support. Last but not least, the "great leap forward" which in its time had so struck the imagination of many people, and was viewed as clear evidence of the historically unprecedented revolutionary character of the Chinese peasantry, in reality proved that it had not yet overcome its traditional features. The "leap" had catastrophic consequences for the economy but did not bring about a political catastrophe: its failure was accepted by the peasantry on the whole in the traditional style—as a natural result of natural calamities.

The peasantry's economic and social backwardness was of hugely unfavourable significance. On the political plane, the backwardness of the peasantry created conditions for the ruling party, the CPC, to distance itself from the masses and become bureaucratic, and this clearly manifested itself during the years that followed.

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The process of decomposition of the Russian feudal peasantry did not result in the disappearance of the peasantry as a single whole, or made it possible to discard its integrated character and replace it with the characteristics of individual strata.

³¹ See A. S. Mugruzin, "On the Conditions of Setting Up Peasant Cooperatives in the PRC" In the book *Third Scientific Conference on Problems of China's History*, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1978, pp. 90-93 and further.

In the economic and agrarian works written before the October revolution, Lenin established that Russia was advancing along the capitalist road, that the peasantry was not a single mass and was becoming increasingly stratified into semi-proletarian and petty bourgeois strata under the influence of the laws of commodity economy. Indeed, for this very reason it rose up with ever growing strength as a single whole against the landlords, demanding the liquidation of the landlord system of land ownership. The agrarian question was the central one in the approaching bourgeois-democratic revolution, and for this reason, the identification of the fundamental interests of individual strata, and especially the pinpointing of the main demand of the peasantry was a task of crucial theoretical and practical importance. This main demand was the focus revealing the changed nature of the overwhelming part of the Russian peasantry. The strategy and tactics of the social democratic party in the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions were worked out after Lenin had first determined that the agrarian question was the core of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

It was in 1921, after the victory of the October Revolution that Lenin wrote: "That the small-peasant 'structure', partly patriarchal, partly petty bourgeois, predominates in a small-peasant country is self-evident... Once you have exchange, the small economy is bound to develop the petty-bourgeois-capitalist way."³² The policy vis-à-vis the peasantry was worked out precisely proceeding from this most general, integrated description of the Russian peasantry, as a petty bourgeois one that is spontaneously drawn towards capitalism: the abolition of surplus-grain appropriation and the introduction of the tax in kind (New Economic Policy), were concrete steps towards the gradual establishment of peasant cooperatives, etc. This does not mean at all, of course, that facts of its decomposition into separate strata were rejected as erroneous, or were forgotten. The general direction of the policy in respect of the peasantry was determined precisely by its integral character, while in the approach to individual strata, details were determined by the characteristics of the strata and the growing classes within the peasantry.

So an integrated description of the peasantry is connected with the task of making a precise and strictly scientifically substantiated definition of the stage of socio-economic development of the country and its agrarian sector, and furthermore the formulation on this basis of the general direction of the long-term agrarian-peasant policy. There is no doubt that the description of economic structures and separate strata of the peasantry is important but it is still of secondary importance. In fact the substitution of such a general integrated description of the peasantry as a whole, with descriptions of separate strata can lead to delusions and grave errors.

The question of the type of the Chinese peasantry, since we are speaking about the integrated, most general description of its state is a complex question encompassing a multitude of aspects: the evaluation of the economic potential of the peasantry, its economic organisation, the system of production relations and exploitation by the dominant classes, the social organisation, social psychology and its psychic makeup, ideology and traditions, etc. Only some of them were dealt with in this article, while some were only presented in general outline.

The article contains only some of the conclusions resulting from the formulation of the question of the type of the Chinese peasantry. It is impossible to draw "full" conclusions within the limits of journal article, especially since each aspect requires its own special analysis.

³² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 344.

SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY IN CHINA

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[Article by A. M. Kruglov, candidate of economic sciences]

In the concrete economic conditions of China, there has always been an objective need to develop small-scale industry. It results from the grievous legacy of old China, namely, underdeveloped productive forces and huge relative overpopulation. Before the anti-Japanese war small businesses of the manufactory type employed 60 per cent of the country's workforce, and the number of handicraftsmen (over 7.5 million) was double that of industrial labour.

The formulation (at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1978) of the tasks for modernising the national economy and for the quadrupling of the annual industrial and farm output (at the 12th Congress of the CPC 1982), as strategic targets for the next 20 years, does not imply that the problem of small-scale industry has been removed from the agenda. On the contrary, the decisions taken by the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, can be viewed as the starting point of a new stage in the development of small-scale industry in China. The policy towards decentralising the national economy, granting more independence to local administration and industrial plants in economic activity, permitting at the same time private enterprise to operate, provides broad scope for the development of small-scale industry.

At the same time, the problem of the role and place of small-scale industry continues to be further aggravated as a result of differences of opinion on the future economic development of the country; in particular, the ways and means of accomplishing the task of turning China into a modern industrial power.

On the one hand, those who believed that this task should be fulfilled exclusively through the development of large-scale industry demanded: "It is necessary first and foremost to develop heavy industry... it is only by developing modern large factories, that it will be possible to put the entire national economy onto a progressive technological footing,"¹ "it is necessary really to turn to large factories... the priority task is a technological reorganisation of large-scale production. This is the only way to subsequently influence small industrial plants as well..."²

Their opponents, however, considered this viewpoint "a blind chase after large-scale complex equipment, and a huge expenditure of resources in excess of what the state could afford."³ "The construction of large modern industries, involving sizable capital investments, and long-term construction programmes, they stressed, not only fails to provide society with the output it needs, but absorbs a big part of the social product... Given the limited material and financial possibilities, the state is in a position to build only a small number of large modern enterprises..."⁴

The arguments put forward in debates on the problems of developing small industrial plants, have perceptibly changed during the past

¹ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 6, p. 26.

² *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 9, 1982.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1981.

⁴ *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 11, p. 22.

few years. The Chinese press has pointed out, that a substantial role has been played here, by the desire to avoid the mistakes of the "great leap forward" period, characterised as it was, by the large-scale construction of small and very small industry. It is still argued, that it is possible to do without large capital investment, that small-scale investment makes possible quick capital turnover, short construction schedules, and the accumulation of resources for national construction. It is also stressed that under the changed conditions, the development of small scale industries can be used to alleviate the employment problems. According to statistics, the state has to spend more than 10,000 yuan to provide necessary equipment for one working place in heavy industry whereas only 6,000 yuan is needed in light industry. What is attractive is not only the low cost of working places in small scale industries (which quite often are not supported by state outlays at all) but also the fact, that because of their relatively low level of mechanisation, they absorb huge amount of labour. In 1978, for instance, small scale industry employed roughly 80 per cent of the country's total industrial workforce.

Emphasis is also laid on the tangible contribution of small-scale industry to the provision of basic necessities for the population. For instance, small-scale industry in Shanghai produces 26,000 out of the 30,000 consumer goods manufactured in this city. It also plays a substantial role in generating hard currency revenue for the state. In 1978, for instance, the output of small textile mills accounted for almost 54 per cent, and that of the handicrafts almost 97 per cent, of Shanghai's total export; of these goods (see *Honqi*, 1980, No. 1).

The Chinese press stresses, that the guiding principle behind the development of small industries should be economic rationale, as well as the need to solve the problem of low labour productivity and poor quality of output. With this aim in view, it is planned to intensify specialisation and the division of labour in large-scale industrial production, to establish "a system of coordination and mutually complementing cooperation" between large, medium- and small-scale industry.⁵

"In planning the fuel industry, and transport, it is necessary to firmly pursue a policy of simultaneously building large, medium-sized and small projects", Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, stated in his report at the 2nd Session of the National People's Congress in May 1984. "... It is necessary to encourage the local bodies and the population to invest a considerable portion of financial and material resources, in the construction of small and medium-sized fuel and energy industrial projects." Shortly before, at the previous, 5th session of the fifth convocation (December 1983), Zhao Ziyang stated in his report on the 6th Five-Year-Plan: "We have decided to grasp two links, in order to accelerate the development of the coal mining industry: on the one hand..., to put into operation large coal pits... and on the other, to start... building small and medium-sized mines."

⁵ The state planning and statistical bodies of the PRC classify industries as large, medium or small, on the basis of their annual productive capacity or on the initial value of their fixed assets. In the iron-and-steel industry, for instance, plants producing annually one million tons of steel or more are rated as large, those producing from 100,000 to 1 million tons, as medium, and those producing below 100,000 tons, as small.

In engineering, the plants having initial fixed assets costing more than 30 million yuan are considered large, those with initial fixed assets costing between 8-29 million yuan and below 8 million yuan are considered medium-sized and small respectively. In coal mining, the mines producing annually 900,000 or more tons of coal are rated large, those producing 300,000 to 900,000 tons as medium-sized, and those producing below 300,000 tons as small. In the textile industry, mills with more than 100,000 spindles are considered large, those with 50,000 to 100,000 are considered medium-sized and those with less than 50,000 small, etc.

Table 1

Industry Structure in Terms of Enterprise Size

	Number of plants (thous.)			per cent		
	1980	1981	1982	1980	1981	1982
Total	377.3	381.5	388.6	100	100	100
Large	1.4	1.5	1.6	0.37	0.39	0.41
Medium-sized	3.4	3.5	3.8	0.90	0.92	0.90
Small	372.5	376.5	383.2	98.73	98.69	98.69

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
Peking, 1983, pp. 213, 220.

The report set the target of increasing the aggregate capacity of small hydropower stations by 1.5 million kW per year. "It is impossible to electrify the country's agriculture if we only rely on the state-run electric power supply," the press pointed out (*Renmin ribao*, March 11, 1983). From 1978 to the end of 1983 the capacity of small hydropower plants grew from 5.3 million to 8.5 million kW and electricity generation from 10 billion to 20 billion kWh, the latter being roughly one half of the power consumption in the countryside in 1983 (47.5 billion kWh).

The new industrialisation strategy envisages the simultaneous development of all types of industrial production: modern automated, mechanised, large-scale and semi-mechanised production, handicraft, and all the way down to traditional small-scale manual labour.

Simultaneously, it is planned to develop in parallel public, collectively owned and private property. "Taking into account the real conditions in China, we must adopt a 'Chinese-type modernisation'," *Renmin ribao* stressed, "combining large- and small-scale industries, automation, semi-mechanised production and handicrafts. Handicrafts will for a long period continue to exist in three forms...: the property of the entire people, i. e., the state, collective property and the property of individual handicraftsmen."⁶

Small and very small industries constitute an absolute majority in the industrial system of China (see Table 1).

Small plants generate over one half of the country's industrial output in value terms. If we discount medium-sized plants, large-scale production contributes only about one-fourth of the total value of industrial output (see Table 2).

Large-scale production has grown insignificantly as compared with other types of production during the past few years (see Table 1). Compared with 1976 and 1977, when it grew by 6 and 6.6 per cent, respectively, it even shrank in relative terms. At the same time, the share of state-run enterprises in Chinese industry fell from 24.1 per cent in 1978 to 22.2 per cent in 1982.⁷

In socio-economic terms, the structure of China's small-scale industry comprises in addition to state-run plants, (i. e., government-managed small-scale plants constituting for the most part, local industry) small collectively owned enterprises, in city and countryside, and private enterprises.

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, July 4, 1979.

⁷ *China Statistical Yearbook*, 1983, p. 213.

Table 2

Gross Value of Industrial Output

	Million yuan			per cent		
	1980	1981	1982	1980	1981	1982
Total	499.2	519.9	557.7	100	100	100
Large	125.1	128.8	145.6	25	25	26
Medium-sized	90.4	92.0	102.7	18	18	19
Small	283.7	299.0	309.4	57	57	55

Calculated from: China Statistical Yearbook, 1983,
p. 215.
1980-1981 — in 1970 prices
1982 — in 1980 constant prices.

A new tendency to be observed in the development of China's small-scale industry today is the reduction, both in absolute and in relative terms, of the number of state-run small plants, and the increasing number of individual and especially collectively owned enterprises.

After the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee (1978), the number of workers and employees at collectively owned plants in cities (now and hereafter including rural settlements) grew by more than 6 million, to reach 26.51 million by the end of 1982, or 23.5 per cent of the total number of workers and employees in the country. During that period the output of those plants increased by 49 per cent.⁸

In late 1982, the collectively owned plants in the countryside (1.36 million plants managed by communes and production teams) employed 31.1 million people, that is over 10 per cent of the country's able-bodied rural population. The aggregate value of the output of those plants was 77.2 billion yuan,⁹ which meant that they generated over one half of the total farm production income.

Although the output of individually owned industrial plants does not appear to be significant—in 1980, according to our estimates, their share was 0.6 per cent of the gross industrial output—the number of private entrepreneurs granted licences rose by 340,000 during 1982 alone, to reach 1.47 million¹⁰ or 33 times the figure in late 1979.

The productive forces of collectively owned plants, established without government investments, are being used extensively in pursuance of resources for the "four modernisations" programme). As a rule, relatively large state-run enterprises congregate several collectively owned factories, as subcontractors, producing separate parts or spares, or performing certain auxiliary operations, such as grinding and packing. In this way costs are cut down, but at the expense of relatively poor working conditions; in particular, substantially lower pay rates for similar operations, as compared with state-run enterprises, the absence of labour insurance, inadequate or nonexistent safety regulations, etc. For instance, collectively owned plants in the city of Ningbo in 1978 turned 32.2 yuan of profit per 100 yuan of assets, whereas the figure for the state-run plants was 22.68 yuan. In Changzhou the collectively owned enterprises generated 67 yuan of profit per 100 yuan of fixed assets, twice as much

⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, May 12, 1983.

⁹ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*, 1983, pp. 206, 209.

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, May 12, 1983.

as the state-run plants did; and 13 yuan of profit per 100 yuan of production costs was generated, 18 per cent more than the state enterprises.¹¹

That part of the accumulated funds of collectively owned (and partially private) industries, deducted as taxes constitutes a considerable share of state revenue. The taxes, levied by the handicrafts industry department, a subdivision of the Ministry of Light Industry (97 per cent of which is made up by collectively owned industries) in 1978 constituted 5 per cent of state revenue.¹²

This also holds true for collectively owned plants in the countryside, i. e., the plants managed by communes and production teams. Deductions from the funds accumulated by those plants in 1978 totalled 2.6 billion yuan, or more than 60 per cent of state investment in capital construction in agriculture.¹³ On the whole, the plants run by communes and production teams paid, in taxes, 6.07 billion yuan between 1977 and 1979.

In addition, these rural industries are an important source of raw and other materials. Not only local industries, but also a number of large state enterprises, rely on the coal and iron ore extracted in small primitive mines run by communes and teams. These collectively owned plants generate more than 15 per cent of the country's total coal extraction, about 7.5 per cent of iron ore, 63 per cent of brick production, 53 per cent of tiles, more than 95 per cent of lime, sand, and other construction materials. In addition, they contribute noticeably to the supply of consumer goods, such as paper, leather, clothes, shoes and kitchen ware, amounting to a total value of 10.4 billion yuan in 1979.¹⁴

In total, in 1983 the rural industries generated 36.8 billion yuan worth of output, which stood at 6 per cent of the country's gross industrial output.

During the past few years, small unprofitable enterprises have begun to be handed down to groups of producers, or to individuals on contractual terms. Zhao Ziyang noted at the first session of the Sixth National People's Congress on June 6, 1983, that "small industrial plants, while remaining state property, are handed over to their workers and employees on a collective or individual contractual basis."

For instance, the municipal authorities of the city of Benxi, Liaoning province, having analysed the performance of the state-run small industries in the city (the overwhelming majority of them were inefficient, incurring an aggregate loss of over 6 million yuan a year), handed them down to workers and employees on contractual terms while labelling them as state property. The workers, however, were responsible, not only for production, assets, marketing, supply, etc., but also for wages, bonuses, work insurance, and so on.¹⁵

Since 1978 several legislative, administrative and political measures have been taken to encourage the development of collective and individual small-scale industries.

The report to the 12th CPC Congress pointed out that at present, industries, among them handicrafts, and also transport, construction, trade and the services in cities "cannot function entirely within the public sector confines" but should be "partially incorporated in the collective sector". It was also stressed, that encouragement needed to be given to collectively owned industries in cities, built on the donations of young people since they were "quite useful". A resolution of the CPC Central

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 16, 1979.

¹² *Ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1979.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1979.

¹⁴ See *China Encyclopaedic Yearbook*, 1981, Peking, 1982.

¹⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 31, 1983.

Committee and the State Council (November 1981) on promoting economic activity and employment stressed the need to develop "new economic forms", including the non-socialist ones. It was pointed out in this respect that "individually owned economic units have become an adjunct to, and an essential complement of, the state-run and collectively owned economy". The resolution stressed that the development of individually owned industries was "of great importance in developing production, enlivening the market, meeting the vital needs of the people and increasing overall employment". It also pointed out that "an appropriate development of private and collective enterprise is intended to be a long-term policy".

Unlike the old constitution, which guaranteed the inviolability of only socialist public property, the new constitution, approved by the 5th Session of the National People's Congress in December 1982, provides for the "protection of the lawful rights and interests of individually owned economic units".

Resolutions of the governing state and party bodies (e. g., the October 17, 1981 resolution of the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council) and also leaders and editorials in the party press, repeatedly urged to "develop in every way and fully employ, the effective potentialities of collectively owned industries", to "take immediate measures aimed at the proper development of individually owned small enterprises"¹⁶ etc.

The progress report to the 2nd session of the fifth National People's Congress (1979) pointed out that "the number of people on job lists, exceeds the number of available vacancies" and that it was necessary "to expand employment, through efforts to develop handicrafts, the municipal services in cities, and to extend the service trade spheres."¹⁷ It was established that the development of collectively and individually owned industries, rather than state enterprises, was the best way to raise employment level.

A resolution of the PRC State Council on industrial development in the communes (September 1979) says that "in future, it will be the accumulation funds of the commune and production team industries" that will become the source for investments in agriculture because, admittedly, "at present and in the foreseeable future governmental appropriations will be far from meeting the real needs of agriculture". It is noteworthy that the resolution also stressed the need "to put those plants to the service of large-scale industry and export".

A joint circular issued by a number of departments and ministries in July 1981, directed that "governmental bodies of different levels and related departments, concerned with finances, trade, material supply, etc., shall encourage in every way the development of private economic units in cities, and assist them in obtaining cash resources and raw materials, in locating, taxation, and market regulation". It noted that "any discrimination against, arbitrary interference with, or indifference towards individually owned plants, does not encourage the growth of the socialist economy and that such attitude is erroneous".¹⁸

These resolutions stipulated that collectively and individually owned plants had to enjoy equal rights with state owned industries in regard to raw materials supply, credits, marketing, etc.

Within the three fiscal years between 1980 and 1982, the People's Bank of China granted a total of 170 million yuan in loans to private entrepreneurs. The loans of the Agricultural Bank of China for the con-

¹⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 15, 1980; Jan. 6, 1983.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1979.

¹⁸ *Renmin ribao*, June 16, 1981.

struction and expansion of industries run by communes and production teams, totalled 800 million yuan during the first half of 1982 alone.

The comprehensive encouragement given to small-scale industry in China, at present, has created serious contradictions. As the rights of local bodies in allocating resources for capital construction were expanded, and a certain degree of independence was granted to small industries by the resolutions of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, the regulating role of centralised planning was substantially reduced. In effect, production became far more haphazard and construction projects were duplicated. The "blind" development of small-scale industrial production and the duplication of construction, in the opinion of the well-known Chinese economist Xue Muqiao, "establishes a course which is at odds with the state plan and the policy of the party, taking into account the general interest of the whole. This poses a serious problem at a time when there has been so far no drastic turn for the better in the financial and economic situation of the country."¹⁹

Another Chinese economist, Lin Zili, stresses that industrial production in the PRC "is characterised by a gap between production capacities and raw materials supply. The irrational development of small industries everywhere has worsened this discrepancy."²⁰ The Chinese press tries to play down the gravity of the situation. "Some people fear duplication and 'blindness' in production and construction", *Renmin ribao* wrote. "Of course, given such a large number of small and medium-sized industries in China, this cannot be totally avoided but should not be feared either."²¹ "We are unable to plan directly the entire economic activity", the journal *Jingji yanjiu* claimed. "Small scale industries, which are plentiful and produce a great many products, should be regulated by the market... We should not fear 'blindness' ... Moreover, market regulation may cause other side effects, such as capitalist style of economic management and a wrong style of work. But this should not be feared."²²

Fresh admissions were made at the 2nd session of the 6th National People's Congress in May 1984, indicating that the main problem in the economy, was the lack of efficient control over the volume of investment in capital construction, which led to shortages of steel, timber and cement. "One source of contradictions in the process of our economic development stands out most dramatically, and that is, that we face the task of launching large-scale construction with insufficient resources," Zhao Ziyang said in his report. He also pointed out that the decentralisation of funds still remained a serious problem.

The chaotic development of small-scale industries, particularly the collectively owned plants run by communes and production teams, has seriously aggravated the contradictions between them and large state-run industry in the field of raw material sources. These contradictions were most manifest in the extraction, silk-making, leathermaking, sugar, canning, liquor, tobacco, paper and soap industries.

According to a survey of the Datong coalfield, (Shanxi province) the country's major coal-producing area, in 1980 the communes and production teams started 140 small-size mines without proper authorisation, of which 42 came into serious conflict with large government-controlled mines over delineation of mining zones. As many as 15 serious incidents were registered during one year alone, causing much damage to the property of the large mines and creating a threat to safety of workers. Si-

¹⁹ *Honqi*, 1982, No. 19; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1983, No. 1.

²⁰ *Shehui kexue yanjiu*, 1981, No. 2, p. 15.

²¹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 14, 1983.

²² *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, No. 9.

milarly, in Hunan province, more than 70 small-scale coal-mining operations were run at random by communes and production teams in one district, and a total of about 400 operated in the area as a whole. There air ducts were damaged, as a result of which, production came to a standstill at one of the largest and most important government-controlled mines in the area, with a design capacity of 450,000 tons of coal a year. Small time coal miners drove a total of more than 10,000 meters of tunnels in the Ningxiang district, Shuangfupu, in that province alone, spoiling 1,550,000 tons of high-quality coal seams.²³

The situation in light industry, particularly, in leather-making also shows what great damage can be done to the interests of large government-controlled production. The state potential in annual procurement of hides is estimated at 5.6 million pieces. In 1979, however, it could only procure 3.98 million hides, the rest being absorbed by a multitude of small tanneries operated by communes and production teams. In the Jiangsu province, the main supplier of hides and skins, small tanneries purchased at prices slightly above those paid by the state almost the entire stock of hides and skins. At the same time, the Chinese press admits, the quality of leather produced by those tanneries, because of their deplorable technical standards, leaves much to be desired.²⁴

Many other small-scale industrial plants run by communes and production teams, in particular, those producing nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizers and those involved in small-scale metallurgy waste raw and other materials because of substandard equipment and obsolete technology.²⁵

The poor development of small-scale industries with their very low technological standards, are making themselves felt ever more forcefully from year to year. Only about one half of all the rural plants are able to use electric power. Most of the small-scale industry even in cities has neither engineering and technical personnel nor skilled workers. These factors combined with outdated, virtually home-made equipment, have meant primitive production processes which have resulted in colossal expenditures of power and raw materials and the production of substandard output all over the country. The extraction ratio at the 1,300 small mines of the abovementioned Datong coalfield in 1980 was a mere 20 per cent. The small nitrogen fertilizer plants in the Henan province incurred losses totalling 230 million yuan in 1979.²⁶

Given the complex financial and economic situation in the country and the aggravated imbalances in the national economy, the problems of the development of small-scale industry are increasingly clashing, on the one hand, with the urgent task of enhancing the centralisation, planning and regulation of the industrial and economic machinery of the country as a whole, and, on the other, with the possibility of using it to realise the "four modernisations" programme.

Now that raising the efficiency of production has been proclaimed the avowed major goal in the country's economic progress, the press is stressing the need to save time and resources, by shifting emphasis from capital construction, to the modernisation of the existing plants, predominantly small and medium-sized ones.

As a matter of fact, two trends in technical modernisation and reorganisation of small industry are most obvious. On the one hand, depending on the technical and economic level of a small plant and the importance of its output for the national economy, measures are taken

²³ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 16, 1980.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1980; Jan. 17, 1980.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1979; *Guangming ribao*, Nov. 3, 1980.

²⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 19, 1979.

either to redirect it towards making other products, or to attach it to some other plants which are in better condition. Small plants which have no durable raw material or energy sources and which have operated at a loss for some years are as a rule closed down. Fixed and circulating assets thus released are concentrated at the operating plants. Only rarely is equipment manufactured by major enterprises installed at small ones, and by and large the process of streamlining small-scale industry relies on the existing production and technological base. As many as 283 out of the total of 1,250 small-nitrogen fertilizer plants in the country were closed or merged with others, and about as many were converted to light industry production, such as artificial leather and dyes.

As result of the readjustment campaign, about 30 per cent of the small steel works in the country had been closed by the middle of 1980. In September 1982, more than 200 works were shut down, and 55 of those remaining were earmarked for technical reconstruction. As a result, cast iron production costs decreased from 340 to 258 yuan per ton and the required coke consumption per ton of cast iron fell by 340 kg.²⁷

The other method adopted is the attempted technical reconstruction of small plants through the importing of foreign technology. As the People's Bank of China announced, \$1.5 billion were set aside to buy equipment and technology for the modernisation of the existing small and medium-sized plants in the sixth Five-Year-Plan Period. The Minister of External Economic Relations and Foreign Trade, Chen Muhua, stated in May 1983 that 3,000 types of technology and machinery were going to be imported for the modernisation of 400 small and medium-sized plants during that period. Between 1980 and 1982 the hard currency credits granted by the People's Bank, for the modernisation of small and medium-sized plants, totalled \$1,029 billion. Shanghai is planning to receive during the remainder of the five-year period (up to and including 1985) more than 1,000 items of advanced foreign technology and equipment to retool small and medium-sized plants. Among the items purchased are precision machine tools, electronics, equipment for alloy and plastics production, food-processing equipment, machinery to make household electric appliances, etc.

Small plants in the Guangdong province which export their output, were allowed to use a part of their hard currency revenue, to buy foreign-made equipment, such as looms, and also dyes, cotton, etc. In late April 1983, the State Council decided, that the city of Tianjin should become "an experimental centre for the modernisation of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises" on the basis of advanced imported technology. However, only 327 projects will be reorganised in the city.

All this makes it possible to draw the conclusion, that small-scale industry in China remains an important component of the national economy. It is a vital reserve of the productive forces, an accumulator of resources for the state budget, not to mention its role in alleviating employment problems and as a foreign currency earner.

Moreover, it is attached a substantial role in the fulfilment of the "four modernisations" programme, particularly in the fuel and power industries.

At the same time it is obvious, that the hypertrophied development of small-scale industry in the economic life of the country, in particular, in the "four modernisations" programme, may entail negative consequences for the national economy. The plan "to save time and resources" resting as it does on the development of small-scale industry, can in practice only add momentum to those centrifugal tendencies, which hamper the fulfilment of today's major socio-economic tasks.

²⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, July 14, 1980.

PRC SAID WORKING WITH U.S. TO SUBVERT DRA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 84 (signed to press 23 Nov 84) pp 86-89

[Article by Yu. M. Ryakin: "The Undeclared War of Imperialism and Hegemonism Against Afghanistan"]

[Text] Six years have passed since the Afghan nation took the path of building a new society. The process of national-democratic revolution in the DRA has been expanding and deepening. The country has been taking measures to assure the fundamental improvement of the workers' life and to reinforce their political authority, and all the necessary steps are being taken to defend the gains of the April Revolution. Unwilling to reconcile themselves to their defeat, the forces of Afghan counterrevolution, acting under the guardianship of their foreign bosses, are attempting to paralyze the DRA economy and to create difficulties for the normal life of the country. Under these conditions, the Afghan leaders emphasized, a task that continues to be a very important task currently confronting the NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and the government is the defense of the country against counterrevolution. As B. Karmal emphasized in a statement at a session of the Politburo of the NDPA Central Committee in August 1984, the DRA is being opposed by various forces acting in collusion--the American imperialists, the Chinese hegemonists, the Pakistani militarists and the Iranian reactionaries. Moreover, areas in Iran and Pakistan are being used for the constantly expanding interference in Afghanistan's affairs. All this is creating a real threat to the peace not only in the region, but also throughout the world.¹

The April Revolution canceled the plans of the local reactionary forces and the forces of imperialism and hegemonism in that part of the world. As a consequence, the Afghan nation had to encounter their coordinated hostile activity, which includes such methods as crude interference in the internal affairs of the DRA, the support of domestic counterrevolution and the constant threat of aggression from outside. By exerting combined pressure on the DRA, the forces hostile to it are attempting to disrupt the development of the Afghan revolution, to do everything to hinder the resolution of the complicated socioeconomic tasks confronting the country and to create foreign policy problems for the DRA that are difficult for it to resolve. It is precisely this tactic--a tactic that exhausts the forces of Democratic Afghanistan--that imperialism and hegemonism are counting on to defeat the Afghan

revolution and bring about the subsequent restoration of their positions in the region.

In the struggle against Democratic Afghanistan, international imperialism and reactionary forces made wide use of the Afghan counterrevolution, to which its foreign protectors provide all kinds of material, military and political support. The intention is to confirm the counterrevolution as a powerful political and military force that is capable--if not of causing the defeat of the DRA--at least of creating for it extremely difficult problems in domestic and foreign policy.

In particular, they are trying to create the myth of the international prestige of the Afghan counterrevolution, to reinforce its position as practically an authoritative member of the international community. In this regard one should note the aggressive actions of China, which are aimed at raising the level of the foreign contacts of the Afghan counterrevolution.

For example, on the eve of and during the course of the 14th Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Countries Participating in the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO] in Dhaka in December 1983, Chinese officials in their contacts with representatives of Bangladesh zealously fought to have the members of the ICO raise the status of the leaders of the "dushmans" who were coming to them.² That action of Beijing should not be viewed in any way other than preparation for the creation of an Afghan "government-in-exile."

In a combination of forces that are dangerously inciting the situation around Afghanistan, the countries distinguished by an especially aggressive drive are the United States and the PRC. That has been pointed out repeatedly by the Afghan leaders. For example, DRA Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Muhammad Dost stated in January 1984 in an interview granted to the newspaper L'UNITA, "At present China's position with respect to us is not only unfriendly but also hostile."³ The same evaluation is given in the DRA to the policy of the United States with respect to Afghanistan.

Beijing and Washington constantly make an elaborate show of pointing out the similarity between their positions with regard to the "Afghan problem." For example, the premier of the PRC State Council, Zhao Ziyang, who made an overseas visit in January 1984, placed special emphasis on the commonality of the approaches of China and the United States to the problem of Afghanistan, and that could not have failed to receive a favorable response in Washington. Moreover, the Chinese leader expressed his conviction that the United States and the PRC would be able to coordinate their actions. The BAKHTAR agency, commenting on 8 February 1984 on this statement by the PRC premier, emphasized that "this coordination means the expansion of the undeclared war against Afghanistan."

The joint actions of imperialism and hegemonism that are directed against Afghanistan include, first of all, the supplying, preparation and organization of the actions of the "dushmans." The details of this "interaction," including those at a high level, are constantly worked out, refined and coordinated. For example, according to reports in the foreign press, the

PRC minister of foreign affairs, Wu Xueqian, during a visit to the United States in 1983, had a meeting with the director of the CIA, during which the question was raised concerning the expansion of the coordinated secret actions of the United States and China against Afghanistan and Cambodia.⁴ The practical forms that this "cooperation" is taking can be judged on the basis of reports in the Afghan press. For example, the newspaper HAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR reported that after the April Revolution, "Beijing became, practically speaking, the second center after the United States for waging an undeclared war against the DRA." HAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR also reported that the intelligence agencies of the PRC had established close contacts with Maoist organizations in Afghanistan, which had been given instructions to cooperate with the most reactionary circles that were orienting themselves chiefly toward Washington. Furthermore, Beijing is putting the Maoist organizations together into a so-called national united front of Afghanistan, on which it plans to rely in its anti-Afghan activity.⁵

Within the confines of their coordinated line aimed against Afghanistan, the United States and China are devoting a large amount of attention to Pakistan. With their "support," the latter country is being rapidly converted into a state whose policy during recent years has been a source of constant and dangerous tension in regions of South Asia and Southwest Asia.

With the knowledge and support of the ruling circles of Islamabad, the territory of Pakistan has been converted into a beachhead for armed interference in the affairs of the DRA and into the chief base for training and equipping armed gangs. According to certain sources, 85 counterrevolutionary organizations are based on Pakistani territory. Inasmuch as the Pakistani authorities have assumed the role of the practical coordinator of the undeclared war against the DRA which is being waged by international imperialism and reactionary forces, the Zia ul-Haq administration receives tremendous financial support from the United States, China and a number of other countries.

China's line, aimed at converting Pakistan into a principal base in the struggle against the DRA, received further development in the course of a visit to Pakistan in March 1984 by PRC President Li Xiannian. During his stay there, the Chinese leader made a number of anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet statements. In this context, the satisfaction that he expressed concerning the "expansion" of Chinese-Pakistani relations had a very definite meaning.

Commenting on the statement by Li Xiannian concerning the "expansion" of relations between China and Pakistan, the BAKHTAR agency on 8 March 1984 emphasized that this "expansion" means "aid in reinforcing the positions of the military regime of Islamabad in the struggle against its own people; [it means] new provocations, including military ones, against India, and new flows of arms for the Afghan counterrevolutionary gangs which have built a nest on the territory of Pakistan." "As for Pakistan itself," the BAKHTAR agency pointed out, "by promising to follow the militant course of Washington together with the hegemonists of China, it is letting itself be drawn into a dangerous game." The inflammatory position occupied by the Chinese leader during his visit to Pakistan caused sharp protests in the DRA. A representative of the DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated to a correspondent in the

BAKHTAR agency, "The DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges a decisive protest with regard to the inflammatory statements made by Li Xiannian and declares that the DRA nation, which has linked its fate with the April Revolution, is ready to wage to the finish the patriotic struggle against the mercenary counterrevolutionary gangs."

By way of Pakistan, Beijing supplies the Afghan counterrevolution with recoilless 75-mm and 82-mm guns, submachine guns, antiaircraft guns, mines and other types of weapons. Chinese instructors, who are specialists in subversive activities, are active in "refugee" camps near Quetta, Chitral and Dir. China has also been rendering massive military aid to the Zia-ul-Haq military regime, supplying it with tanks, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft, artillery guns, small arms and ammunition. A new and threatening element in the already explosive situation in the region has been introduced by the Chinese-Pakistani contacts in the nuclear area.⁶

Islamabad, which ties itself closely with the United States and China and which has granted the use of Pakistani territory for anti-Afghan activity, has proven to be a hostage in the hands of its senior partners, who, in what is factually an uncontrolled manner, have been in charge of its foreign policy line. The Indian magazine MAINSTREAM remarked in this regard, "Although the Pakistani Government has a self-interest in seeing that China provides the Afghan counterrevolutionaries with material and military aid, it wants to also retain control over the relations that the leaders of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries have with third countries. It appears that Zia-ul-Haq is afraid that the Afghan counterrevolutionaries, with the support of foreign forces, including China, can be brought into unforeseen actions that could threaten the long-term interests of Pakistan and its security."⁷ In other words, Pakistan can be drawn, by its patriots who are acting through the Afghan counterrevolutionaries, into a dangerous military provocation, the consequences of which are difficult to predict.

It must be said that, for the Chinese leadership, the anti-Afghan position that it occupies means, apart from everything else, the favorable opportunity to maintain a "strategic dialogue" with Washington.

In China they are counting on getting, in response, a well-disposed attitude on the part of Washington in various spheres of Sino-American relations. The Afghan press has directed attention to this peculiarity of the PRC position. For example, in the spring of 1984, on the eve of U.S. President Reagan's visit to China, there was a marked increase in the number of anti-Afghan items in the Chinese press, which were apparently intended to create the appropriate background for the Sino-American summit meeting. On 11 April 1984 the BAKHTAR agency, directing attention to the fabrications that were being circulated by the NEW CHINA NEWS agency concerning the employment of "Soviet chemical weapons in Afghanistan," asked a completely pertinent question: "Aren't fabrications like this part of the pattern in the welcome mat that Beijing intends to roll out in front of the U.S. President?"⁸

The tone set by Chinese propaganda agencies was taken up by President Reagan and the persons accompanying him after they had arrived in the PRC. The

American representatives used their stay in China for the purpose of making anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet attacks. American Secretary of State G. Shultz, in an interview on U.S. television, for example, stated that there even exists a "program" for aid to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries, and he explained, "I am not planning to speak about this program, but there is no doubt that if there is an opportunity to render assistance to the freedom fighters, they deserve the aid." (According to information in the press, American aid alone to the "freedom fighters" during the current Afghan year, from March 1984 to March 1985, will come to 125 million dollars.)⁹ Making statements during their stay in the PRC that contained attacks for the purpose of effect against the DRA and USSR, Reagan and the members of his administration emphasized, as it were, the stability of the American-Chinese cooperation with regard to the "Afghan problem" in terms of the corresponding foreign policy effect for all the world to see.

In addition, the similarity of the positions of the two sides with regard to the question of Afghanistan enabled Washington--as well as Beijing--to conceal, as it were, or to shove into the background the definite American-Chinese differences of opinion that had manifested themselves--for example, those dealing with the Taiwan problem. In this sense it can be said that the anti-Afghan position of Beijing and Washington is one of the important elements that cement the Sino-American relationship.

Immediately after R. Reagan's visit to China, the military and political pressure against the DRA increased sharply, and the secret subversive operations became especially intensive. In the summer of 1984 a group of leaders of the Afghan "dushmans" who were vocally against the legal government of Afghanistan secretly visited Beijing. According to reports in the press, that group's visit was preceded by a visit to China by Pakistani generals Ali Akbar Khan and Sakbar Husein Sa'id. According to information that has been leaked, the Pakistani military conducted negotiations relative to the implementation of an understanding concerning shipments to Pakistan of tanks and missiles intended for destroying helicopters. These missiles, according to certain sources, are also intended for use against bandit formations in Afghanistan. In addition, the Chinese side pledged to train, on its territory, several hundred Pakistani servicemen to be specialists in sabotage operations. Their training is to be carried out in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.¹⁰ According to information in the press, in May 1984, in one of the camps on the territory of Xinjiang, 50 "dushmans" had completed their training and had been sent into Pakistan for the purpose of being sent farther on, into the DRA. In addition, detachments of the counterrevolutionaries were undergoing training in two other camps on Chinese territory. According to reports in the press, they had arrived at the Chinese military training centers accompanied by Pakistani officers, who then took part in their instruction, jointly with U.S. and Chinese specialists.¹¹

Also oriented to the further exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan were the Sino-American negotiations that were conducted during the visit to China by Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaqub Khan in July 1984. His trip to the PRC was obviously used for the purpose of increasing the activity of the Afghan counterrevolution, of drawing Pakistan further into the dangerous

anti-Afghan activity and of causing a general aggravation of the situation involving Afghanistan. True, the Chinese side, counting on the political effect, attempted to depict its position with regard to the "Afghan problem" as practically a peacemaking one. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian stated, for example, that the "Chinese Government and nation firmly support the government and nation of Pakistan in all the efforts they are undertaking in order to achieve the political resolution of the Afghan question on the basis of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, while manifesting a firm adherence to principle and observing justice." However, statements such as this, which in no way conform to Beijing's actual behavior, cannot mislead anyone. As has become known, during the course of negotiations the Pakistani authorities requested the Chinese side to move some of the Afghan counterrevolutionary camps from Pakistan to China. In this regard it was pointed out that the Afghan counterrevolutionaries have begun receiving modern, improved, more complicated arms from the United States, including antiaircraft missiles, and that the instruction in using those arms could be provided only on Chinese territory, inasmuch as Islamabad did not want to assume that mission itself. In conformity with the understanding that had been reached during the negotiations, three camps of Afghan "dushmans" have already been moved from Pakistan to the southern part of Xinjiang.¹²

All this could not fail to mean a further dangerous shift in the position of the PRC and Pakistan relative to Afghanistan. In this regard an Afghan newspaper wrote, "The rhetorical statements by the Chinese minister of foreign affairs to the effect that 'China supports the efforts of the UN general secretary in organizing Afghan-Pakistani contacts' and is attempting to promote the development of relations between these countries on the basis of 'dialogue and consultations' do not have anything in common with reality. In no way does Beijing support the initiative of the Afghan Government with regard to the peaceful settlement of the problems that pertain to the situation with regard to Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Beijing leadership is intensifying its interference in the internal affairs of the DRA and has been increasing its financial support of the Afghan counterrevolution.¹³ The same conclusion was reached by the BAKHTAR agency, which stated in a commentary on 16 August 1984 that "the provocation visit by Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaqub Khan to Beijing, and the understanding that was reached at the negotiations with PRC officials concerning the transfer of a number of camps for the training of Afghan counterrevolutionaries to China to the Xinjiang area attest to the intensification of China's interference in the internal affairs of the DRA."

The BAKHTAR agency emphasized that "Yaqub Khan's visit to Beijing was nothing else but the implementation of plans that were previously worked out during U.S. President R. Reagan's trip to Beijing. In the question of Afghanistan, the interests of the United States and of Chinese hegemonism are closely intertwined."

One of the confirmations of the accuracy of the conclusions made by the Afghan agency can be provided by the negotiations that were conducted in August 1984 in Pakistan by U.S. Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman. According

to reports in the press, at his negotiations with the leaders of the Pakistani military regime attention was focused on the reinforcement of the military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, particularly in the provision of arms to the Afghan counterrevolutionary gangs operating from Pakistani territory. In this regard there was a discussion of the possibility of increasing the rate of activity in their raids against the DRA. With regard to the working out of the military and political interaction against Democratic Afghanistan, the participants at the negotiations also discussed questions of coordinating the actions of the Pakistani military authorities with the corresponding officials in the PRC in the matter of instructing the Afghan "dushmans" in Chinese military camps in Xinjiang and subsequently sending them into Afghanistan.¹⁴

At the present time it can be stated with a sufficient amount of certainty that the mechanism for the military and political interaction between the PRC and the United States which is directed against Afghanistan has been worked out and has been completely activated. This circumstance can have dangerous long-term consequences, inasmuch as this previously worked out interaction between Beijing and Washington can be used not only against the DRA, but also against any other country, for example, in the zone of the national liberation movement, the actions of which will run contrary to the plans of the United States and the PRC. It is indicative that, after visiting Pakistan, J. Lehman went to the PRC. The negotiations between J. Lehman and the Chinese leaders that occurred during that visit have shown that the United States and the PRC not only are continuing to reinforce the military and political cooperation on a bilateral basis, but are also attempting to use Pakistan in the interests of their hegemonistic policy in Asia.

As a whole, the situation involving Afghanistan is still strained. International imperialism and reactionary forces are exerting all kinds of pressure on Democratic Afghanistan and are building up the tension in this region. They are not overlooking attempts to turn back the development of the Afghan revolution and thus to restore their positions in this part of the world. However, the Afghan nation is firmly resolved to defend its country's sovereignty and independence and the gains of the April Revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 11 August 1984.
2. MAINSTREAM, 10 March 1984.
3. L'UNITA, 4 January 1984.
4. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 17 November 1984, p 15.
5. HAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR, 25 January 1984.
6. MAINSTREAM, 10 January 1984.

7. Ibid., 10 February 1984.
8. Quoted in PRAVDA, 11 April 1984.
9. HAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR, 8 August 1984.
10. PRAVDA, 28 July 1984.
11. Ibid., 15 August 1984.
12. Ibid., 4 August 1984.
13. KABUL NEW TIMES, 1 August 1984.
14. PRAVDA, 15 August 1984.

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USSR, CPC SEEN AS GUARANTORS OF CHINESE UNITY AGAINST JAPAN

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[Article by Professor M. F. Yur'yev: "China in 1944"]

It was the seventh year of the Chinese people's war against the Japanese imperialists, a war which started on July 7, 1937. For China, it was a just war for the liberation of the entire national territory, which included Manchuria (seized in 1931-1932) and certain areas of Northern, Eastern, Central and Southern China occupied in 1937 and later on. In September 1939, the Second World War broke out, and anti-Japanese resistance, became a part of that war, which was to be an event tremendous in both its scale and effect on the destinies of humankind.

The treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought into life the coalition of the USSR, Britain and the US, joined subsequently by dozens of other states. The biggest of them was China, which broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy in early July 1941, when they recognised the Wang Jingwei puppet regime. After the Japanese militarists had attacked the armed forces and colonial possessions of the Western powers, triggering off war in the Pacific, China declared war on Germany and Italy, in December 1941.

The Soviet-German front became the main front of the Second World War. The heroic defence of the Brest fortress, of Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol and scores of other Soviet towns and cities, and the defeat of German troops outside Moscow thwarted the Nazi blitzkrieg. The great victories scored at Stalingrad and outside Kursk in 1943 were the turning point of the war. In 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces dealt fresh powerful blows at the German army, drove the enemy from Soviet territory, and began the liberation of the countries of Europe.

The Chinese people made a considerable contribution to the struggle against the aggressive Nazi-militaristic bloc. In the early years of their war against China, the Japanese imperialists, relying on the military, technological and organisational superiority of their army, advanced fairly deep into Chinese territory. Their success was in no small part due to the inherent weakness of the Guomindang forces, which were suffering, not only from shortages of up-to-date weapons and survivals of militarism in their midst, but also from disunity among officers and men and an unwillingness on the part of their Guomindang leaders to involve the mass of the people in the active defence of the country. As a result the Japanese seized the main centres of political, economic and cultural life in China, such as Beijing (Peking), Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan and Guangzhou as well as numerous key lines of communication. In late 1938, the more reactionary group of the Guomindang politicians, with pro-Japanese leanings headed by Wang Jingwei, Vice-Chairman of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, openly went over to the Japanese side, made their way to the occupied territory, and voiced their agreement with the Japanese policy with respect to China. Though they had seized a huge area of territory the Japanese imperialists nevertheless failed to consolidate their hold over vast rural and especially mountainous regions. Beginning from 1938, anti-Japanese bases were set up in the Japanese troops' rear under the guidance of the Communist Party of China. They were promoted by the Eighth and the New Fourth Army troops and supported by guerrilla units and the people.

le's volunteer corps. Democratic reforms were carried out there—land rent was lowered, loan interest limited and the taxation system altered in the interests of the majority of the population. Peasants were encouraged to take part in management, and measures were exercised to spread literacy, to instill patriotism, and to raise the cultural level of the population. The ranks of the people's armed forces, of the Communist Party organisations and of the peasant's trade unions, women's, youth's and children's unions kept growing, guided by the policy being propagated, that of a united anti-Japanese national front. All this created conditions for the drawing of broad masses of the people into the movement resisting the Japanese aggression. There were, of course, certain difficulties connected with departures from class policy and with manifestations of nationalism. Mistakes were also made through lack of experience and as a result of other reasons. The main thing, however, was that a new state system was taking shape in the Special Region, at the junction of the Shenxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces and at the anti-Japanese bases.

Consequently, during the national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese imperialists, the country was divided into three parts. Firstly, the regions under Guomindang rule (the so-called "big rear" in Western China with the temporary capital of Chongqing), secondly, the territories controlled by the CPC (the Special Region with its centre in Yanan and the bases in the Japanese rear), and thirdly, the occupied lands, cities, and lines of communication in North-Eastern China (Manzhou-guo with its capital of Changchun or Xinjing), and Northern, Eastern, Central and Southern China with its puppet government seated in Nanking.

There existed not only radical differences, but also complicated relationships between these parts of China. The Guomindang-controlled regions and the territories run by the Communist Party were linked by the same national, anti-Japanese character but were different in social respects. The latter circumstance was aggravated by the influence of the subjective factor. This resulted in clashes which, more often than not, threatened to develop into a civil war. The Chiang Kaishek government differed greatly from that of Wang Jingwei in its attitude to the Japanese aggression, but the two had a similar social base. In some cases hatred of the CPC not only brought them closer together ideologically, but even involved them into joint actions against troops of the Eighth and the New Fourth Army and caused Guomindang generals, together with their divisions, to go over to the Japanese side.

A part of the inhabitants of the anti-Japanese bases had to pay taxes to two sides—the bodies of democratic authority and the Japanese puppet administration. In daytime the areas were controlled by the invaders, at night by the guerrillas. The enemy sought to strangle the CPC bases with a blockade, but failed to stop trade between the free and the occupied regions, whenever the two sides were interested in it.

Nevertheless, neither the heavy blows dealt by the Japanese military machine, nor the formation of a puppet government by a pro-Japanese grouping, which had broken away from the Guomindang, led China to capitulation. The diverse moral, political, economic and military support given by the Soviet Union, and the heroic example set by the Soviet people were the paramount international factor, which promoted the struggle against the aggressor.

The bourgeois governments of Western countries, from which the Guomindang hoped to get support, in fact betrayed China from the first months of the war. The US continued supplying Japan with strategic raw materials and equipment, the Vichy government laid a ban on sending munitions to China through the Indochinese border in June 1940, while the Churchill cabinet closed the Burma-China route in July 1940.

It was only the Soviet socialist state that came to China's aid. On August 21, 1937, a month and a half after the beginning of the war, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and China. In 1938 and 1939, the USSR gave China three loans amounting to a total sum of \$250 million, to pay for arms and munitions supplies.¹ Delivery of these was started on October 31, 1937. More than 900 planes, 1,140 guns, 82 tanks, about 10,000 machine-guns, 50,000 rifles, and more than 2,000 cars and tractors, together with 2,000,000 shells, 31,600 bombs and 18,000,000 cartridges were sent in the period from 1937 to 1941. Soviet military advisers, numbering 140 by early 1941 actively participated in the Chinese people's war against the Japanese militarists. They were headed (at different times) by the well-known military leaders M. I. Dratvin, A. I. Cherepanov and V. I. Chuikov, who had gained their experience during the Civil War in Soviet Russia, and had worked in China in the 1920s. More than 90,000 people were trained in different educational establishments and Chinese army units, under the guidance of Soviet teachers and instructors. In the period from 1937 to 1940 a school functioned in Urumqi, which trained personnel for the CPC led Eighth Army, at which 416 people studied, among them, 41 aviators. Several hundreds of Soviet pilots and ground technicians volunteered to defend Chinese cities from the barbarous bombing raids and more than 200 of them perished while performing their internationalist duty.

China was greatly aided in its just struggle by the repulse of the Japanese provocations at Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 which made necessary the drawing of a major Japanese armed force away from the Chinese front to the Soviet border (The USSR had to keep more than 1,000,000 officers and men in the Far East). This was pointed out by Mao Zedong in September 1939: "After Japan had been brought to its knees [as a result of the Soviet repulse.—*Author*], the Japanese militarists recognised the inviolability of the Soviet and Mongolian borders. Such an agreement on ending military operations will increase the possibility of the Soviet Union giving aid to China rather than lessen this aid."²

Chinese leaders who had different political views, but who shared the same anti-Japanese sentiments, recognised the special importance of the Soviet people's struggle against nazi Germany and aid to China. A directive "On the International United Front Against Fascism" issued by the CPC Central Committee on June 23, 1941, stated: "In the sacred war waged by the Soviet Union against the nazi aggression the Soviet people defend not only their own country, but all the nations engaged in the liberation struggle against fascist enslavement." The same idea was expressed in an appeal made by the CPC Central Committee to all the compatriots, officers and men of the anti-Japanese war on July 7, 1941, on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of the war against Japan.³ Nie Rongzhen, a senior commander of the Eighth Army and subsequently Marshal of the PRC, assessed, in 1951, the importance of diverse Soviet aid to China in the following way: "Needless to say, the successful outcome of the anti-Japanese war of the Chinese people was inseparably bound up with Soviet aid." Luo Ronghuan, another military leader of the PRC, also stressed that the Soviet Union "was the only state to have come out for the cause of justice, against the Japanese aggressors".⁴

¹ See *Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957. A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 161-162, 167-170, 172-179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³ See *Reference Material on the History of the Chinese Revolution*, Vol. 4, Peking, 1959, p. 168 (in Chinese).

⁴ *Xin jiangshe*, 1951, No. 4, p. 8; 1957, No. 5, p. 14.

At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war Chiang Kaishek admitted that without the aid of Soviet weapons China would not have been able to put up prolonged resistance, while Gen. Chen Cheng (head of the Guomindang army political department) even said that: "Had we concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union before the Lugouquiao events [the Japanese army attack on China on July 7, 1937.—*Author*], there might have been no war."

The consistently principled policy pursued by the CPSU, and the Soviet state in helping to create and maintain a united anti-Japanese front of all the patriotic forces of China, had a great role to play in China's resistance to Japanese aggression.

The position of the Communist Party of China, the staunch struggle by its armed forces against the invaders, and the setting up of anti-Japanese strongholds in the enemy rear, were an important internal factor preventing capitulation. During the war party membership grew considerably, as did its prestige among the people, and its influence on the destiny of the country. In 1941 and 1942, the Japanese militarists, having strengthened their troops fighting against the CPC army, succeeded in capturing some of the territory of the CPC's bases, but in 1943 the retreat was stopped, and in 1944 the people's armed forces launched a partial counteroffensive. Taking advantage of the transfer of a sizeable portion of the Japanese troops to the Guomindang front for another major offensive,⁵ the CPC troops in Northern and Eastern China forced the enemy to withdraw from the areas seized by it in 1941-1942. In March and April 1944, Luo Ronghuan's units routed 13 regiments of puppet troops (7,000 people) in Central Shandong and liberated an area with a population of 300,000. The second half of 1944 saw victories in Southern Shandong, the Bohai, Maritime and Jiaodong regions, in which millions of inhabitants were also freed from the invaders' rule, and dozens of puppet army units went over to the side of the Eighth Army. In the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area the CPC army formations led by Nie Rongzhen launched an offensive in January 1944, and within 10 months had liberated 24 cities and towns, dealing blows even at important centres, such as Shijiazhuang, Baoding and Gaoyang. Of great long-term importance was the strengthening of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning area, a border "corridor" leading from bases in Northern China to Manchuria. Troops of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area, led by Liu Bocheng captured more than 1,000 enemy strongholds in 1944, and liberated a territory with a population of 5,000,000 encompassing 19 cities and towns. In the Shanxi-Suiyuan region Liu Zhengcao's units liberated in 1944 areas with a population of 370,000. The New Fourth Army, acting in Central China, also scored noticeable military successes. The 1st division led by Su Yu, defeated Japanese and puppet units in the battle at Cheqiao (Northern Jiangsu) in March 1944, and in July, seized several river ports on the Yangtze. In one year Su Yu's formation put 15,000 enemy officers and men out of action and occupied 135 fortified bases. The 3rd division led by Huang Kecheng scored several victories in 1944. It destroyed a puppet naval detachment, and occupied new territories, thus ensuring the unification of the anti-Japanese bases in Northern and Central Jiangsu. Meanwhile the 7th division led by Tan Xilin stepped up military operations in Central Anhui, in the Nanking-Anqing-Wuhu area. In Southern China in 1944 an anti-Japanese base was consolidated in the northeastern part of Hainan Island (Qiongyai region).

⁵ According to Japanese historians, a total of 13 divisions of troops deployed in the occupied regions had been mobilised for the purpose (*The History of the War in the Pacific*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1958, p. 74).

All in all in the course of 1944, troops led by the CPC, while carrying out a partial counteroffensive, went into action (according to incomplete data) more than 20,000 times. The enemy lost 350,000 officers and men either killed, wounded, taken prisoner or mutinied. The territory liberated amounted to 80,000 sq km and comprised 5,000 strongholds and 47 district towns, among them those seized by the enemy in 1941-1942.⁶ Summing up the results of the military operations in the seven years of the anti-Japanese war, Zhu De wrote, that the Eighth and the New Fourth Army had destroyed, put out of action and taken prisoner 1,100,000 officers and men of the Japanese and puppet forces. Further it had established control over a territory with a population of 80,000,000 and had set up 15 anti-Japanese bases in Northern, Central and Southern China.⁷ By late 1944, the Eighth and the New Fourth Army had respectively 508,000 and 251,000 combatants, while the anti-Japanese column of Southern China had 21,000 making in all a total of 780,000 combatants. In addition the people's voluntary corps numbered about 1,700,000 men.⁸

The situation on the Guomindang front was however quite different. On the one hand, the reactionary home policy pursued by the Guomindang leaders, their attempts to prevent the people from taking part in the war, and to isolate the Communist Party, together with the withdrawal of troops from front in order to blockade the Special Region, and, on the other, the weakness of Chiang Kaishek's army, to say nothing of the armies of regional military leaders, had all combined to undermine the resistance of the army of the Chongqing government. The Japanese command took full advantage of this situation by launching in 1944 a large-scale offensive code-named *Ichigo* ("The Plan of Active Defence in the Pacific") in the provinces of Central and South-Western China. The operation had as its aim the following: "The spring-summer offensive of the Imperial army in China has to ensure the complete capture and control of railway and highway communications from the South Manchurian Railway to the Yunnan-Burma road, including the Peking-Hankou and Hankou-Canton railways. In addition it must ensure the seizure or destruction of all the American airfields in Central and South-Western China and break the communications between the Burmese front and South-Western China".⁹ The *Ichigo* operation was to be carried out in two phases. The first was aimed at defeating the Chinese troops on the Beiping-Hankou and Longhai railways and capturing the Henan province. Two armies and an air division were assigned for the purpose, numbering in total 172,000 officers and men, more than 400 guns, about 200 tanks and armoured vehicles and 230 aircraft. According to Chinese historians, whose data are corroborated by other publications, between 50,000 and 60,000 Japanese officers and men were directly involved in the Henan offensive. The Chinese Command (Gen. Jiang Dingwen and Gen. Tang Enbo) had 19 armies (57 divisions) with a total of 456,000 officers and men, more than 900 guns, 32 armoured vehicles and 70 planes.

Despite the manifold numerical superiority of the Chinese troops, they failed to withstand the onslaught of the well-trained and equipped enemy. The defences of Henan were breached: in three areas—on the

⁶ *The General History of the Period of the New Democratic Revolution in China*, Vol. 3, Peking, 1961, pp. 324-326 (in Chinese).

⁷ See Zhu De, "The Heroism of the Eighth and the New Fourth Army". In *Let Us Build a Strong National Defence Army and Defend the Homeland and the People*, Peking, p. 13 (in Chinese).

⁸ See *Lectures on the History of the CPC*, Peking, 1981, p. 398 (in Chinese).

⁹ From B. G. Sapozhnikov, *China in the Flames of War, 1931-1950*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 273-274 (in 1944, two Chinese armies led by American Gen. J. Stilwell fought against Japanese troops in Northern Burma).

Hwang Ho River, at the Mixian station of the Beiping-Hankou railway, from where the Japanese marched southwards; in the area of the Xinyang station, from where another army grouping moved along the same railway line northwards to meet the former troops; still another grouping was active along the Longhai railway, moving westwards towards Luoyang. By May 25, the first phase of the operation was completed and the Japanese had seized the entire Henan province with its important lines of communication.

After redeploying their troops, the Japanese launched the second phase of the operation at the end of May. Two armies (13 and a half divisions with 252,000 officers and men, 500 guns, 150 tanks and 280 aircraft) pushed southwards from Hankou and westwards from Guangzhou. They were confronted by 16 Chinese armies (139 divisions and 19 brigades, totalling 1,120,000 officers and men, having more than 2,300 guns and 200 aircraft, plus 250 planes of the US 14th air division. On May 28, 100,000 Japanese troops attacked the Chinese positions approximately halfway between Hankou and Changsha, penetrated the Chinese front line, and moved further to the south and southwest. Another army advanced from the Guangzhou region to link up with them. On November 10-11, the two groupings united in the Guilin-Liuzhou region (Guangxi province). On November 24, Nanning was seized with the participation of a Japanese detachment, which had come from Vietnam through Longzhou. That meant that the Japanese had established control over the railway line from Manchuria to Indochina. On December 20, 1944, they occupied Dushan in the Guizhou province, 60 km away from its centre, Guiyang. Apart from areas of Central and South-Western China, a large portion of the maritime province of Fujian was also occupied.

Japanese troops could have advanced to Guiyang and Chongqing, but their offensive was abruptly stopped. Perhaps, the Japanese imperialists sought in this way to keep open a road to collusion with Chiang Kaishek, founded on their mutual anti-communism.

The success of the *Ichigo* Operation had little effect on the military position of Japan. Their main gain was the possibility to redeploy troops and weaponry speedily, with the aim of continuing war in Asia, even if the Americans landed on the Japanese islands. But the Japanese militarists were unable to profit by it because in August 1945 the USSR entered war, and routed the Kwantung army, the strike force of the Japanese ground forces.

Defeat in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi had the most serious consequences for the Guomindang military-political leadership. According to different sources, their army lost in eight months between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people. The enemy seized enormous territory (200,000 sq km), including four provincial centres (Luoyang, Changsha, Fuzhou and Guilin), seven major US air bases and 36 airfields, the Beiping-Hankou, Longhai (from Zhengzhou to Luoyang) and Hunan-Guangxi railway lines and the southern section of the newly built Guizhou-Guangxi road, as well as fertile lands, natural resources, and hundreds of industrial enterprises and mines. As many as 60 million more Chinese fell under the Japanese colonialists' yoke.¹⁰

That was second major defeat of the Guomindang rulers since 1937-1938. The main reason was the anti-popular character of the Chiang Kaishek regime, the disintegration of the Guomindang elite and the inability of its political leadership and military command to use all the forces at their disposal to defend the country. The Henan events provided a

¹⁰ See *Lectures on the History of the CPC*, part 1, Hubei, 1982, p. 168 (in Chinese); *General History*, pp. 327-330.

graphic example. Henan peasants used to say that their province was racked with four scourges—droughts, the Hwang Ho floods, locusts and Gen. Tang Enbo. Chiang Kaishek's favourite who, given a manifold numerical superiority over the enemy, yielded Henan almost without any resistance. According to American journalists who witnessed the events, out of 30 million Henan residents 2 or 3 million died of starvation and disease, and almost as many fled. Retribution came when the Japanese divisions attacked Tang Enbo's troops for then the Henan peasants, instead of helping Chinese troops, openly opposed the marauding military. At first they disarmed small groups of soldiers, then entire companies, stripping arms from 50,000 of Tang Enbo men, who were dispirited and lacking proper guidance.¹¹ Chinese historians note that in July 1944, more than 7,000 peasants led by Wang Chuan disarmed a large group of Guomindang men in the Xinyang area (Southern Henan). The 28th division of the 69th corps was sent to quell the peasant rising, as a result of which 5,000 people, including old people, women and children, were killed. Tens of thousands of peasants responded to that brutal reprisal by forming the Peasant Army for the Salvation of the Homeland, and destroyed the 28th division under the slogan of "struggle against troops who do not oppose Japan".¹²

An important reason behind the defeat of Chinese troops was the Guomindang leaders' desire to prevent, by all means, the Communist Party from gaining strength and influence. Expressing friendly feelings towards the Chinese people, and concern over the military defeats of the Guomindang, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* in its issue of December 2, 1944, pointed to the dangerous actions of the reactionary forces, who were undermining the unity of China in opposing the Japanese aggressors. The Guomindang's anti-communism became especially manifest in the blockade of the Special Region of Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia, for which purpose 400,000 to 500,000 men were set under the leadership of Gen. Hu Zongnan, a notorious reactionary. Officially he was in command of the forces defending the borders along the Hwang Ho River from the Japanese but in fact, only one-third of his divisions were performing that task, while the remaining two-thirds were deployed around the Special Region and were engaging in provocative attacks on the Eighth Army units.¹³

Under the circumstances, Yanan viewed the defeat of Guomindang troops in Henan from the point of view of the alignment of forces between the CPC and the Guomindang. The CPC leadership sought to expand the territory under the anti-Japanese bases even under the conditions prevailing during the Japanese offensive and in fact, deal tangible blows at the enemy. The command of the Eighth Army created a special West-Henan detachment. The New Fourth Army command ordered the 4th division of Peng Xuefeng to move from Anhui westward, to Eastern Hunan, and the 5th division units, under Li Xiannian, from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region to Southern Henan then through Hubei to Northern Hunan. From September to December 1944, a territory inhabited by more than 1,000,000 people was captured in Western Henan. Peng Xuefeng perished during the battles for Northern Anhui, but his unit, in coordination with troops of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region, established their rule in some counties not far from Kaifeng, inhabited by 1,000,000 people. In Southern Henan, the 5th division overran the larger part of the Xinyang, Queshan, Suiping and Runan counties and entered the

¹¹ See T. White and A. Jacoby, *Thunder out of China*, N. Y. 1946; P. P. Vladimirov, *China's Special Region. 1942-1945*, Moscow, 1973, p. 353 (in Russian).

¹² See *General History*, p. 333.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

mountainous region of Tongboshan from the west.¹⁴ In Northern Hunan, Wang Zhen's detachment (under commissar Wang Shoudao) also occupied a considerable territory close to Yueyang, Huarong and other towns. On November 9, 1944, this detachment numbering 3,800 people left Yanan, secretly crossed the Hwang Ho and then, covered by the New Fourth Army troops, crossed the Yangtze and entered Hunan. It was called the Hunan Anti-Japanese Army for the Salvation of the Homeland.

One of the significant consequences of the defeat suffered by the Chiang Kaishek army in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi in 1944 was the upsurge of the democratic movement in the country. The Communists pointed out that the military fiasco was the result of Chongqing's anti-popular policy, the one-party dictatorship, that had terrorised the democrats, suppressed free-thinking, allowed corruption among the Guomindang upper crust in the centre and in the provinces. Other reasons were the economic crisis, the closing down of enterprises by the national bourgeoisie and the raging profiteering. *Xinhua ribao*, which was published in Chongqing by the CPC, reported on March 1, 1944, that senior officials in Kunmin (centre of the Yunnan province) had secretly hoarded with the aim of profiteering commodities enough to supply the troops and population of the entire Yunnan for five years.¹⁵ Growing prices and unemployment, the heavier taxation and the requisitioning—all worsened the situation, difficult as it was of the peasants, shop-floor and office workers, the petty bourgeoisie and the lower strata of the intelligentsia. *Shishi xinbao* wrote on September 10, 1944, that the workers' real wages, miserly as they were, had shrunk by more than 50 per cent during the war. The situation of the unemployed was even worse, and in March 1944 there were 40,000 unemployed among Chongqing textile-workers alone.

The peasants, defenceless in face of the arbitrariness of the authorities, army officers and the rural upper crust, also suffered greatly from natural disasters. In 1944, crop failure and requisitions left 20,000,000 rural residents of Szechuan and 3,000,000 of Northern Hubei in a serious plight. Rank-and-file employees, school teachers and the majority of higher school lecturers led a hand-to-mouth existence, while soldiers in the Guomindang army were beaten and robbed.¹⁶

Discontent among the broad mass of the working people and the middle strata with the hard economic situation developed into political struggle against the Guomindang dictatorship. In early 1944, bourgeois-democratic leaders held a number of public discussions of state affairs, criticising the Guomindang's intention to keep in force a draft anti-democratic constitution adopted on May 5, 1936, in conditions of the civil war. They demanded that political parties be allowed, that constitutional rule be introduced, the rights of the citizens be guaranteed and also that the government be reformed. The fairly amorphous League of Democratic Political Organisations, which was set up in 1941, also became active. In May, it issued a declaration on the current situation, denouncing the Guomindang for its anti-democratic policy, for its persecutions of other parties and associations and for its plans to prolong the period of political trusteeship. That same month five organisations of the national bourgeoisie sent to the 12th plenary meeting of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee "An Opinion on the Settlement of Present-Day Political and Economic Problems", advocating changes in the Guomindang policy. Then the *Xianzheng* monthly ("Constitutional Rule") pu-

¹⁴ See *The People's Liberation Army in the War Against the Japanese Invaders (The Military Operations of the Eighth and the New Fourth Army)*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 211-212.

¹⁵ See Wu Min, Xiao Feng, *From "May 4" to the Birth of the PRC*, Peking, 1951, pp. 220-221 (in Chinese).

¹⁶ See *General History*, pp. 331-332.

blished the demands made by representatives of the industrialists assembled in Chongqing: freedom of production, support for national enterprises, democratic rule and the renunciation of dictatorial rule.

Defeats suffered by the Guomindang troops stimulated growing opposition to the Chiang Kaishek dictatorship. In June 1944, the Guangxi Guomindang officials, led by Li Jishen and Liu Yazhi, organised the Committee to Propagandise the Mobilisation of Forces to Oppose Japan and the Union of Guilin Workers in Culture for Stepping up the Anti-Japanese War. Those organisations called for an immediate mobilisation of the broad masses of the people, the resolute repulse of Japan and the punishment of the defeatists. The Guangxi initiative evoked response among the representatives of different sections of the population in other cities. At the suggestion of the well-known Sichuan public figure Zhang Lan, the Society Promoting Democratic Constitutional Rule was formed in Chengdu. It demanded that legality and the people's rights and freedoms be respected, that the people be mobilised and armed to fight against Japan, that a new policy be adopted and that abuses in mobilisation, land rent and tax collection be eradicated. Shen Junru, Guo Moruo and Tao Xinzhi issued a statement in Chongqing in support of the demands made by the Guilin cultural community. In Kunmin, Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo, democratic leaders especially popular among students and refugees from the occupied regions, published the journal *Ziyou longyun* (Freedom Rostrum), which denounced "the Guomindang fascist dictatorship"¹⁷ and stressed that the Chinese people needed "freedom, freedom and once again freedom". The non-governmental newspapers in Chengdu (*Huaxi ribao*), Kunmin (*Yunnan ribao*) and Xian (*Qinfeng ribao*) published articles demanding democracy, constitutional rule and an end to the national crisis.

Students were especially active in the anti-dictatorial movement. Beginning with July 1944, students in Guilin, Chengdu, Chongqing, Kunmin and other cities, many of them refugees from Beiping, Tianjing, Shanghai, Nanking, Duhan, Guangzhou, Henan and Hunan, started to organise lectures and discussions, demanding democracy and freedom. On the 7th anniversary of the July 7, 1937 events, more than 3,000 students of Yunnan University (formed of lecturers and students from schools of higher learning in the occupied cities) and the Central Law University (Zhongfa) held a meeting, calling for political changes. In his speech Wen Yiduo exposed the anti-national policy pursued by Chiang Kaishek and urged the young people to join actively the struggle for democracy. Three thousand students of Kunmin organised a demonstration on May 4, 1944, on the 25th anniversary of the "May 4th Movement", demanding democracy and freedom.

There are no data on the participation of Communists in these demonstrations, but recent publications of the CPC directly state that the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee headed by Zhou Enlai did a great deal to promote the democratic movement.¹⁸ The possibilities for that had grown, as a result of changes in the party cadre policy. Many Communists defamed during the "testing of cadres" campaign were rehabilitated in 1944. Modern Chinese authors say that "leftist violations were made at the second stage of that campaign, during the so-called urgent salvation movement, when two types of contradictions of different character were confused and confessions extorted, which

¹⁷ The CPC propaganda characterised the Guomindang dictatorship as fascist in 1943, after Chiang Kaishek published his book, *The Destinies of China* and following the third anti-communist campaign. That assessment was expounded in detail in Zhou Enlai's report "On Chinese Fascism—Neodespotism" (August 1943). For the theses of that report see Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Peking, 1981, pp. 195-203 (in Chinese).

¹⁸ See *Lectures on the History of the CPC*, Part 1, Hubei, p. 167.

caused great damage. The Party Central Committee revealed and corrected these mistakes."¹⁹ These changes occurred, as a result of certain domestic and international reasons. Of no small importance was the position of the world communist movement, whose prestige, even after the dissolution of the Communist International, was high, and continued growing, as a result of the historic victories of the Soviet people. That position was expressed in Georgi Dimitrov's address to Mao Zedong (December 1943), in which he said that "the correct party measure, such as purging the party of hostile elements and its consolidation, is being carried out by Kang Sheng and his apparatus in such monstrous forms, that they can only sow mutual suspicion, evoke profound indignation among the rank-and-file members of the party and help its enemies to disrupt the party."²⁰ According to P. P. Vladimirov, Mao Zedong told him on January 4, 1944, that he understood Georgi Dimitrov's profound and sincere desire to help the CPC leadership, and appreciated that help because it had always proved wise. P. P. Vladimirov believed that that purely outward reaction to Dimitrov's address was aimed at keeping Kang Sheng within the CPC leadership, as head of the party's "intelligence and counterintelligence"²¹ section.

The rehabilitation of party members expanded the possibilities for the party organisations to strengthen various branches of their work, including that carried out among the ranks of the democratic movement. The CPC prestige was also boosted by the successes of its armed forces. Indirect evidence allows us to assume that in its work the Communist Party directly influenced the position of the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and certain bourgeois elements. Among the active members and, in many cases, organisers of the democratic movement were Song Qingling, Guo Moruo, Zou Taofen, Li Gongpu, Wen Yiduo, Tao Xinzhi, Shen Junru. Among them were leaders close to the CPC. Slogans of democratic movement coincided to a considerable extent with the Communists' demands, which were formulated in an address on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of Japan's invasion of China, made public on July 6, 1944, during the Japanese offensive in Henan and Hunan. The Communist Party demanded that the Chiang Kaishek government should raise the army efficiency, support the democratic movement of the people in the rear, so that it "double our forces in the war against the aggressor", take steps to strengthen internal cohesion including that between the Guomindang and the CPC. In addition the party demanded that the government change its domestic policy, carry out democratic transformations, put into effect the three popular principles, introduce democratic freedoms, mobilise the entire nation for a general counteroffensive, legalise anti-Japanese parties and groups, rescind the diktat over the economy, stop profiteering, help expand agricultural and handicraft production and trade, take measures to overcome the economic crisis, and lay the economic foundation for the war against the aggressor.²² Eight out of the 24 demands made referred to domestic affairs, with seven of them fully or partially reflecting the sentiments current among the representatives of the general democratic forces (the patriotically-minded intelligentsia, the democratic parties and groups, and the petty and middle bourgeoisie). The Communist Party took measures to make those demands known throughout the country. On September 15, 1944, Lin Boqu, the CPC representative at the talks with the Guomindang, stated the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

²⁰ *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1982, pp. 81-82.

²¹ P. P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, pp. 249-256.

²² See *Reference Material*, pp. 322-324.

position of the Communist Party.²³ He raised the question of eliminating the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and of the holding of an All-China conference of the representatives of the anti-Japanese political parties and groups including the troops, the local bodies of power and people's organisations with the aim of forming a coalition government.²⁴

Zhou Enlai expounded the idea of forming a coalition government in greater detail in his speech "What's the Solution?", which was made in Yanan on October 10, 1944, on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Xinhai revolution and which gained wide publicity. He made the following proposals on behalf of the Communist Party: 1) A state conference should be convened as soon as possible made up of the representatives of the Guomindang, the CPC, the other anti-Japanese parties and groups, the anti-Japanese armed forces (central troops of the Guomindang, local troops and also the CPC-controlled armed forces operating in the enemy rear), also present should be the local authorities (including those in the deep rear, and the bodies of power elected by the people in the liberated areas in the enemy rear) and the delegates nominated by the people's associations in the deep rear and the liberated areas. 2) The state conference should work out a political programme of eliminating the crisis, on the basis of the three revolutionary popular principles and correct fully the Guomindang's present incorrect policy. 3) The political programme should be based on the formation of a coalition government of the representatives of all the anti-Japanese parties, groups and leaders firmly advocating anti-Japanese war, democracy and cohesion; the defeatists and the fascist elements should be excluded from the coalition government. 4) The coalition government is to have the right to reorganise the supreme command and to establish a coalition supreme command. 5) After the coalition government is formed, it is necessary to convene immediately a National Congress, which is to be elected by the people and which shall exercise constitutional rule.

These demands were known to be unacceptable to the Guomindang: (the placing of the Chongqing government on the same footing as the local bodies of power in the areas controlled by the CPC; an end to the Guomindang monopoly on the supreme command, and so on). However, the CPC's position was in fact supported by organisations of the intelligentsia and the petty and national bourgeoisie, which had reacted quite sharply to the major military fiascos of the Guomindang and to its unwillingness to democratise the political system, to weaken the dictat of bureaucratic capital and to put an end to corruption, inflation and profiteering.

In September 1944, the League of Democratic Political Organisations was transformed into the Chinese Democratic League, which promoted the activity of the "intermediary" forces in the general national democratic movement. On October 10, the League made public a political statement on the crowning stage of the anti-Japanese war, demanding that the Guomindang's one-party dictatorship be eliminated, that a coalition government of all the anti-Japanese parties and groups be formed and a democratic policy pursued.

The anti-dictatorship movement kept growing in the autumn of 1944. On September 24, 1944, more than 500 public figures, including Dong Biwu, member of the Politbureau of the CPC Central Committee, and also Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Lan, Huang Yanpei, Zhang Bojun and Shen

²³ Those talks had been held with interruptions beginning with 1940 and centred on the democratisation of the political system, the legalisation of the anti-Japanese parties, the release of political prisoners and the status of troops of the Border Shensi-Gansu-Ningxia Border region and the anti-Japanese bases in the enemy rear.

²⁴ *Jiefang ribao*, Sept. 22, 1944.

Junru, held a meeting, calling for the formation of a coalition government. On October 7, the same demand was made by a Chengdu meeting attended by 2,000 students, and on November 11 (the day of Zhou En-lai's arrival in Chongqing for talks with the Guomindang) 10,000 Chengdu students held a stormy demonstration against the local Guomindang bureau, insisting on an immediate end to the one-party dictatorship. In October 1944, Song Qingling, Guo Moruo, Zhang Lan and 69 other progressive leaders, organised a meeting in Chongqing, during which they called for the struggle against fascism and denounced the Guomindang dictatorship.²⁵

The fact that the main political demands of the democratic forces and the CPC were the same, gives us grounds to believe, that the Communist Party (to a great extent) succeeded in gaining support for its course towards placing the Guomindang in isolation and uniting the broad masses of the people of different walks of life with its national-patriotic and democratic slogans.

Thus, up to 1944, in the Guomindang-controlled regions the main bulk of the working people, not only in countryside but also in town—workers, rank-and-file employees and teachers as well as the Guomindang servicemen remained uninvolved in the democratic movement even though peasants and workers rose spontaneously against the arbitrariness of the authorities. That was the main reason for the weakness of the movement. Another reason was the fact that far from all of the members of the democratic movement understood the importance of cooperating with the Communists in the struggle for the victory over Japanese imperialism and for the democratisation of the political system in China.

This uprising of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and other Xinjiang minorities against the great-Han Guomindang oppression was a major event of the anti-Chiang Kaishek struggle. In early September 1944, peasants in the Nilking county rose against the requisitioning of 10,000 horses for the Guomindang army. Several guerrilla groups came into being, which, with the help of the local population, seized the county centre on October 7-8 and later on some more settlements in the Yili district. Simultaneously the Union of Freedom which acted illegally launched preparations for an uprising in Kuldja (Yining), the district centre. The Union was made up of the representatives of the landowners, the bourgeoisie, the clergy and also some progressive leaders. A headquarters of the uprising and the military-revolutionary committee were set up, and the guidance of the rebellious units was established. As a result of the armed operations by the rebels and guerrillas, Guomindang rule in Kuldja and the environs fell on November 7-9, and a provisional revolutionary government (the People's Committee) of the East-Turkestan Republic was formed on November 10 (the 12th November, according to other sources). Soon the East-Turkestan Republic set up an army under the command of Ishkakebek Muninov, leader of one of the guerrilla groups.²⁶

The defeats suffered by the Guomindang army in April-December 1944 had one more consequence. Some staff members of the US Department of State and American Embassy in Chongqing, American intelligence agents, military men (including Gen. Stilwell, chief of staff of the allied forces in the Sino-Burmese-Indian theatre of military operations) and journalists began to criticise the inefficiency of the Chiang Kaishek regime in the military field, and its inability to conduct military operations

²⁵ See *General History*, pp. 337-340; Wu Min Xiao Feng, *Op. cit.*, pp. 225-227.

²⁶ See Z. Tiapov, *Fighting for Freedom*, Moscow, 1974; *General History*, pp. 341-342; V. A. Bogoslovsky and A. A. Moskalov, *Nationalities Problem in China (1911-1949)*, Moscow, 1984, pp. 178-180.

against the Japanese or to solve China's economic and political problems. They contrasted the Guomindang's defeats with the successes scored by the CPC troops and came to the conclusion, that it was expedient to revise US policy in China, to establish military cooperation with the Communist Party and to supply its army with US weapons.

The CPC leadership sought to use those sentiments in order to gain American political support, and ensure that the US direct its military aid not to Chongqing but to Yanan. It hoped furthermore to lay the foundations for rapprochement with the US, not only during the war but also in the post-war period. In July 1944, a group of US military observers (the Dixi Mission) came to Yanan and visited CPC bases in the rear of the Japanese army. Reports taken to Washington by intelligence officer Col. Dave Barrett and J. Service, US Embassy staff member in Chongqing, who were members of that group, contained favourable description of the CPC armed forces and suggested that weapons, ammunition and instructors be sent to them. J. Service met Mao Zedong repeatedly and came to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were "agrarian reformers" rather than advocates of scientific socialism, and that it was in US interests to establish good relations with the CPC. However their suggestions were not acted on: ²⁷ the pro-Chiang Kaishek grouping had the upper hand in the American administration. Unwilling to clash with Chiang Kaishek, President F. D. Roosevelt in October 1944 replaced Gen. Stilwell with Gen. Wedemeyer, who was against any rapprochement with the CPC.

The US continued its attempts to strengthen its influence in China by "mediating" between the Guomindang and the CPC. In November 1944, Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, the US President's personal envoy to China, came to Yanan. His talks with the CPC leaders resulted in a draft agreement on the formation of a coalition government, the recognition of the legitimacy of all the anti-Japanese armed forces, the granting of civil freedoms to the people, and the legalisation of the political parties. However, Chiang Kaishek refused to recognise that draft, insisting on the subordination of troops and territories controlled by the CPC, to the Guomindang. ²⁸

The crushing blows dealt by the Soviet Army in the decisive battles of 1944, the strengthening of the Communist-led Resistance movement, the successes scored by the Eighth and the New Fourth Armies in Northern and Central China combined with the opening of the long-promised second front and the stepped up operations by US troops in the Pacific, were the factors that in one way or another brought closer the victory of the anti-fascist coalition. Of decisive importance for the destinies of many European and Asian nations was, as mentioned before, the struggle being waged by the Soviet people outside the boundaries of their country in 1944. The front was edging towards nazi Germany, the main stronghold of the aggressive bloc.

Under the conditions brought about by the major successes won by Japanese troops in the Chinese theatre of military actions, and the tremendous tribulations that the people had undergone as a result of the anti-national Guomindang tyranny, China faced the real and acute problem of the post-war future for the country. The two main military and political forces in China—the CPC and the Guomindang—were already getting prepared to settle that historic problem.

...That was how China entered the victory year of 1945.

²⁷ P. P. Vladimirov wrote on August 12, 1944, "Mao Zedong invited me today and said: 'We are thinking of renaming our party, of calling it something different rather than the "communist party". Then the situation will be more favourable for the Special Region, above all among the Americans.'" (P. P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 315).

²⁸ See Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 263.

PRC'S 'BUILDING SOCIALISM ACCORDING TO CHINESE SPECIFICS' HIT

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 105-116

[Article by S. R. Ratnikov and D. A. Radikovskiy: "Discussions of National Development Patterns in PRC"]

Of late, the ideological and political life of the PRC, as well as theoretical publications in the nationwide periodicals, have been rife with propaganda of the so-called "national model" of development, or, in today's parlance, "building socialism with due account of China's specifics in mind". This review, while not claiming to be complete, discusses the predominant evaluations of the content, methods, and aims of the elaboration of this concept as presented by Chinese periodicals.

First of all, let us note the outward attributes of the concept. As for terminology, it was coined in early 1983. The set phrase *You Zhongguo tese-di shehuizhuyi* has won stability in Chinese propaganda. Chinese publications translate it as "socialism with due account of China's specifics"; another translation is also possible, "specifically Chinese socialism", since the binomial *tese* is rendered this way in the newest PRC dictionaries. The meaning attached to the term "specific" helps elucidate the concept of socialism being worked out by Chinese theoreticians: it means "national" socialism, a socialism that has appeared and is developing exclusively on Chinese soil.

Chronologically, the current ideological campaign was launched on a national scale at the beginning of 1983, when Peking's newspaper *Guangming ribao* sponsored discussion on the "main ideological principles of building socialism with due account of China's specifics". The pursuit of this course was declared "the chief strategic goal facing the Party and the people".¹ The aims and methods of the campaign were propounded in a speech by Su Shaozhi, Director of the Peking Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong under the Academy of Social Sciences, at a theoretical conference in Peking to mark the 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. A part of the text was published under the heading "In the Process of Comprehensive Reform, to Develop Marxism and to Build Socialism with due Account of China's Specifics". That was one of the first major theoretical pronouncement on this subject.²

It should be noted, however, that the PRC leaders and the mass media had periodically touched on the abovementioned thesis still earlier. Back in late 1979, Deng Xiaoping spoke of "modernising the Chinese model" and pointed out "two main peculiarities" determining building "socialism with due account of China's specifics": "a weak (material and technical) base coupled with a vast population and a shortage of arable land".³ In May 1980, he came up with "the impossibility of building socialism on just one model", while at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC he "summed up the experience of building specifically Chinese socialism" and named its ten directions. Subsequently this problem was

¹ *Guangming ribao*, January 17, 1983; *Honqi*, No. 8, 1983, p. 30.

² *Renmin ribao*, March 11, 1983.

³ *Guangming ribao*, June 6, 1983.

touched upon by Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and other PRC leaders.⁴ The 12th CPC Congress officially endorsed the programme of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics", calling it the "essential goal and the task of the day", "the quintessence of the 12th Congress", and outlined the ways of its fulfilment. Since then the campaign has been gaining momentum, so that now participation in it is termed "the main criterion of a true Communist".⁵

In early 1983 this theme became the leit-motif of Chinese propaganda. *Guangming ribao* opened up a new large section, called "Exploring and Building Socialism with Due Account of China's Specifics" and has regularly been printing whole columns (up to 10 articles) devoted to these issues. Much attention has been paid to the theoretical aspects of the problem by the journal *Hongqi*, a mouthpiece of the CC CPC, the newspapers *Renmin ribao*, *Beijing ribao* and other leading PRC periodicals.

The prime concern of the PRC press was to prove, with references to the founders of Marxism-Leninism,⁶ that the thesis of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics" allegedly does not contradict the basic ideas of Marxist-Leninist teaching. Citing separate passages from the works by Marx, Engels and Lenin taken out of context, the Chinese authors assert that Marxist-Leninist theory envisages the possibility of a "specific way of social progress", and "the peculiarity of social revolutions in the Orient". "An even more specific revolution" was made in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong, who "creatively developed the theoretical problems of transition from new democracy to socialism".⁷ PRC ideologists thus declared that the thesis of "building socialism with due account of China's specifics" met, on the one hand, "the objective needs" of the development of one country, and, on the other, was in line with the general rules of building socialism.⁸ A special symposium in Nanking, organised by a Society to Study Scientific Socialism, pointed out that the concept (and the term itself) now being elaborated imply "concrete forms, ways and methods of building socialism, used under different conditions with due account of national specifics, but on the basis of general Marxist guiding tenets."⁹

PRC periodicals recognised that the general and the specific "exist and develop in close interrelation" and, "having torn one from the other, it is possible to make "left-" or right-wing mistakes".¹⁰ Nonetheless, Chinese theoreticians have clear preference to "national peculiarities".¹¹ Presenting the main principles of building socialism formulated by Karl Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, the Harbing journal *Fendou* said that even though these principles "are still of universal guiding significance", "today the main problem is how for economically underdeveloped countries to correctly work out a concrete way of socialist construction, with due account of the real conditions in each separate country"¹². Stress was placed on the necessity "to go one's own way" in the process of "linking Marxism-Leninism with the experience of a given state", the "blind imitation" of Marxist-Leninist tenets, as well as of foreign experience (above all Soviet), including positive experiences, was denied. The following was offered as an alternative: "To seek one's

⁴ See *Guangming ribao*, March 13, 1983.

⁵ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 6, p. 19; No. 8, p. 30.

⁶ See *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 12, 1983.

⁷ *Xueshu Yanjiu*, No. 3, 1983, p. 6.

⁸ See *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 25, 1983.

⁹ *Guangming ribao*, May 9, 1983.

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 22, 1984.

¹¹ See *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 31 and Nov. 14, 1983.

¹² *Fendou*, 1983, No. 3, p. 16.

own way, relying on the independent realisation by Communists in each state of the socio-political situation in their country".¹³ All of that was justified by the assertion that the principles worked out by the founders of Marxism-Leninism allegedly no longer correspond to the present economic and socio-political development of the PRC since "the present-day concept of socialist society has already surpassed the guiding propositions by Marx and Engels", as well as conclusions "made by Lenin on the basis of generalised experience of his epoch".¹⁴ In other words, the classics of Marxism-Leninism, "proceeding from the experience of their time, answered the questions raised by their epoch", but "could not undertake a concrete analysis of contradictions within a socialist society".¹⁵ It has to be noted that Chinese ideologists are talking mainly about the practical experience of building socialism in different countries, whether a positive or negative experience, but not about the scientific theory of building socialism, nor about the general principles governing such a process.

Thus, the Chinese press, declaring the construction of "socialism with due account of China's specifics" to be in accordance with the principle of combining the general and the particular, in reality adheres to the thesis of the plurality of "national models" of socialism on the ground that China, due to the "exclusiveness" and "peculiarity" of its historical, socio-economic and cultural development, "cannot help going its own, independent way".¹⁶ Calling for respect for the principle of "independence and self-sufficiency", Chinese authors do not limit the "specificity of their country" to the truly existing national peculiarities of building socialism in China, but extend it to the general principles of socialist construction, asserting the existence of "special objective laws" of such construction in the PRC.¹⁷

Among the main factors for the existence in China of "special laws" for building socialism these authors point out, first and foremost, the "two main objective peculiarities" of the country singled out by Deng Xiaoping: "the weak (material and technical) basis" and "a vast population with a shortage of arable land". Economic factors mentioned included the multi-layered structure of the economy, the prevalence of socialist economic forms, the leading role of state planning and the secondary role of market regulations, the necessity of the correct division of economic functions between the central and local bodies of management, and some others.¹⁸ Assessing these and other elements, "which determine the way of building a socialist economy", the PRC press said that "they have been worked out on the basis of a study of our reality and therefore, naturally, reflect Chinese specificity". At the same time, the so-called "new views and new conclusions, obtained during the study" will allegedly result in "a new enrichment and development of the theory of scientific socialism", and therefore they are asserted to be of "universal theoretical importance".¹⁹

Numerous items from PRC periodicals, underwriting the "harmony" of the current Chinese concept with Marxism-Leninism, present the following line of argument. Marxism laid the foundation of the theory for socialist construction, having put forward the "guiding propositions" regarding the course of this process. Leninism came up with a "Russian version" of Marxist teaching, a "Russified", "national" form of Marxism, created by Lenin and the Bolsheviks "in accordance with the reality of

¹³ *Guangming ribao*, June 6, 1983.

¹⁴ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 24, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 24, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12; *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 31, 1983.

¹⁷ See *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 26, 1983.

¹⁸ See *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 29.

¹⁹ *Xueshu yanjiu*, 1983, No. 3, p. 13.

a new historical epoch" and "concrete conditions in Russia". That was possible because Lenin, as the Chinese authors put it, "did not stick to Marx's historically limited conclusion on the possibility of only a simultaneous victory of proletarian revolution in the developed capitalist countries of the world". This gave "justification" to the "natural" and "lawful" appearance of a "Chinese version of Marxism", resulting from the theoretical and practical activities of Mao Zedong and the CPC under his leadership, a version which combined, in the conditions of the Orient, "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete reality of China proper".²⁰ Without that "it would have been impossible to find the correct road befitting the country's conditions" and lead the Chinese revolution to victory because "the process of the triumphant development of the communist movement in China is, generally speaking, a process of struggle for combining the basic tenets of scientific socialism with the concrete experience of Chinese revolution".²¹

To add weight to the "specificity" and "peculiarity" of China's road to socialism, PRC ideologues exploit the authority of Li Dazhao and other pioneers of Marxism in China. Lii Mingzhuo, editor of the quarterly *Qilu xuekan* (published in the city of Qufu in Shandong), in an article titled "Li Dazhao's Contribution to the Spread of Marxism", wrote that Li Dazhao was the first "to point out the necessity of combining Marxism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution" and thus "marked the beginning of the specific task of linking Marxism with the peculiar conditions of his country which was set by Lenin for the Communists of the Orient". This, in turn, "was of no small importance for the subsequent shaping of Mao Zedong's ideas".²²

It must be especially stressed that in the course of the campaign to build "socialism with due account of China's specifics", PRC newspapers and magazines have paid much attention to the "thought of Mao Zedong", which, according to Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, "were, are and will always be the banner of socialism in the country".²³ The Chinese press alleged that in his works "On the Ten Most Important Relationships" (1956), "On the Question of the Correct Solution of Contradictions Amidst the People" (1957), in his "Speech at the Enlarged Working Conference of the CC CPC" (1962) and some others, Mao Zedong, "proceeding from Chinese reality", applying "a realistic approach" and "the principle of self-reliance", worked out the main directions of building "socialism corresponding to China's conditions". Special attention was paid to propaganda of his article "On the Ten Most Important Relationships" (published, incidentally, only in 1977); its directives on questions of economics, politics, culture and foreign relations were declared still valid,²⁴ because "here the task was already set to seek a way of building socialism in accordance with China's conditions, a task which remained, however, unfinished".²⁵ In this connection it was demanded that someone write how the thought of Mao Zedong emerged and developed because in order "to correctly evaluate and scientifically elucidate the guiding provision of the thought, one must first describe their main content in detail and theoretical substance, especially all those points which, in the future, will be consistently translated into reality".²⁶ The press even carried direct statements reminding that "the starting point for Mao Zedong's economic thought was the demand to proceed from

²⁰ *Guangming ribao*, March 13, 1983.

²¹ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 24, p. 7.

²² *Zhexue yanjiu*, 1983, No. 2, pp. 15-21.

²³ *Beijing zhoubao*, Sept. 5, 1983.

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 6, 1984.

²⁵ *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 26, 1983.

²⁶ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 13, pp. 4-42.

practice, to go along the road of building socialism with due account of China's specifics".²⁷

A lot of publications have been devoted to the assessment of the thought of Mao Zedong on philosophy, which were called "a treasure in a treasure-trove", because they are absolutely "basic" for the comprehension of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution.²⁸ "The fourth basic law of dialectics," or "the law of up-and-down development", formulated by Mao Zedong was emphasised particularly.²⁹ This was directly connected with the search for a theoretical justification of the course of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics", since the action of the aforesaid "law", according to Mao Zedong, affects mainly the countries of the Orient and above all China. "The thought of Mao Zedong" is officially assessed as "a whole scientific system", providing the ideological and theoretical basis for the current course of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics".³⁰ The press is rife with statements that the CPC and its leaders "are consistently coming out for the thought of Mao Zedong, are true to his theoretical legacy and are developing it", viewing the "correct and comprehensive thought of Mao Zedong as guidance for action".³¹ All of that is "substantively reflected in the works of Deng Xiaoping and CPC documents", published after the 3d Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC (1978).³²

Thus, PRC periodicals made no bones about the fact that "Mao Zedong's ideological legacy" had already formed and will probably continue to form the political decisions of his successors and determine the framework within which they will be solving China's problems. Since "the correctness of the thought of Mao Zedong was proved in practice", the Chinese authors stressed, it "continues to be a guide in building socialism in the country" and "must serve as a guiding ideology for the CPC",³³ including the construction of a "national model" of socialism. In 1984, the press stated explicitly that "the thought of Mao Zedong is the ideological and theoretical foundation of socialism with due account of China's specifics",³⁴ However, speaking of the urgent need to "undeviatingly follow the thought of Mao Zedong", Chinese ideologists also demanded that this thought be "further developed" and this demand was declared the "core of the issue".³⁵

Thus, the essence of the discussion of Mao Zedong's ideological legacy can be summed up as follows: even though in recent years "certain new directives in various spheres have been worked out in the PRC", "in most cases what is being done was proposed by Mao Zedong in his day, but not realised. ...Nevertheless, Chinese Communists developed the thought of Mao Zedong and will, of course, continue to develop them".³⁶ "The correct way of building socialism with due account of China's specifics, already mapped out by the CPC" is, on the one hand, "a continuation", and on the other, "a development and enrichment of Mao Zedong's ideas."³⁷ Both sides of the general directive have been broadly reflected in the numerous materials devoted to the analysis and propaganda of

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 6, 1984.

²⁸ See *Guangming ribao*, May 2, 1983; *Beijing ribao*, March 16, 1984.

²⁹ "Up-down (saddle-like)" development is "such a development when it is high on both ends and low in the middle. In production in 1956-1958 we could see: high tide—low tide—even higher tide, i. e., a leap—a stagnation—a big leap" (Report on the Work of the CC CPC on the 2nd Session of the 8th CPC Congress, May 5, 1958).

³⁰ See *Honqi*, 1983, No. 24, pp. 8, 9.

³¹ *Beijing zhoubao*, Sept. 5, 1983.

³² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 6, 1984.

³³ *Beijing zhoubao*, Sept. 5, 1983.

³⁴ *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 23, 1984.

³⁵ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 13, pp. 41-42.

³⁶ *Beijing zhoubao*, Sept. 1, 1983.

³⁷ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 24, pp. 8-9, 13.

the collection *Selected Works by Deng Xiaoping*, published in the summer of 1983 and called the "fruit of a great historical turning point", "a strategic and comprehensive programme of building socialism with due account to China's specifics".³⁸ Zhai Xishi, a regular writer for *Hongqi*, in his article, "To Undeviatingly Follow the Thought of Mao Zedong and Develop It Is a Fundamental Principle of Our Party", wrote that Deng Xiaoping, "having deeply analysed the great role of the thought of Mao Zedong", stressed that "we must hold aloft the banner of his thought not only today but in the future as well... Otherwise, a big historical mistake will be made" because "the preservation of Mao Zedong's ideological legacy is of extreme importance for the cause of revolution and construction in China."³⁹ As for the other aspect of the directive—"to develop and enrich the thought of Mao Zedong" Chinese authors noted the main task was to search for "a concrete way of building socialism with due account of China's specifics", a task set by Deng Xiaoping "in a new period of a socialist construction." The official press declared that much had already been done on this score, since recently the CPC and its leaders, "checking the truth of the thought of Mao Zedong through historical and current experience, continued the job of linking the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the experience of socialist construction in the PRC," thus "developing and enriching Mao Zedong's teaching." Elaborating on this statement, Chinese authors explain that this "development and enrichment" boil down mainly to the following points: first, "certain true tenets abused during the ten-year chaos" were offered anew, confirmed and developed; second, in the course of changing historical conditions "new conclusions were made which corresponded to present-day reality and replaced certain tenets which were outdated; third, with new experiences in mind, "some original, basic truths were enriched in order to make them fuller and more concrete"; forth, "proceeding from the implementation of the four modernisations," new conditions were studied, emerging problems solved, different emphases made, "some new theoretical and practical directives elaborated."⁴⁰

Touching the contents of these theses *Hongqi* wrote in its editorials that while preparing to build "socialism with due account of China's specifics" (i. e., after the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC in December 1978), the CC CPC carried out "a lot of theoretical and practical work" along the following main lines. First, in ideology, "the line of realistic approach to the present-day state of affairs", which is "a must for the cognition of the realities of Chinese society and for the construction of socialism with due account of China's specifics" was confirmed. Second, in policy, "a clear-cut explanation was given" that "the class struggle is no longer the main contradiction of Chinese society," even though "it will linger for a certain period of time and can even become aggravated at times."⁴¹ Simultaneously it was stated that under present conditions "the contradiction between the constantly growing material and cultural demands of the people and backward social productions"⁴² is coming to the fore. It was also noted that one of the main problems to be solved would be the attainment of "a high level of development of democracy", and, in this connection, "practical measures would be taken to strengthen socialist democracy and lawfulness, and to improve party and state guidance." Third, in economic matters, it was pointed out that the main determinant of China's economic level was "a

³⁸ *Beijing ribao*, July 22, 1983.

³⁹ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 14, pp. 3-4; *Guangming ribao*, July 2, 1983.

⁴⁰ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 14, p. 6.

⁴¹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 2, 1984; *Guangming ribao*, Feb. 11, 1984.

⁴² *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 9, 1984; *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 22, 1984.

weak base coupled with a vast population and a shortage of arable land," which calls for great efforts to boost the economy and implement a "stage-by-stage modernisation." The streamlining of economic planning based on social property," was characterised as quite important but the simultaneous "development of auxiliary market regulation" was also deemed necessary. Besides, a goal was set to fight "criminal activity that does damage to socialism in the matters of the economy, policy, ideology and culture."⁴³

It can be noted that during the initial stage of the current propaganda campaign, the PRC press offered mostly vague propositions regarding the new policy course. Chinese authors tried to justify this by saying that the notion of "specificity", according to Su Shaozhi, was not "a set and sealed scheme, but is substantiated, augmented and developed in the course of the practical cognition of the regularities of socialist construction."⁴⁴ Substantiative comments were rather timid. In this connection the following statement by Hu Yaobang is of interest: "Some comrades ask whether there is a ready-made answer to the question 'what is socialism with due account of China's specifics?' We reply that there is not, neither can there be any ready-made answer. Guided by correct theories and in the process of practical deeds we can only enrich our understanding."⁴⁵ However, beginning with the second half of 1983, Chinese writers became more outspoken in their theorising in regard to concrete aspects of the "national model" of development. First of all, they worked out "four main methodological criteria" to elucidate the notion of "socialism with due account of China's specifics." First, this notion implies following Mao Zedong's thesis of "combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution;" second, the term "Chinese specificity" means not only what sets China apart from other countries, since "different features of one or another phenomenon may be present in certain general characteristics" and may be repeated in phenomena of different kind; third, the notion constitutes an "organic whole", not a bundle of separate and disconnected features; fourth, the "necessity and inevitability" of constant "creative development" and enrichment of the notion of "China's specifics" was again stressed.⁴⁶

Other concrete points of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics" were also noted. PRC periodicals were confident enough in predicting a "stage-by-stage" implementation of China's "own form" of socialism. The main trend at the present, initial stage is to carry out "comprehensive and multi-stage reforms" in the economic and political structure, "indispensable for the formation of a new system, fitting the political context of modern China."⁴⁷ In addition, the PRC press, explaining the essence of the "national model" of socialism, pointed out "the inevitability of linking ideological-political and economic effort." This set of questions was addressed by a number of national conferences, sponsored by the CC CPC, and was reflected in the CC CPC document "Main Guidelines of Ideological and Political Work among Workers and Employees of State Enterprises", which emphasised that ideological-political workers must be competent in questions of production and management and "must organically combine ideological education with the implementation of a reform in the methods of economic management."⁴⁸

⁴³ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 26; No. 24, p. 9.

⁴⁴ *Guangming ribao*, May 23, 1983.

⁴⁵ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 1, p. 4.

⁴⁶ *Guangming ribao*, May 9, 1983.

⁴⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 8 and 10, 1983; *Guangming ribao*, May 23, 1983.

⁴⁸ *Wenhuibao*, Sept. 15, 1983; *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 28, 1983; *Gongren ribao*, Jan. 6, 1984.

The principle of "self-reliance" was cited again as a prerequisite for success in this respect which was also presented as a concrete feature of the "national model" of development. The PRC press never tired of repeating that the practical implementation of "an independent and self-sufficient" course of building socialism implies the most stringent observance of this principle, that is "reliance on the strength of one's party, one's country and nation," since the Chinese people has achieved all its successes just by sticking to this principle, having overcome tendencies towards "dogmatising Marxism", "making a fetish of Comintern decisions and Soviet experience."⁴⁹ Such an approach, as pointed out by the Chinese press, "remains intact in principle under present conditions as well", however, the following stipulation was made: "since today the country finds itself in a more amiable international environment" than ever before, it "can receive foreign aid on a bigger scale than in the past."⁵⁰

The 4th National Conference on Scientific Socialism, held in Nanking in October 1983, made an attempt to determine the "essence" of the course to build "socialism with due account of China's specifics". A "wide discussion" of this problem revealed three different points of view: according to the first, "the socialist system has its specifics at every stage; the second, only "the construction of socialism is specific"; and, lastly, only "the aim of the struggle [mature socialism:—*Auth.*] has its own specificity." In spite of this seemingly principled difference in the approach to the problem, the participants in the conference were unanimous in determining the main characteristics of the notion of "socialism with due account of China's specifics." These are as follows: on the basis of the "four main principles" ("to stick firmly to the socialist road, to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the leadership of the CPC and to Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong thought"), to work for the "consolidation of all peoples of the country"; to regard economic construction as the "pivot of modernisation"; to implement "an historical, dialectical approach to Marxist-Leninist theory and our own practical experience"; to stick to the slogan "one-thousand-million-strong Chinese people is a great force of socialist construction."

The idea that "reliance on one's own forces" is one of the "main conditions for success" (and "principles of struggle") was also contained in the "essence" of the concept. Besides, the new course implies that "simultaneously with the construction of materially developed socialist civilisation it is necessary to create a highly developed spiritual civilisation, achieving a due level of socialist democracy." This position was characterised as one of the distinctive features and strategic goals of "the Chinese model" of socialism and "a new contribution by the CPC to the treasure-trove of scientific socialism", as if Lenin had not written on communist education and socialist democracy. The same conference formulated the "main principles" of building "socialism with due account of China's specifics": "the ideological system of communism" as the guiding ideology of this process; "a realistic approach to reality", as "the ideological line" of the CPC, "the main method of research and resolving of all problems arising in the course of building socialism", stringent observance of ideological orthodoxy as expressed in the "four main principles", as "main guarantee" of success in building "socialism with due account of China's specifics"; no deviation from the "road of comprehensive development", when different aspects of construction (economic, political, ideological, social and cultural) are embraced as an "organic whole"; the "inevitable way" of creating "the Chinese model"

⁴⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 1, 1983.

⁵⁰ *Beijing zhoubao*, Sept. 5, 1983.

of socialism is the implementation of comprehensive, systematic and profound reforms".⁵¹ In reality, all these points boil down to the same principle of "realistic approach to reality" which, in essence, ignores the objective character of the general principles governing the building of socialism.

It must be said that the implementation of "step-by-step reforms" is given special importance in the propaganda campaign under discussion. It is assessed in the press as an "important requirement for solving various problems in all spheres of social life" and as a guarantee of the successful modernisation of the country. Without reforms it would be "impossible to create a new system corresponding to the general political situation in China."⁵²

PRC periodicals' stress on the questions of reforms can be explained by the fact that the "four modernisations", according to Deng Xiaoping, constitute "a great revolution, drastically changing the backward economic and technical countenance of the country and consistently strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat". Even though such a "revolution" must result in multi-faceted changes in the relations of production and in the superstructure, it is, nonetheless, "a revolution not in regard to man, but in regard to the system".⁵³

According to Chinese ideologists, such a "revolution" is necessary because "certain contradictions are preserved under socialism." Ma Hong, President of the Academy of Social Science, writes that socialism has rid society of contradictions of the capitalist system and, through the development of productive forces and higher living standards, has demonstrated its obvious superiority over capitalism, "but this does not at all mean that socialist society is free of contradictions and does not need revolution." The reforms conducted within the framework of the "four modernisations" just constitute the substance of such a "revolution."

Thus, as distinct from Marxists, today's PRC ideologues call any, more or less substantial, change of social relations a revolution. Such a "revolution", according to leading Chinese theoreticians, is aimed at "improving" the PRC social order by way of "cardinal and profound reforms." The thesis that "reform is also a revolution" (*gaige ye shi geming*), says Ma Hong, is "a programme point", that was clearly explained in Deng Xiaoping's *Selected Works*.⁵⁴

The broad propaganda campaign, urging the study of the above collection of works, helps to understand the underpinnings of the whole idea. The periodicals stressed that Deng Xiaoping, "having mapped out the only correct course of building socialism with due account of China's specifics",⁵⁵ has thus made "a fundamentally important contribution" not only to the re-thinking and enrichment of "Mao Zedong's theoretical legacy" but also to "the further development of Marxism-Leninism in China".⁵⁶ Rhetorics aside, what the numerous official publications imply on this score is that Deng Xiaoping's pronouncements on "socialism with due account of China's specifics" constitute "an integral part of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought" (as stated by *Renmin ribao*).⁵⁷

However, there are lots of indications in the press that Chinese society contains numerous covert sources of opposition to reforms and some segments even have openly negative attitudes towards the current shift in ideological orientation. The attempt, on the part of the PRC

⁵¹ *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 31, and 12, 1983.

⁵² *Guangming ribao*, May 23, 1983; *Jingji ribao*, May 29, 1984.

⁵³ *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works*), Peking, 1983, pp. 125-126, 351, 352.

⁵⁴ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 20, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁵ *Renmin ribao*, July 15, 1983.

⁵⁶ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 7, pp. 42-46.

⁵⁷ *Renmin ribao*, July 19, 1983.

leadership, to legalise the new ideological line has met strong opposition, in particular, from the intelligentsia. One commentary, entitled "Strengthen the Solidarity of the Workers in Literature and Art Through the Study of the Basic Ideas of the Collection of Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works" emphasised that, at present, "some comrades indulge in idle talking about the recommendations to writers offered by Deng Xiaoping on behalf of the CC CPC." "These people must be more demanding of themselves because... they are subject to the influence of one or another erroneous ideology". Because of that, a deviation that appeared among the intellectuals deserves close attention and serious criticism, since it has not been fully overcome and "continues to adversely affect socialist construction with due account of China's specifics."⁵⁸

The press reports that the critique of the new ideological concept is conducted both by the "left" and "right". Both question the correctness of the chosen "national model" of development, and, according to *Guangming ribao*, they distinguish "China's specificity" from "socialism" and even "oppose one to the other."⁵⁹

Critics from the "left", write Chinese periodicals, charge that the present PRC leadership's search for a "particular", "original" way of building socialism in the PRC "has nothing to do with the universal truth of Marxism" and "the tenets of scientific socialism" but is just a "generalisation of the experience of socialist construction in China." Some view the "private sector of the economy" and market regulations as "capitalist factors or a shift towards capitalism."⁶⁰ Others say that "the socialism built in China" is not a Marxist scientific socialism, but "a petty-bourgeois and even feudal (!) socialism".⁶¹ Countering critics from the "left", Chinese ideologues reiterate that the search for a "particular" way of development is allegedly conducted with "strict adherence to the basic tenets of Marxism," that the presence of the private sector in the economy "does not indicate the development of capitalist tendencies" because national enterprises operating in accordance with the state plan dominate the PRC economy, while market regulation plays "an auxiliary role".⁶²

According to the Chinese press, critics from the "right" fall prey to "another extreme." Some, pointing out the backwardness of China's productive forces, assert that the country "lacks conditions for the creation and development of socialist ownership, and demand on these grounds an "additional lesson of capitalism", saying that "after the victory of a new democratic revolution it was necessary to develop capitalism in full measure" and only then make a socialist revolution and build socialism. "otherwise there was no chance to escape distortions of the law of correspondence of relations of production to the level of productive forces".⁶³ Others say that socialist state ownership of the means of production is being "alienated from the masses" and therefore it has to be changed. Still other critics from the "right" declare that the PRC lacks proper conditions for a planned economy and demand that it be completely replaced by "a market economy", based on the "self-regulation" of economic processes with a free play of the law of value.⁶⁴ Answering these opponents, official press points out that such measures would spell the end of the economic system of socialism in China, that for renunciation of planning in the economy would lead to anarchy in production typical of the ca-

⁵⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 16, 1983.

⁵⁹ *Guangming ribao*, Nov. 14, 1983.

⁶⁰ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 24, pp. 11-12.

⁶¹ *Xiueshu yanjiu*, 1983, No. 3, p. 5.

⁶² *Guangming ribao*, Nov. 14, 1983; *Renmin ribao*, March 25, 1984; *Gongren ribao*, June 3, 1984.

⁶³ See *Xiueshu yanjiu*, 1983, No. 3, p. 5; *Honqi*, 1984, No. 3, pp. 26, 28-29.

⁶⁴ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 24, pp. 11-12.

pitalist economy, would contradict one of the "basic features" of the country's socialist economic system, "the leading role of planning with the auxiliary role of market regulation," and that, in general, there are absolutely no grounds for the claim that socialist society in China "was born prematurely" and "did not come up to the standard."⁶⁵

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that in the propaganda campaign for "building socialism with due account of China's specifics" the stress was shifted in 1984 to the search for ways of solution various practical problems. In this connection the press said that "exploring and building socialism with due account of China's specifics, we must pay attention not only to questions about what socialism is, what peculiar features and general principles it has, not only to the study and borrowing of foreign experience, but at the same time it is even more important to go deeper in the study of the real situation in China... and proceeding from the peculiarities of the country, to solve various practical problems," in other words, "to seek for concrete ways and means of building socialism with due account of China's specifics".⁶⁶ The set of questions was dealt with by the majority of items published in national periodicals, whose contents primarily boil down to the attempts to prove the existence of "special laws" in various spheres of China's life, which determine the "specificity" of practical solving of individual problems. For example, these articles discuss the creation of a Chinese "specific system of planned management", the "management of the economy" within the framework of the "national model" of development; the formation of a "banking system of socialism with due account of China's specifics," the "training of specialists and intellectuals by means of methods that take into account China's specifics" and the creation of "a specifically Chinese account of socialist spiritual civilisation."⁶⁷ They also write about "the five peculiarities of the country" that must be taken into account when building "a juridical system of socialism with due account of China's specifics. [Incidentally, the method of singling out these peculiarities helps understand the methodology of analysing social development in general.—Auth.]: "First, our state is a socialist state of the democratic dictatorship of the people, guided by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The foundation of our society is the socialist order, and the system of exploitation has already been eliminated. The exploiting classes have been liquidated as such but the class struggle, within certain limits, will still continue for a long time to come because bourgeois ideology continues to exert serious decadent influence on some people. Second, China possesses rich natural resources and an immense economic potential but, compared with modern developed countries, China's economy and culture even today are very backward. Third, China is a single multi-national state, numbering 56 nationalities with the preponderance of Hans. Four, China's territory is vast, its population immense, extensive is the length of frontiers from the Northeast to Southwest and from the eastern coast to the western borders, therefore the level of economic, political and cultural development of separate regions of the country is not even and local customs and traditions differ widely. Fifth, China is a state of ancient civilisation. The wonderful culture of the Chinese has existed for millennia, always at a high level. There are not many such examples in the world. Diligence, wisdom, and courage are glorious revolutionary traditions of the Chinese people. Yet, at the same time, our country knows thousands of years of feudal history and traditions. China lacked the theory and practice of democratic institutions

⁶⁵ See *Xueshu yanjiu*, 1983, No. 3, p. 9; *Jingji ribao*, Nov. 8, 1983.

⁶⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 22, 1984.

⁶⁷ *Hongqi*, 1984, No. 9, pp. 26-30; *Renmin ribao*, March 1, 1984; *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 9, and 12, 1984.

and the legislation system; the influence of feudal stereotypes is rather strong, and today many social vices still bear the imprint of feudalism".⁶⁸

In 1984, the Chinese press repeated even more insistently that it was "too early to sum up results" or "outline concrete prospects" of the new course: "Even though we implement certain reforms in the economy, in all spheres, except agriculture, they've just begun and there is no notable change in the situation." "We are just embarking on the road of building socialism with due account of China's specifics".⁶⁹

This review only touched on the main ideological features of the campaign for building "socialism with due account of China's specifics." Today the campaign is being carried out in a somewhat diversified form—the accent is put on practical activity—so, it seems too early to pass final judgement. Nevertheless, even today the following can be stated with certainty: theoretical articles devoted to the theme under discussion are dominated by the ideas of the priority of the "national factor", exaggerating the significance of "specificity." Publications of the PRC press devoted to the subject attest to replacing an adequate mastering of the theory of principles governing socialist construction with the invention of methods to circumvent these regularities with the help of "their own way of development" and "national socialism". What is more, they reveal attempts to present a search for "the national model" as one of the general regularities of building socialism, which runs counter both to the logic and the principles of scientific analysis.

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⁶⁸ *Honqi*, 1984, No. 3, pp. 8-9.

⁶⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 25, 1984.

CHINA SEEN SEEKING 'NEW ARGUMENTS' FOR CLAIMS ON KAZAKHSTAN

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 137-147

[Article by R. B. Suleymenov, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and V. A. Moiseyev, candidate of historical science: "Refuting the Misrepresentation of Kazakhstan's History"]

Of late Chinese historiographers have been showing a growing interest in the history of the Kazakh people. One might think that the expanding scope of research undertaken by Chinese scholars should only be welcomed, but on closer scrutiny some of their publications on Kazakh history evoke not only bewilderment but even protest. For all the evidence this "scholarly" interest stems from a desire to find "new arguments" which substantiate their claims on Soviet territory, from a desire to denigrate Russian policy in Kazakhstan, in every way, while at the same time glossing over what the Manchu Qing dynasty did in Central Asia. Typical examples of this "research" are the articles published by Su Beihai in the *Xinjiang University Bulletin*.¹ Although Kazakh historiographers have subjected Su Beihai's article about the Junior zhuz to principled scientific criticism, the publication in China of subsequent works by the author on the history of the Middle and Senior Kazakh khanates, makes it necessary to go back to questions relating to the Kazakh people's past that he touches on.²

Su Beihai's articles put forward an idea that the Kazakhs and their historical ancestors, who had lived on the territory of Kazakhstan from time immemorial up to the 19th century, were the subjects of the Chinese emperors and were always under the political influence of the Celestial Empire. It is only natural therefore, that all the afore-mentioned articles open with an ethnogeographical description of the Kazakhs. Su Beihai addresses the complicated problem of Kazakh ethnogenesis with ease surprising for a scholar. With definite aims in view he discusses the ethnic history of the Kazakhs, completely ignoring relevant works by Soviet Kazakh historiographers and draws conclusions long ago rejected by Marxist-Leninist historiography. For example, the author asserts that "the main tribes which formed the Kazakh Middle zhuz were the Kereis, the Naimans, the Hunghirats, the Merkits, the Argyns, the Kypchaks and others. During the rise of Genghis Khan those nomadic tribes, for the most part, roamed the vast steppes of Mongolia and the Altai mountains." During Genghis Khan's march into Kazakhstan and Asian countries they were "resettled in Central Asia", consequently, the author infers, "the Kazakh Middle zhuz had been Chinese from time immemorial." Speaking about the tribes and peoples that participated in the ethnoge-

¹ Su Beihai, "Tsarist Russia's Aggression Against the Junior Zhuz", *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, No. 1, 1983; Su Beihai, "Tsarist Russia's Aggression Against the Middle Zhuz of the Chinese Kazakhs," *Ibid.*, No. 2; "Tsarist Russia's Aggression Against the Senior Zhuz of the Chinese Kazakhs and People's Struggle Against Russia," *Ibid.*, No. 3 (all in Chinese).

² See G. S. Sadvakasov and U. H. Shalekenov, "Defying Historical Truth", *Bulletin of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences*, No. 4, 1983; No. 4, 1984, pp. 61-71.

nesis of the Kazakh people and that formed part of the Senior zhuz—the Usuns, the Dulatis, the Jalairs and so on, Su Beihai maintains that, as the Usuns were allegedly “subordinate to China since the time of the Western Han ... they had for more than 2 millennia been a brotherly people of China.”

It is thus quite evident that we are offered an updated version of the pseudoscholarly concept of a “single Chinese nation”, extracted from what seems to be long-discarded “theories” of the Chinese nationalists. In a nutshell, the concept boils down to the assertion that a “single Chinese nation” (*zhonghua minzu*) existed in China from time immemorial, and that all the peoples surrounding China are “offsprings” of that nation. At the same time no mention is made of the fact that a nation is a historical category that appears only at a definite, fairly high level of human development in the post-feudal period. In this way, following the Mongols, the Manchus, the Uigurs, the Tibetans and others, the Kazakhs were accorded the “honour” of being included into the Chinese family. The political strings of this pseudo-scientific and anti-historical concept are evident. In reality, the Kazakh people have always had a rich history of their own.

Comprehensive studies undertaken by Soviet scholars have provided an in-depth and wholesale analysis of the mechanism of the continuous ethnogenetic processes which operated on the territory of Kazakhstan in ancient and mediaeval times.³ The Kazakh nation was formed on the basis of the aboriginal Turkic tribes and peoples in the late 14th-early 15th centuries, that is to say, long before they had direct contacts with Qing China.⁴ This is attested to not only by Turkic and Persian authors but also by Chinese sources. Moreover, notes made by European travellers Marco Polo and Guillaume Roebruck as well as other materials corroborating these data cannot be unknown to the Chinese author either.⁵ Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that history has never seen either “pure” ethnic communities or an absolutely aboriginal ethnic group. Some tribes from the Naimans and the Kereis who came from Mongolia indeed took part in the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh people and the local nomads inherited their ethnonyms. These ethnonyms are also encountered among the peoples inhabiting Central Asia and the Volga basin, but this does not mean that, say, the Uzbeks, Bashkirs or Tatars are “Chinese” peoples. All the more so, since the problem of the ethnic classification of the Naimans and the Kereis who moved to Kazakhstan has not as yet been resolved scientifically. Some researchers think they were of Mongol stock, while others associate them with Turkic peoples.⁶

Fundamental studies by Soviet Sinologists of the problems of Chinese ethnogenesis made public in the past few years forcefully confirmed the

³ See *The History of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic from Ancient Times to Our Day*, in 5 volumes, Vol. 2, Alma Ata, 1979.

⁴ See V. V. Vostrov and M. S. Mukanov, *The Composition and Settling of Kazakh Clans and Tribes (Late 19th-Early 20th Centuries)*, Alma Ata, 1968; O. Ismagulov, *Kazakhstan's Population from the Bronze Age to Our Day*, Alma Ata, 1970; M. S. Mukanov, *The Ethnic Composition and Distribution of the Kazakhs in the Middle Zhuz*, Alma Ata, 1974.

⁵ See Rashid-ad-Din, *Collection of Chronicles*, Vol. 1, Part 2, Moscow-Leningrad, 1952; S. A. Kozin, *The Cherished Legend*, Vol. 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1941; *The History of Abul-Gazi*, Library of Oriental Literature, ed. by I. Berezin; Vol. 3, Kazan, 1854; *Sheibaniada*, Library of Oriental Literature, ed. by Berezin; B. A. Akhmedov, *The State of the Uzbek Nomads*, Moscow, 1965; S. Amanzholov, *Problems of Dialectology and the History of the Kazakh Language*, Alma Ata, 1959, pp. 8-82; B. Ye. Kumekov, *The Kimak State in the 9th-11th Centuries According to Arab Sources*, Alma Ata, 1970; V. V. Bartold, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1968, (Articles on the Karluks, the Kimaks and the Kypchaks); V. V. Bartold, *Turkestan During the Mongol Invasion*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1968 and other writings.

⁶ See *The History of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic from Ancient Times to Our Day*, Vol. 2, pp. 43-44.

conclusion that the ancient Chinese ethnic group was formed in the Huang Ho basin in the 7th-6th centuries B. C., on the basis of the local ethnic substratum with the active participation of the neighbouring (including proto-Turkic) tribes and peoples. The Great Wall of China, whose construction was started in the 3rd century B. C. under Emperor Qin Shihuang, became a border of sorts, separating the Han ethno-cultural group from the Turkic and Mongol nomads. The Han land-tillers took no part, not even indirectly, in Kazakh ethnogenesis, as borne out by ample paleoanthropological and archaeological material, written sources and linguistic data which the author, apparently, intentionally ignores.

Su Beihai devotes much attention in his writings to the history of the Dzungarian khanate, portraying the Qing Empire as its legitimate successor. However, his arguments here seem to be fairly far-fetched. For instance, in his article about the Junior zhuz he enthusiastically describes the predatory wars of aggression waged by the West Mongolian feudal lords in Kazakhstan and Central Asia and then, speaking about the Middle and Senior khanates, he declaims about how both the Kazakhs and the Oirats allegedly aspired to unity.

Without taking the trouble to look for, or analyse concrete historical facts, he peremptorily states that the Middle and Senior Kazakh zhuzes were "subordinate to Dzungaria", while the latter "beyond any doubt belonged to China". According to Su Beihai's logic, the Kazakh khanates were the Qing Emperor's vassals way back in the 17th and early 18th centuries. The information offered by the author is misleading to put it mildly.

It is known that the nomadic feudal state of the Western Mongols—the Oirats or, as they were called at the time, the Dzungarians (from "zungar" meaning the left side)—came into being in 1635 on the vast Central Asian expanses, primarily within the northern section of the present-day Xinjiang-Uigur autonomous region of the PRC. Thanks to the efforts of its energetic rulers Batur (1635-1654) and Galdan (1671-1697), several decades later it turned into a powerful nomadic state with which Chinese, Russian and Indian rulers reckoned.⁷ The Oirat feudal lords maintained a double-edged foreign policy; while containing and warding off the Qing Empire's aggression in Central Asia in the east, they pursued a policy of conquest towards the inhabitants of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the west. Disunited politically and torn by inter-feudal strife, the Kazakh khanates, despite successes in individual campaigns against a strong enemy, in the long run after fierce wars in the 17th and the early 18th century lost enormous regions in the Tarbagatai and the "land of the seven rivers" (Russian Semirechye), that had belonged to them from time immemorial.

A few words here about Oirat-Kazakh relations after the beginning of the voluntary unification of Kazakhstan with Russia would be appropriate.

As is known, after the representatives of the Senior zhuz recognised themselves subjects of Russia in 1731, many tribal chiefs of the Middle and the Senior zhuz volunteered to join Russia in 1734-1740.⁸ However, the process of Kazakhstan's unification with the Russian Empire was considerably complicated by the predatory aspirations of the Dzungarian (Oirat) and later by those of the Qing feudal lords.

⁷ See I. Ya. Zlatkin, *The History of the Dzungarian Khanate*, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1983 (in Russian).

⁸ See V. Ya. Basin, *Russian and the Kazakh Khanates in the 16th-18th Centuries*, Alma Ata, 1971, pp. 146-157 (in Russian).

In 1741, Dzungarian troops overran the nomad camps of the Middle and the Senior zhuz. Khan Galdan-Tseren of Dzungaria demanded that the Kazakh khans and sultans recognize themselves Oirat subjects. Trapped in an exceedingly complicated military-political situation, the Kazakh nobility was divided as to the issue. Hoping to return the towns of Southern Kazakhstan seized by the Oirat feudal lords, Khan Abulmambet, Sultans Abulfeiz, Niyazbatyr, Devletbai and others, who "until then received tribute from towns around Tashkent" insisted on meeting Galdan-Tseren's demands and sending him hostages. But the "assembly of the nobility and the people" of the Middle zhuz held in autumn 1741 rejected those proposals.

"We do not want to be under Galdan-Chirin's rule," said the participants in the assembly, "but we want to be loyal under the protection of Her Imperial Majesty"⁹ (that is, the Russian Empire).

The military defeats suffered by the Oirats in Central Asia forced the Dzungarian khan not only to abandon his demands for hostages and tribute, but even to turn for help and protection to the Kazakh feudal lords. The question of submission therefore no longer arose. The Russian government did everything it could to protect its new subjects from incursions by the Oirat feudal lords. The Senate edict of May 20, 1742, addressed to the Orenburg and Siberian administration said, that "correspondence should be established" with the Dzungarian ruler, Galdan-Tseren, "the subordinate khans and sultans together with their men should be protected as far as possible, but the fortresses and the whole border are under threat from him."¹⁰ The Collegium of Foreign Affairs recommended that the Kazakh rulers should bring their camps closer to Russian fortresses. Ambassador K. Miller was sent to the Oirat khan's headquarters to demand from Galdan-Tseren "that he no longer cause them (the Kazakhs—*Auth.*) ruin nor send his troops against them nor lay only aforementioned claims upon them". In other words, that he should stop demanding tribute and hostages, and ensure the release of Sultan Ablai and his men taken prisoner by the Oirats in one of the battles of 1741. The military-diplomatic steps taken by the Russian government produced a corresponding effect on the policy pursued by the Dzungarian feudal lords in Kazakhstan. Upon his release from the Oirat captivity, Sultan Ablai told Russian representatives who visited him that he "should pray to God for the most gracious tsarina... who had the great kindness to set me free from captivity in Galdan-Chirin's Kalmyck lands." In short, facts attest to something diametrically opposite to Su Beihai's conjectures. The Kazakh Middle zhuz, had never been a vassal of the Dzungarian feudal lords, while the Oirat incursions merely delayed but didn't stop, nor could they stop, its unification with Russia.

The history of relations between the Dzungarians and the Kazakhs of the Senior zhuz has not been studied thoroughly enough for any far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. In the early 18th century, this khanate is known to have been made up of not one single state formation but was divided into several independent feudal lands. As a result of a series of incursions by the Oirat feudal lords in the late 17th-early 18th centuries, some clans and tribes migrated to Kazakhstan's western and central regions, while the rest had to stay on in their native camps and pay tribute to the conquerors for some time.

Availing themselves of the weakening Dzungarian khanate as a result of the feudal strife for the throne of the All-Oirat Khan in the mid-1750s the Qings, at last, succeeded in vanquishing their formidable

⁹ The Central State Archive, fd. 248, 1st department, Senate, invt. 113; 1744, file 365, sh. 4 back.

¹⁰ *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries*, Alma Ata, 1961, p. 199.

neighbour. "Dzungaria," wrote the Siberian historian S. Shashkov, referring to those tragic events, "was literally strewn with corpses, its waters went red with the blood spilt and the air reeked with the smoke of burning camps, forests and grasses... All and everything that had legs and could move fled to Siberia."¹¹ Such were the relations between the Qing Empire and the Dzungarian khanate, and it takes really wild imagination to speak of the Oirat feudal lords' dependence on the rulers of the Qing dynasty.

After conquering Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan, the Qings started openly threatening the Kazakh and other peoples of Central Asia. Ch. Valikhanov wrote that "Central Asians were seriously alarmed: the downfall of powerful Dzungaria and the conquest of Minor Bukharia, which was of the same faith, left them panic-stricken and filled with mystic fear, all the more so since the superstitious Moslems believed that the Chinese were to subjugate the whole of the world before its end according to a legend¹² prevalent at the time."

Su Beihai draws an entirely different picture. He asserts that "the entire Kazakh people led by Ablai found themselves ruled by the Qing government... The Chinese people made Ablai's nomadic camps part of Chinese territory. Emperor Qianlong presented Ablai a document certifying him a bearer of the title of hereditary prince and a deed on the terms for the acknowledgement of submission. Placed under the rule of the Qing dynasty, the Middle zhuz began to fight ever more resolutely against the aggression of tsarist Russia." The article cited Ablai's message to Emperor Qianlong containing the request to accept him together with his people as Chinese subjects, and gives the dates of the arrival of the Kazakh representatives in the Qing court, and then states that "during that period (second half of the 18th century—*Auth.*) the bloody aggression of tsarist Russia against the Middle zhuz was in the final outcome unsuccessful." The history of relations between the Qing Empire and the feudal lords of the Senior zhuz is interpreted in much the same way. After the demise of Dzungaria, Su Beihai expounds, "the Senior zhuz of the Kazakhs was subjected to Qing rule, the areas of its nomadic settlements were added to the territory of Qing China, while its chiefs paid tribute from time to time to the Qing government."

The question is what the situation was like in reality.

Up until 1755 the Qing court and the Kazakh rulers, as is known, had no direct contacts. But the Manchu dynasty always took into account the character and state of relations between the Oirats and the Kazakhs when carrying out any military-diplomatic actions in Central Asia, and sought to kindle enmity between them. When it became clear in spring 1755 that the end of the Dzungarian khanate was close at hand, Peking radically changed its attitude to the Kazakhs' raids into Dzungarian territory. Afraid that they might restore their former nomadic settlements between the seven rivers and in Tarbagatai, Emperor Qianlong sent the Kazakh tribal chiefs a manifesto which warned unambiguously in closing: "Thou shalt not invade [Dzungarian territory] if thee attack as before, we'll send a great army to punish you".¹³ In the summer of 1755 the Qing army command established diplomatic contacts with Sultan Ablai of the Middle zhuz. "In their relations with the inhabitants of Kazakhstan and Central Asia," B. P. Gurevich, a Soviet researcher study-

¹¹ S. Shashkov, "Slavery in Siberia", *The Case*, Vol. 3, 1863, p. 47 (in Russian).

¹² Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Collected Works* in five volumes, Vol. 1, Alma Ata, 1961, p. 428.

¹³ *Dai Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu* (A Chronicle of the Rule of Gaozong Chunhuangdi of Great Qing), Vol. 489, Tokyo, 1937-1938, sh. 18-18b; Quoted from V. S. Kuznetsov, *The Qing Empire at the Border of Central Asia* (Second Half of the 18th-first Half of the 19th Century), Novosibirsk, 1938, p. 20.

ing the history of international relations in Central Asia, points out in this connection, "the Manchu-Chinese conquerors alternated threats and direct military pressure with the establishment of political and economic ties."¹⁴ The history of relations between the Qing Empire and the peoples and states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan has been thoroughly studied by Soviet historiographers, so we shall just touch upon some details.

In the autumn of 1755 an anti-Qing uprising flared up in Dzungaria, which was led by Amursana, who relied on support from Ablai and other Kazakh feudal lords. Defeated by Qing troops, Amursana found shelter in Ablai's camps. Under the pretext of chasing the "rebellious" *noyon* the Qing authorities invaded Kazakhstan in summer 1756. "It is necessary to establish order among the Kazakhs...", read the imperial edict addressed to the army command, "[the rebels] must be resolutely exterminated or seized..."¹⁵

The united detachments of Ablai and Amursana marched towards the enemy. "Numerous Mungal troops are advancing against the Kirghis-Kaisaks..." documents reported, "and the Kirghis ruler Ablai-sultan with his army set out for a battle against those Mungal troops and met them at the Nor-Ishim border where they fought the battle, but as Ablai's army was not big, he could not withstand the Mungal force."¹⁶ Some facts about that battle can also be gleaned from the story told by Abdulla Kaskinov, a Russian official who visited Ablai's camps in autumn 1756. Ablai's home guard marched towards Qing troops, "stopped in a hidden place and waited for Chinese troops to advance upon them, but was all of a sudden surrounded, about 200 Kaisaks were killed, while the rest of them and Ablai-sultan himself... , wounded, barely escaped by fleeing, and for that reason they intended to take along the afore-mentioned Kalmyck ruler Amursana and, together with the Kalmycks, to set out against those troops."¹⁷

Ablai was seriously wounded in the leg by a spear but continued leading the Kazakh and Oirat armed forces into battles against the Manchu-Chinese invaders. Battles raged on deep into the autumn of 1756 when the Qing command failing to accomplish the mission withdrew its troops.

The following year, after quelling the Dzungarian rebels, the Qings again launched their army against the Kazakhs. Under the circumstances some Kazakh feudal lords decided to open negotiations with the Qing command. "Upon hearing about the invasion of his camps by the 30-thousand-strong Qing corps," the elders Kayanbai and Otogon informed Russian authorities, "Ablai-sultan gathered all the elders, gave them the news, and told them that it was time to make peace with the Chinese because war could bring nothing but extreme ruin... All the elders agreed with Ablai-sultan on that, and some of the elected elders were sent as envoys to both the Chinese army and the said *cherchuts*."¹⁸ The Qing government, interested in tearing the Kazakhs away from the liberation struggle of Central Asian nations, willingly agreed to negotiations and a ceasefire. It was under these circumstances that the first diplomatic and then trade contacts, were established between a group of Kazakh feudal lords and the Qing court.

As Imperial China's foreign policy was dominated by the Sinocentrist dogma and ideas, which precluded equal relations between the Ce-

¹⁴ B. P. Gurevich, *International Relations in Central Asia in the 17th and the First Half of the 19th Centuries*, Moscow, 1979, p. 175.

¹⁵ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁶ The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *Zungorian Affairs*, invt. 113/1, 1755-1757, file 4, sh. 539 back.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, sh. 562-562 back.

¹⁸ The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *Zungorian Affairs*, invt. 113/1, 1758, file 4, sh. 32 back-33.

lestial Empire and other states, Kazakh khans and sultans were treated by the Manchu court as new vassals of the Emperor, while the gifts they traditionally sent in those days were registered in historical chronicles as "tribute". The Chinese Emperor granted the Kazakh envoys who visited the court and their rulers all sorts of grand titles and even documents and seals authorising their rule. This granting of deeds of various titles and ranks, the Soviet Sinologist L. Duman wrote, "was as a rule purely symbolic with no practical meaning, since those rulers could own their lands and govern their people without any deeds from the Chinese Emperor."¹⁹

All the aforesaid fully applies to the Kazakh feudal lords who maintained political and trade links with the Qing court. Suffice it to mention that on their way back from Peking to their native camps the Kazakh envoys simply threw those deeds and seals away.²⁰ Of course, they knew in Peking that all those calendars, deeds and seals were of no significance in the steppes but nevertheless they continued staging these shows. This was done not only to please the Chinese emperor, to demonstrate the greatness of the dynasty, etc. "In any situation," Soviet researcher A. G. Malyavkin said in this connection, "whether an edict conferring investiture upon the head of an independent state, dividing foreign territory into regions, or getting 'tribute' from peoples whose representatives quite unexpectedly appeared at the court, the vigorous activity formalised in the emperor's edicts was deliberate and had far-reaching goals. Whenever the balance of forces in Eastern Asia changed and the emperors of the Middle Kingdom had real power, records of spurious rights, embellished or falsified and corresponding to a given moment, would be brought to light and real claims would be presented. In so doing the emperor and his closest advisers were in no way embarrassed by the fact that there was often a gap of hundreds of years between the date of the record, the issuance of an edict and the laying of claims."²¹ However, Su Beihai and others of his ilk, instead of critically analyzing the data offered by Chinese sources and comparing them with other peoples' relevant chronicles, exploit the falsified writings of the court historiographers of feudal China.

The Qing government sought to prevent Kazakhstan's unification with Russia and to win the Kazakh feudal lords over to its side. The doctrine of the "common ancestor", that is Genghis Khan, was brought forward with this aim in mind, and a large arsenal of sophisticated methods of diplomatic pressure was also used.²² These included promises made by the Qing government to return the Kazakhs their nomadic settlements which had been seized by the Oirats. The Qing emissaries visiting Ab-lai's headquarters in the winter of 1757 told the sultan that had the Kazakhs acknowledged submission to the Chinese emperor, "they would have been migrating along the Zungorian lands that were still uninhabited."²³ Mindful of the bitter experience of the Oirats and its tragic consequences, the Kazakhs, for the most part, were not taken in by all

¹⁹ L. I. Duman, "Traditions in Chinese Foreign Policy". In *The Role of Traditions in Chinese History and Culture*, Moscow, 1972, p. 207.

²⁰ The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *id.* The Asian Department Library, invt. 505, file 71, sh. 122 back.

²¹ A. G. Malyavkin, *The Uyghur States in the 9th-12th Centuries*, Novosibirsk, 1983, pp. 67-68.

²² K. Sh. Khafizova, "The Policy of Qing China Towards the Kazakhs (Second Half of the 18th Century)". *The 5th Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports. Part 2*, Moscow, 1974; pp. 193-198; *id.*, "Qing Diplomacy in the 18th Century (as Illustrated by China's Policy in Central Asia)". *The 6th Conference. "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports. Part 1*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 179-183.

²³ The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *id.* *Zungorian Affairs*, invt. 113/1, 1757, file 7, sh. 128.

these flattering promises. "The Chinese authorities are deceitful," Kazakhs told the Russians who visited their camps, "if one shows even the slightest inclination towards them they, a great and powerful state as it is, can put one under their dominion."

Subsequent developments showed that their wariness was well justified. After stamping out the last seats of resistance among the Oirats in Dzungaria, and conquering Eastern Turkestan, China started to alter its policy towards the Kazakhs. In summer 1760, Emperor Qianlong told Ablai's envoys Yulbarsu and Devletkirei that the Kazakhs should leave the area in the Ili river basin.²⁴ Meanwhile, the Qing troops began to oust the nomads from their native lands by force.²⁵

It would be natural to ask how, being subjects of the Russian Empire, Ablai, Abulmambet and some other Kazakh feudal lords could maintain independent relations with the Qing court. The fact is that in the 1730s-1750s the process of Kazakhstan's unification with the Russian Empire, determined as it was by both objective socio-economic and political reasons and subjective aspirations, had not been completed. While signing legal acts acknowledging their submission to the Russian Empire in the interests of their people, the Kazakh feudal lords also had in mind their personal, class interests, namely, relying on tsarist help and support, to strengthen and expand their influence in the steppes. In addition they tried to prevent the tsarist officials from limiting their rights. It goes without saying that the Russian government and the local administration took measures to stop any actions by the Kazakh rulers contradicting the Russian policy. Though they maintained contacts with the Qing dynasty, Ablai and some other Kazakh feudal lords never severed their ties with Russia nor did they renounce their Russian affiliation, but hoped to secure thereby maximum independence and material profit for themselves. Ablai repeatedly assured the Russian authorities that "our Kirghiz masters and common people are the loyal subjects of Her Gracious Majesty."²⁶ When Qing troops invaded the Kazakh nomad camps the civilians found shelter in Russian fortresses. Receiving news of the invasion of Kazakhstan by Manchu-Chinese troops, the Russian government immediately sent a decisive protest to the Foreign Relations Tribunal of the Qing Empire, insisting on the withdrawal of troops, and took steps to beat off the enemy attacks.²⁷

Needless to say, all of Su Beihai's articles, without exception, are primarily pervaded with the desire to distort the history of Kazakhstan's unification with Russia, and to denigrate Russian policy in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The author makes every effort to prove that there was no voluntary unification of the Kazakh khanates with the Russian Empire, and that this is nothing but the "invention" of modern Soviet historiographers who seek to embellish the tsarist policy towards the non-Russian inhabitants of that area. Juggling with facts taken at random from works by bourgeois authors and researchers abroad, and ignoring the findings of modern Soviet historiography, Su Beihai is out to present the long and complicated process of Kazakhstan's unification with the Russian Empire as a forced conquest of one nation by another. At the same time he is claiming that Russia acceded not Kazakh but Chinese lands. "With fire and sword Russia seized vast *Chinese* (my emphasis—*Auth.*) lands in the Irtysh and Ob areas."

²⁴ See The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *Id. Zungorian Affairs*, invt. 113/1, file 1, 1761, sh. 98.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, file 2, sh. 14.

²⁶ The Archives of Documents on Russian Foreign Policy, *Id. Kirghiz-Kaisaks Affairs*, invt. 122/1, file 18, 1766-1769, sh. 368.

²⁷ See B. P. Gurevich, "The Invasion of Central Asia by the Qing Empire in the Second Half of the 18th Century and Russian Policy". In *Istoriya SSSR*, No. 2, 1973.

Let us leave these assertions concerning the seizure of "Chinese" lands to the author's conscience and retrace just some of the facts of Kazakhstan's rapprochement and unification with Russia. In the late 17th-early 18th centuries the political situation inside and outside Kazakhstan worsened. Due to the historical peculiarities of the nomadic way of life and its economy, and the division of labour between the nomadic and the settled population, Kazakhstan's nomads had at all costs to gain access to markets in the neighbouring farming countries.²⁸ But the situation in Central Asia at the period was unfavourable for the steppe inhabitants. As has already been mentioned the Oirat feudal lords dominated Central Asia blocking the way to the Kazakhs' East Turkestan markets. Besides, there were about ten major independent feudal domains in Central Asia whose rulers engaged in fierce bloody wars among themselves, undermining the productive forces of the area, depleting its material resources and leading to the massive loss of human life and the devastation of cities.²⁹ "The 18th century," Academician V. Bartold said in this connection, "was an age of political, economic and cultural decline for the whole of Moslem Asia."³⁰ Against this backdrop, economic contacts between Kazakhstan and Russia continued to expand and become stronger with every passing year. The high prices offered for husbandry products in the markets of Siberia and the Urals, the safety enjoyed by trade caravans and the absence of any restrictions were factors stimulating the development of Russian-Kazakh trade and bringing peoples closer together.

The devastating invasion of Kazakhstan and Central Asia by the Oirat feudal lords in the 1720s put the country on the verge of total collapse. It was only Russia that could help the Kazakh people. For this reason, the more far-sighted representatives of the Kazakhs ever more frequently offered the Russian government a military alliance, later to be followed up by unification with the Russian Empire. Of course, the interests of the common people and those of the nobility were not always the same. While on the one hand the working people hoped to be delivered from the internecine wars and protected from foreign invasions, the ruling elite of Kazakh society on the other, wanted to strengthen and extend its rule with the help of tsarism.

"One should not oversimplify the motives and the entire complicated process of Kazakhstan's voluntary unification with Russia," D. A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, said in his report at a gala session in Alma Ata devoted to the 250th anniversary of Kazakhstan's voluntary unification with Russia, "a process which was not completed in a day nor in a year. It had many advocates and quite a few adversaries, especially among the reactionary feudal lords, the Moslem clergy and other opponents of rapprochement between Kazakhstan and Russia.

"But the policy of unbreakable friendship with Russia which was ardently supported by the people predominated. The more far-sighted representatives of Kazakh society realised that the Kazakhs had no future without unity with the great Russian people."³¹ In this way the cen-

²⁸ See V. S. Batrakov, *Economic Relations Between the Nomadic Peoples and Russia, Central Asia and China*, Tashkent, 1950.

²⁹ See V. A. Moiseyev, "The Political Situation in Central Asia on the Eve of Kazakhstan's Unification with Russia (First Half of the 18th Century)". In *United Forever. The 250th Anniversary of Kazakhstan's Voluntary Unification with Russia*, Alma Ata, 1982.

³⁰ V. V. Bartold, *The History of Turkestan*, Collected Works in nine volumes, Vol. 2, part I, Moscow, 1963, p. 164.

³¹ D. A. Kunayev, "The Great Power of Friendship and Brotherhood". In *Partiinaya Zhizn Kazakhstana*, No. 7, 1982, p. 15.

turies-long evolution of economic and political ties between Kazakhstan and Russia culminated in the voluntary unification of the Kazakh khanates with the Russian Empire in the 18th and early 19th centuries.

Such are the true historical facts. Of course, it took Soviet historiographers some time to arrive at a unequivocal understanding and a common assessment of this complicated and controversial phenomenon.³² But as more facts became available, insight into the past reached deeper, Leninist methodology gained ground and methods of research were perfected, an objective picture of those events gradually took shape. Su Beihai's article which while referring to conclusions made by Soviet historians in the 1930's-1950's at the same time neglects the accomplishments of current Kazakh historiography amounts to a deliberate distortion of historical facts.

It is noteworthy that Su Beihai adopts an oversimplified and primitive approach to characterising the people who participated in those historic events in the Kazakh steppes in the 18th and early 19th centuries. He brands all the advocates of rapprochement with Russia "traitors and stooges", while the opponents are treated as "heroes". For example, one of the sections of the article on the Senior zhuz is subtitled: "Kenesary Kasymov and His Son Sadyk—Heroes of the Resistance Struggle Against Russia". The author is apparently at odds here with dialectical materialism, the fundamental principle of the study of history. He makes a jumble of uprisings, different in their goals, motivations and nature and abandons class positions in assessing the liberation movement in Russia, in favour of nationalist positions. He equates the national liberation uprising of Isatai Taimanov and Makhambet Utemisov with the reactionary monarchic movement of Kenesary Kasymov. Contrary to Su Beihai's assertions, Kasymov's uprising was not anti-colonial and certainly not popular as is irrefutably evidenced by Soviet research into the problem. That movement, aimed at restoring the feudal-monarchic system, the khan's rule and the old order in the Kazakh steppes, brought a lot of grief and suffering to the Kazakh people.³³ As for a number of other uprisings, which were caused by a variety of reasons, all of them were directed against the colonialist policy of tsarism and the feudal oppression by the *bais* (rich landowners), not against the unification with Russia or against the Russian people. These uprisings became an important component of the general liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of Russia, the movement actively supported by the Russian proletariat and the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin. Su Beihai dwells at length on the construction of towns and fortresses in the Kazakh steppes, feigning an exposure of Russia's aggressive policy. It is necessary to state categorically, in reply to Chinese propaganda's numerous accusations levelled at Soviet historiography that Soviet scholars, including Kazakhstan's historians, in their general studies and monographs, have never ignored nor glossed over the essence of tsarist policy.

Nevertheless, proceeding from Marxist-Leninist teaching and guided by scientific methodology Soviet historiographers managed to perceive and demonstrate the profoundly progressive consequences of Kazakhstan's unification with Russia. Besides heightened exploitation and social and national oppression, the sprouting towns and emergent capitalist relations had a civilising effect on the backward outlying area, and involved it in the general world progress.

The towns and fortresses that appeared at the borders of Kazakhstan

³² B. A. Tulepbayev, "Kazakhstan's Voluntary Unification with Russia and Its Progressive Role". In *United Forever*, Alma Ata, p. 50.

³³ See *The History of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic from Ancient Times to Our Day*, Vol. 3, Alma Ata, 1979, pp. 169-175.

were not only colonial centres but protected the Kazakhs from invading Oirats and later Qing troops. Thousands upon thousands of the steppe nomads brought their families and property to the safety of these walls.³⁴ But Su Beihai does not care about all that.

"The building of fortresses by the Russian authorities," he insists, "was an act of aggression fully directed against China." It is not clear, however, in what way China could be threatened by fortresses and trading centres built, say, on the Yaik, the Ishim and the Syr-Daria. As for the fortresses built along the Irtysh, they had come into being long before the Chinese armed forces appeared at Kazakhstan's borders—that at Omsk in 1716, at Semipalatinsk in 1718 and Ust-Kamenogorsk in 1720. When the domain of the Russian Empire and the Qing China came closer together in Central Asia, a strict order was issued to avoid by all means when building new towns the Qing territory. For instance, when the Ayaguz and Kokpekty districts were formed, Kaptsevich, Governor General of Western Siberia, instructed the officials: "Bear in mind the sanctity of friendliness towards our old ally, the Chinese power, avoid the slightest error that might give rise to displeasure and stay away from Qing lands for fear of a severe penalty as laid down by the law."³⁵ Last but not least, it is necessary to point out that, as a rule, towns appeared on Kazakhstan's territory proper, only after the local population acknowledged themselves subjects of the Russian Empire and not the other way round.

Though tsarism pursued colonialist goals, the nineteenth century reforms had a progressive impact, as they involved the complete assimilation of Kazakhstan's productive forces into the general process of capitalist development in Russia precipitating social differentiation in Kazakh settlements and creating conditions for the joint struggle of the Kazakh and the Russian peoples against social and national oppression, which culminated in the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic has made an unheard-of stride forward from backwardness to economic, scientific and cultural progress in the close-knit family of the Soviet republics. Suffice it to say that after the sixty years of USSR's existence industrial production in the republic grew 938-fold.³⁶ The republic maintains economic contacts with 82 countries all over the world and the children of yesterday's nomads today render economic, scientific and technical assistance to 65 states.

Su Beihai wrote his research papers from positions completely alien to genuine science. It is futile to look in his work for a class historical approach in the analysis of social phenomena of the past, the dialectical formulation of one problem or another, or substantiated conclusions. His arbitrary dissection of facts, extreme subjectivism in their interpretation, limited sources, and neglect of works by Soviet historiographers and the obvious propaganda bias in his articles (to "justify" claims on Soviet territory) render them unimportant from the scientific point of view. Publications which flagrantly distort the history of the inhabitants of Soviet Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia appear regularly, in particular in *The Xinjiang University Bulletin*, and show that nationalist tendencies persist in Chinese historiography. The publication of similar "studies" in China not only interferes with the process of objectively recreating the historical truth about the Kazakh people but also has a negative effect on the process of restoring normal, good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and China.

³⁴ See Zh. K. Kasymbayev, "Russian Defence Installations Protecting Kazakh Lands from the Enemies". In *Voyenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal*, No. 11, 1981.

³⁵ N. Konshin, *Documents on the History of the Steppe Area*. Memorandum-Book of the Semipalatinsk Region 1900, issue 4, Semipalatinsk, 1900, p. 32.

³⁶ See *The Soviet Economy, 1922-1982*. Jubilee Statistical Book, Moscow, 1982, p. 74.

HONG KONG: ITS POLICY AND ECONOMY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 148-154

[Article by A. G. Larin]

The special role played by Xiang Gang (Hong Kong) in international economic ties and its relations with the People's Republic of China and Great Britain attract constant interest. In recent years attention has been paid to Xiang Gang due to China's moves to re-assert its sovereignty over the territory. What are the principal special features of Xiang Gang's position in the current period, which is a major landmark in its history?

A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CENTRE

Xiang Gang's renown is largely that of the world's chief producer and exporter of a number of consumer goods. Xiang Gang has 48,000 factories, employing almost 1,000,000 people and it exports more than eighty per cent of its industrial output.¹ In 1983, Xiang Gang's exports totalled HK \$104.4 billion.²

The leading industry is the manufacture of textiles and textile products: it employs 43 per cent of Hong Kong manpower and accounts for 40 per cent of its exports.³ In the past ten years, Xiang Gang was on several occasions the world's leading exporter of clothing.

The second most important industry is electrical engineering and electronics. Xiang Gang manufactures electronic computer units, television sets, portable computers, radios, video games, etc., and exports them to many countries. In 1982, 9.5 per cent of Hong Kong's industrial workers were employed in this industry, and its output accounted for 10 per cent of Hong Kong's exports.⁴

Watchmaking is growing rapidly in Xiang Gang. In the late 1970s, Hong Kong became the world's number-one exporter of watches, leaving Switzerland and Japan behind. In 1983 Xiang Gang exported more than 270,000,000 watches.⁵

Foreign capital plays a prominent role in promoting Xiang Gang's industries. In recent years foreign investments have grown constantly, reaching a total of HK \$7.8 billion in 1983. Foreign capital controls 438 factories in Xiang Gang, less than one per cent of the total, but those are major factories, with personnel totalling more than 10 per cent of the workers employed in Hong Kong's industries.⁶

¹ In *The Markets of Asia-Pacific. Hong Kong and Macao*, Aldershot, 1982, p. 75; *Jingji Daobao*, № 3, 1983, p. 6.

² In *Jingji Daobao*, № 12, 1984, p. 13. In the early 1980s the HK \$ exchanged for 0.19 to 0.21 US \$, but after a rapid slump of the Hong Kong currency in 1983 the rate was fixed at 7.8 HK \$ = 1 US \$. — In *Jingji Daobao*, № 42, 1983, p. 6.

³ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 43, 1983, p. 9.

⁴ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 14, 1983, p. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, № 13, 1984, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, № 15, 1983, p. 6 and № 43, 1983, p. 9.

The number-one investor is the United States, accounting for 46.2 per cent of all foreign investments in Xiang Gang. The US is followed by Japan (29.4 per cent) and Britain (5.8 per cent). 35.9 per cent of the foreign investments are in electronics.⁷

The unsteady economic situation in the capitalist world greatly affects Xiang Gang's entire economy. During the economic recession in the West in 1982 Xiang Gang's exports went down by 2.6 per cent, re-exports, by 4 per cent, and imports, by 3 per cent, while production was curtailed, which reduced the number of jobs. However, Hong Kong's exports more than doubled from 1978 to 1982; in the early 1980's Xiang Gang made it into the top twenty in world trade, and its per capita trade figure even put it into the top ten.⁸ There was overall growth in Xiang Gang's trade in 1983.

The number-one importer of Xiang Gang's products is the United States, which bought 41.9 of the Hong Kong exports in 1983. Britain purchased 8.2 per cent of the exports, Federal Germany, 7.7 per cent, the People's Republic of China, 6.0 per cent, and Japan, 3.4 per cent. Xiang Gang's exports to China have been growing especially dynamically, increasing approximately 50-fold in the past 5 years.

Re-exports are a long-established tradition with Xiang Gang, dating back from the 19th century and currently rapidly developing. Re-exports are quite important for Xiang Gang's foreign trade, totalling HK \$ 56.3 billion in 1983.

Xiang Gang is a trade link between the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and advanced capitalist states, and Taiwan and several other countries of the Asia-Pacific region, on the other. Xiang Gang's re-exports to China totalled HK \$ 7.92 billion, while re-exports of Chinese goods by Xiang Gang reached HK \$14.69 billion.⁹ In 1983 re-exports to China grew to HK \$ 12.2 billion.

Xiang Gang's imports grow at about the same rate as its overall exports; they increased approximately by 12 per cent a year from 1978 to 1982, and by 25-26 per cent in 1983.¹⁰ This is only natural, since Xiang Gang imports just about everything that's vital for its people and economy: even drinking water is brought from China. Xiang Gang's imports totalled HK \$ 175.4 billion in 1983.

Xiang Gang's orientation towards foreign markets and raw materials and its role of middleman in trade have turned it into a major international seaport with advanced ship-repair facilities. More than 35,000,000 tons of cargo were shipped through Xiang Gang in 1983.¹¹ Xiang Gang has modern container-handling equipment, handling more than 1,500,000 containers a year, and in 1984 this capacity is to grow to 2,200,000.

Xiang Gang's numerous banks play major role in its function of an international economic centre financing above all trade between Far Eastern and Southeast Asian developing nations and advanced capitalist states. Financial assets in Xiang Gang totalled HK \$ 420 billion in 1982.¹²

Goods and services sold to tourists from Southeast Asia, Japan, and the United States are a form of "invisible" trade, making a secondary but appreciable contribution to Xiang Gang's foreign economic ties. More

⁷ *Ibid.*, № 7, 1984, p. 13.

⁸ In: *Jingji Daobao*, № 3, 1983, p. 5 and № 21, 1983, p. 9; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17, 1983, vol. 119, № 11, p. 47.

⁹ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17, 1983, vol. 119, № 11, p. 47; *China Trade Report*, May 1, 1983, vol. XXI, p. 14.

¹⁰ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17, 1983, vol. 119, № 11, p. 47; *Jingji Daobao*, № 12, 1984, p. 13.

¹¹ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 4, 1984, p. 9.

¹² For more information on Xiang Gang's banks see V. N. Karpunin, "International Financial Centres in South-East Asia", *Far Eastern Affairs*, № 1, 1984.

than 2,700,000 tourists came to Xiang Gang in 1983, and they spent more than HK \$ 10 billion there.¹³

Xiang Gang's number-one partner in trade is the United States, and the key positions in banking belong to the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. In turn, Xiang Gang plays a very important role in People's Republic of China foreign economic ties. First of all, Xiang Gang is China's biggest source of convertible currency, part of which comes from trade: Xiang Gang is China's second most-important trade partner (after Japan) and the number-one market for Chinese goods. In 1982, Xiang Gang accounted for 15.7 per cent of China's foreign trade and for 23.3 per cent of its exports; trade between China and Xiang Gang exceeded \$ 6.4 billion, with a balance of \$ 3.8 billion in China's favour.¹⁴

China also derives considerable profits from direct participation in Xiang Gang's economic affairs. Xiang Gang authorities estimate that Chinese investments in the territory amount to \$ 3 billion to \$ 5 billion; there are 13 Chinese banks, more than 50 offices of China's trade and investment agencies, and 101 department stores selling Chinese goods in Xiang Gang.¹⁵

China's overall incomes from economic ties with Xiang Gang total an estimated \$ 8 billion a year, which equals, according to some calculations, 36.5 per cent of China's foreign currency revenues.¹⁶

Hong Kong businessmen are China's closest partners in its efforts to attract direct investment. More than 60 per cent of China's joint-project agreements with foreign companies have been concluded with Hong Kong firms—which account for the same percentage of overall foreign investment in China. In the special economic zones in the south of China, established as centres for foreign investments, Xiang Gang's percentage in these investments is especially high, exceeding 90 per cent.¹⁷

Hong Kong businessmen, attracted by tax privileges, low rents, and relatively inexpensive labour, are investing a lot of money in China's economy. But if one regards the Hong Kong investments as a factor stimulating China's economic development, one can easily see the faults in them that are inherent in all foreign business activities in China. This has been indicated in studies by Soviet experts.¹⁸

First, the bulk of Hong Kong investments are made not to promote production, but to build hotels, resort areas, tourist and shopping centres, or for real estate transactions. Investments in real estate have exceeded HK \$ 1 bln.¹⁹ Second, the investments made in production for the most part go to non-basic industries such as the textile industry, tailoring, printing, and toy manufacturing. The biggest joint project—the construction of the Xiawan industrial region in the special Zhuhai economic zone—is primarily designed to produce building materials.²⁰ Third, a great part of the factories involving Hong Kong capital are built to process raw materials on order or to assemble radios or watches or other such products; those factories are small and ill-equipped. These features are long-term because they are due to a whole range of economic and political

¹³ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 4, 1984, p. 8.

¹⁴ In *Direction of Trade Statistics. Yearbook.*, Washington, 1983, p. 127.

¹⁵ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 46, 1983, p. 17; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 20, 1983, vol. 119, № 3, p. 41.

¹⁶ In *Newsweek*, June 27, 1983; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 20, 1983, vol. 119, № 3, p. 42.

¹⁷ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 46, 1983, p. 16, 17.

¹⁸ See, e. g., S. A. Manezhev, L. V. Novosyolova, "The Role of External Factors in the Economic Construction in the People's Republic of China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, № 2, 1983.

¹⁹ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 20, 1983, vol. 119, № 3, p. 42.

²⁰ In *Jingji Daobao*, № 32, 1983, p. 5.

factors now relevant to China and to the structure of the Hong Kong economy.

DECOLONISATION OF XIANG GANG

Xiang Gang's transformation into the colony within its present frontiers was a nearly 50-year-long process of several stages. In the course of two Opium Wars (in 1840-1842 and in 1856-1860) Britain captured Xiang Gang island and the southernmost part of the Jiulong Peninsula "in perpetuity". In 1898, Britain "leased" the so-called New Territories, which are more than nine-tenths of the colony's entire territory for a period of 99 years.

From the first period of colonisation, Xiang Gang became a spring-board for imperialist expansion in China. Britain built a naval base in Xiang Gang, and a growing stream of goods was channeled through the colony, including opium smuggled into China and coolies shipped out for work in various parts of the world. Later bank capital was concentrated in Xiang Gang, and the Hong Kong-Shanghai Banking Corporation made a big contribution to the financial enslavement of China.

The working class of Xiang Gang rebelled many times against its oppressors. The Xiang Gang sailors' strike in 1922 was the first major anti-imperialist strike in China, and the famous Xiang Gang-Guangzhou strike of 1925-1926 was supported, on the Soviet working people's call, by a powerful campaign of international proletarian solidarity.

In pursuing Chiang Kaishek's retreating troops in 1949, the People's Liberation Army of China approached the border of Xiang Gang. Britain seriously worried about the colony, but China left it intact, hoping to get political and economic advantages in the future, specifically in trade with the West.

These hopes came true only partially. In 1951, soon after the United States started its aggression in Korea which grew into an undeclared war against the People's Republic of China as well, the USA and its allies launched a policy of economic blockade and embargoes against China. This affected shipments of goods to China through Xiang Gang. From 1951 to 1956 China's purchases in Hong Kong went down more than 12-fold, and declined even more in the 1960s.²¹

The West sought not only to weaken military resistance in Korea, but also to impede the economic restoration and development of the People's Republic of China. The policy failed, because of the great help that China got from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Thus, repeated claims made by the western press quoting Chinese sources that Xiang Gang became a vital artery to China²² after the embargo was imposed are obvious exaggerations.

Convertible currency income from Xiang Gang to China grew every year, except for certain periods, and this made the Chinese leadership keep intact Xiang Gang's colonial status. In 1972, the Chinese Ambassador at the United Nations sent a letter to the Chairman of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, insisting that Hong Kong and Macao not be included in the list of colonies, because, he wrote, they were "parts of Chinese territory occupied by the British and the Portuguese authorities", so deciding their future was "China's sovereign right entirely" and the Chinese government would decide it "in an appropriate way" when "the conditions matured".²³

²¹ In A. G. Kukolevsky, *Hong Kong in the System of World Economic Ties*, Moscow, 1972, p. 20, 100 (in Russian).

²² In *Times*, Nov. 17, 1980.

²³ Quoted from M. I. Sladkovsky, *China and Britain*, Moscow, 1980, p. 265 (in Russian).

But the end of Britain's "lease" on the New Territories is drawing near, and at the turn of the 1980s businessmen in Xiang Gang became increasingly concerned over their future. The expediency of long-term investments in Xiang Gang was questioned. In those conditions the Chinese leadership felt it was necessary to state its attitude to Xiang Gang's affairs. For the first time in 1979 Deng Xiaoping received the British-appointed Governor of Xiang Gang and called on him "to reassure the Hong Kong investors", pledging that "investments in Xiang Gang would be encouraged".²⁴ This has been reiterated more than once by the Chinese leadership.

China's stand concerning the future of Xiang Gang became clearer in 1982, when Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Hu Yaobang made a number of statements about China's intention to re-assert its sovereignty over Xiang Gang but maintain its "prosperity and stability" by sticking to the "one country—two systems" formula.

Apparently, this step was connected with efforts made by the Chinese leaders at that time to make progress towards Taiwan's reunification with the People's Republic of China by promising to preserve the island's economic and political order. That purpose was featured in the proposals made by Ye Jianying in December 1981. A special article was included in China's Constitution adopted in December 1982. It says, "The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of specific conditions". Chinese politicians have commented on the idea of setting up special administrative regions, saying bluntly that this could be applied to Taiwan.

It has been stated also that Xiang Gang and Aomen (Macao) will receive this status. Obviously, Xiang Gang is being regarded by the Chinese leadership as an example applicable to Taiwan. Apart from promoting prosperity, the Hong Kong businessmen and the press were to become, according to Ye Jianying, "a bridge to effect ties between Taiwan and the mainland".

Considering the negative developments in Xiang Gang's economy caused by businessmen's apprehension, the Chinese leadership started pushing for the elaboration of a plan for the colony's future. At the end of 1982 the People's Republic of China and Great Britain entered into lengthy negotiations on Xiang Gang, in which both states made their positions clear.

China maintained that its rights to Xiang Gang were unquestionable and were not to be discussed at the talks. The People's Republic of China would re-assert sovereignty over the whole of the colony on July 1, 1997, when Britain's "lease" of the New Territories expire. This statement was made by Hu Yaobang during an interview with Japanese journalists.²⁵ He also explained China's motives in postponing decolonisation by almost fifteen years, saying that "although the British-Chinese treaties are in fact unequal, China intends to respect their historical results".

The Chinese leadership regards the remaining time as a transitional period needed to "maintain prosperity and stability in Xiang Gang", that is to say, to prevent the ebbing of capital and a general economic derangement there, because that would reduce foreign currency revenues coming from the colony.

China wanted British assistance in this, and that was what it sought at the talks, but it had been pre-determined that after 1997 Britain would not be allowed to take any part in governing Xiang Gang.

²⁴ In *Daily Telegraph*, April 7, 1979.

²⁵ In *Mainichi*, Aug. 16, 1983.

At the same time, Zhao Ziyang stated that "Xiang Gang would not alter its social system, economic system, or way of life for another fifty years. To implement this course, the National People's Congress will pass a fundamental law for Xiang Gang. What will be done in the subsequent period will be decided by the future government of the Xiang Gang special administrative region".²⁶

Speaking at the Second session of the 6th National People's Congress in May 1984, the State Council Premier set forth a number of political directions on Xiang Gang, in addition to the above principles. He said the future special administrative region "would be governed by local people themselves and enjoy a high degree of autonomy". It would retain "the status of an open port and international financial and trade centre".²⁷

However, at a meeting at that time attended by representatives of Xiang Gang and Aomen, Deng Xiaoping said that "after re-asserting sovereignty over Xiang Gang the Chinese government would have the right to deploy its troops there".

Britain's position at the talks was at loggerheads with China's stand on a number of issues. Britain defended the validity of the treaties that had sealed the colonial status of Hong Kong, and, according to the press, only eventually did it recognize China's rights to the whole of Xiang Gang.²⁸

The Thatcher government insisted on retaining administrative power in Xiang Gang for an indefinite period of time after China re-asserted sovereignty over it. Britain claimed it had "obligations to the people of Hong Kong" and said that only the presence of the former administration would ensure the atmosphere of confidence that was necessary for stable business activities in Hong Kong. At first Britain insisted that the existing system of government be fully preserved, but later it made a proposal on a joint government of Xiang Gang to be administered by British and Chinese officials.²⁹ There was speculation in the press concerning the proposal to make Xiang Gang "a free city" and to lease it to Britain under "a contract on government".

China strongly criticized the British position in the mass media, describing it as an attempt "to trade sovereignty for the right to govern" and accusing Britain of "standing to this day on the platform of colonialism".³⁰ The only concession that the Chinese government made was that it agreed to "take into account the economic interests of Britain and other states in Xiang Gang".

As the Chinese-British talks went on, there were recurrent spells of anxiety during the year in Xiang Gang, characterized by share slumps at the local stock exchange, the weakening of the HK dollar, and the withdrawal of capital from the colony. To check these developments, Chinese officials worked hard to convince businessmen in Xiang Gang that they had nothing to worry about. To prove its intentions, China concluded a number of major commercial deals through its firms in Xiang Gang (one deal was the purchase of controlling interest in Conic Investments—a company manufacturing consumer electronics).³¹

At the end of their talks in September 1984 Britain and China initiated a joint declaration based on China's principles. The two sides agreed that Britain would exercise administrative control in Xiang Gang till 1997, after which power in the special administrative region of Xiang

²⁶ In *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 15, 1984.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, May 16, 1984.

²⁸ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 9, 1983, vol. 120, p. 43-44.

²⁹ In *Newsweek*, Dec. 12, 1983.

³⁰ In *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 20, 1983.

³¹ In *Asiaweek*, Feb. 3, 1984.

Gang would be assumed by a body made up of local people. The chief executive would be appointed by the national government of the People's Republic of China "on the basis of election returns or after holding consultations in the locality".

Xiang Gang's current laws "will basically remain unchanged". Xiang Gang will have the right to keep a currency and a financial system of its own, independently develop its economic and trade policy, and conclude agreements with states and international organisations, all under the name of "Xiang Gang of the PRC".

Along with China's flag and coat of arms, Xiang Gang will be allowed to have similar "regional" attributes of power. This measure, regarded as superfluous by the Xiang Gang businessmen, confirms that in handling the problem of Xiang Gang the Chinese leadership wants to build a pattern for re-asserting sovereignty over Taiwan.

Despite the implications of the Xiang Gang agreement for the future of Taiwan, the US Secretary of State George Shultz approved of the British-Chinese declaration. Evidently having no apprehensions that the example of Xiang Gang will weaken American positions in Taiwan, monopolist circles of the USA and other countries having large investments in Hong Kong, hope to use the latter in future as a bridgehead for acquiring an influential position on the Chinese market.

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BOOK ON USSR-JAPAN TRADE, ECONOMIC TIES REVIEWED

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[Review by A. I. Senatorov, candidate of historical sciences, of book "SSSR-Yaponiya: problemy torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [USSR-Japan: Trade and Economic Relations], edited by Yu. S. Stolyarov and Ya. A. Pevzner, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 240 pages]

Soviet economic scientists, together with specialists from Soviet organisations involved in economic, scientific, and technological contacts with Japan, have produced a fundamental work surveying a wide range of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations. The problematic approach of this study is quite successfully combined with a succinct, nonetheless, factually rich excursus into the history of Soviet-Japanese relations. The book provides an unbiased picture of the evolution of relations in the economic sphere right up to and including the present day.

Each of the eight chapters in the monograph sums up the rich positive experience accumulated in trade, in the implementation of plans for economic cooperation and in all other areas (scientific and technological exchange, transport, fishing, credit and

finance relations) of the USSR's contacts with Japan, the second capitalist country in the world in terms of industrial capacity. Carefully noting the positive aspects of these relations the authors also analyse factors impeding trade and economic cooperation and make an attempt to point out ways to overcome the emerging problems and obstacles.

The authors clearly show that the Soviet Union, while persistently pursuing a policy in favour of creating stable, mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific and technological relations with capitalist countries, does not regard these relations merely as a means to rationally use the advantages of the international division of labour and to raise, in the final outcome, the efficiency of socialist production. At the same time, it considers them a key factor

in helping to consolidate world peace and establish goodneighbourly relations with countries having different social systems. The history of both pre-war and post-war Soviet-Japanese relations graphically shows, that the interest the two countries display in developing mutually beneficial trade and economic contacts provided a powerful impetus to restoring and, consequently, developing political relations. In this context, some facts about the history of Japan's concessions in the Soviet Far East cited in the book, deserve much attention. The authors believe that these concessions which were partially supported by Japanese capital "had a key role to play in establishing and developing normal relations between the two countries. As a result of its granting concessions, the Soviet Union managed to attract Japanese capital to developing the oil, coal and timber resources of the Far East, thus speeding up, to a certain extent, the process of rehabilitation of the region's economy which had been undermined by the Civil War and foreign intervention. The concessions also made possible a favourable solution of the problem concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin, thereby consolidating the Soviet Union's positions in the Far East and the Pacific as a whole" (p. 14).

It was precisely their desire to develop trade with the USSR, normalise relations with it in fishing as well as other economic interests, that encouraged the Japanese business community, yet again after World War II, to work actively for the restoration of interstate relations with the USSR. In pursuance of these aims, in the 1950s Japanese organisations such as the committee to facilitating the development of trade between Japan and the USSR, the society assisting Soviet-Japanese trade contacts at the Japanese Diet and the international trade assistance association vigorously expanded their activities (p. 50). It is noteworthy, that the signing of the declaration on normalisation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan was preceded by the convention on fishing on the High Seas in the Northwest Pacific signed between the USSR and Japan in May 1956 (p. 117).

There are, however, counteracting influences at work: specifically, the level and rate of development in the sphere of trade and economic relations are affected by the foreign policies of the countries concerned, as well as by the state of political relations between them. The Soviet course is clearcut: the USSR has invariably been and still is in favour of developing trade and economic

contacts with Japan on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The Japanese approach, on the contrary, had many zigzags. For example, in pre-war years the normalisation of bilateral relations "rooted in the mutual desire of both states allowed, among other things, the conclusion of several concession agreements between the USSR and Japan, unequalled in scope and terms of action, as compared with the Soviet Union's agreements with other capitalist countries at that period". On the other hand, the deterioration of the political atmosphere through the fault of the Japanese resulted, in fact, in a total break of trade contacts in both the pre-war and war years (pp. 16-17).

During the post-war period, the Japanese leadership also was inconsistent in its approach towards relations with the USSR. In spite of the interest shown by the Japanese business community in trade with the USSR the volume of trade between the two countries, prior to the normalisation of diplomatic relations, was insignificant. The government, led by S. Yoshida, actually pursued a policy of holding back these contacts. During the period of US aggression against Korea in 1950-1953, when Japan became a springboard and rear base of US Armed Forces, Soviet-Japanese trade, in fact, ceased (p. 17).

The situation, however, changed with the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1956 and the subsequent signing of a series of interstate documents, including the treaty of trade. The bilateral economic ties "acquired a lasting legal foundation. Relations in the field of fishing and freight haulage began to be developed, and an exchange in the fields of science and technology was gradually set up. Similarly there was an improvement of the organisational structure of economic ties and the regular exchange of economic delegations was started. Already by the mid-1960s, Japan had become one of the USSR's leading economic partners among the industrially developed capitalist states" (p. 18).

The growing interest of Japanese business circles in the Soviet Union as a perspective trade partner, and the mutual desire to use the advantages of the international division of labour and the close geographical proximity of the two countries, resulted in the setting up, in July 1965, of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees on economic cooperation. "With

the beginning of these committees' activities, the economic relations between the two countries entered a qualitatively new phase of their development. Thenceforth, traditional trade contacts were coupled with more advanced forms of cooperation envisaging, above all, the joint development of the natural resources in Siberia and the Far East" (p. 19).

The period of 1968-1971 saw the beginning of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation on a compensation basis: Soviet foreign trade associations and Japanese firms concluded general agreements specifying for the exploitation of timber resources in the Far East, the construction of a sea port in the Vrangeli Bay (port Vostochny) and the deliveries of various equipment and machinery from Japan. Remarkable vistas opened in the field of cooperation in the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM).

In 1973, the joint Soviet-Japanese communique recognised the need to intensify economic cooperation, including the development of the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. An agreement was reached to promote economic cooperation, to conclude contracts between Japanese firms and corresponding Soviet organisations, and to assist in the timely implementation of these contracts. Proceeding from this agreement, and in a situation when, in late 1973, the Japanese economy began to move towards the most severe and prolonged crisis of the post-war period, the Japanese government decided to allow the state-run Export-Import Bank of Japan to grant credits to the Soviet Union: up to that time economic cooperation had largely been based on corporate credit terms. This fact made it possible "to switch over in practice to large-scale long-term agreements on economic cooperation" (p. 76).

The monograph details the steady advance of Soviet-Japanese trade relations noting, among other things, that the trade growth rates between the USSR and Japan in 1971-1975 were running ahead of the overall volume of the USSR's foreign trade: 24.1 per cent against the average annual growth rates of 18.1 per cent (p. 52). At the same time the authors cite many facts testifying to the increasingly negative attitude of the Japanese government to trade and economic relations with the USSR. Japan's leadership, while taking major decisions that determined further economic cooperation between the two countries, was

increasingly guided by the "inseparability of economics from politics" principle, in other words, it pursued a strategy of restricting economic contacts for political reasons.

The book shows, that already in the early 1970s, Japan was ever more "looking back" to the USA and other countries as it developed its trade with the USSR. Campaigns, instigated by right-wing elements and directed against broader trade and economic contacts with the USSR, intensified; attempts were made to tie in the participation of Japanese firms in joint projects with the solution of the "northern territories problem", with "state security" issues, etc. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Defence Agency were especially zealous in this campaign" (p. 21). Tokyo ignored both the draft project of inter-governmental agreement on the principles of economic cooperation, dispatched by the Soviet government in 1973, and the Soviet proposal to Japanese businessmen in 1976, concerning "the possibility of a long-term programme for economic cooperation for 10 to 15 years, based largely on the intensified use of the Siberian and Far Eastern resources".

Later on, this negative "politics-oriented" approach of the Japanese government to the problems of economic cooperation with the USSR, became ever more pronounced. This was reflected in "the attempts by Japanese ruling quarters to tie in the trade and political treatment of the USSR with concrete political problems; in adopting differentiated approach to the USSR and other socialist countries; in reproducing, as a token of 'solidarity' with other leading capitalist countries, primarily the USA, (either fully or partially) the same trade and political terms and restrictions" (p. 38).

In the early 1980s, the authors underline, the "inseparability of economics from politics" became the underlying principle of Japan's trade and political relations with the USSR" (p. 44).

Much space is given to the evidence supporting the view that trade and economic cooperation is beneficial both for the USSR and Japan. This proposition hardly needs to be substantiated, for it is obvious that trade cannot exist if it is detrimental to any side. Yet, there are people in Japan who try to portray their country as a "victim" of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. The author of this review personally heard such ridiculous statements,

made in public by a Japanese participant in a scientific symposium held in Sapporo in 1981.

Economic contacts between the USSR and Japan, as the monograph repeatedly stresses, rest on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. Besides, in most areas of economic cooperation, the USSR and Japan have a variety of alternatives which, therefore, permit choice. "The fact that under present conditions the two countries maintain economic contacts at a rather high level, implies mutual benefit in a true sense of the word" (p. 191).

The study deals extensively with the importance of bilateral economic relations and in fact, one particular chapter is especially devoted to it. Concrete examples illustrate that cooperation with Japan helps the Soviet Union in saving labour, time and material resources, in accelerating technological progress, in implementing Soviet plans to develop the economy of the remote Eastern regions of the country. At the same time, the authors analyse the advantages that economic cooperation with the USSR brings to Japan, attaching much importance—to the USSR as a market for Japanese products and, conversely, to Soviet imports for Japan's economy. It is mentioned, specifically, that exports to the USSR provide jobs for quite a number of Japanese workers, a factor of great value in conditions of persisting unemployment. Proceeding from the ratio of the volume of Japanese exports per person employed, it was estimated that in 1982, nearly 1,400,000 people were engaged in the production of export items for the USSR (p. 192).

Contrarywise, obediently following in the wake of US diktat, which demands from its allies all kinds of "sanctions" and restrictions in economic relations with the USSR, Japan incurs damage to its own national interests and weakens its positions on the world markets. The book brings forward a series of examples showing how Tokyo by playing up to Washington, finally lost to Western Europe many profitable large-scale orders, that the Soviet Union had originally planned to place with Japan. "Empty spaces" that appeared as a result of Japan's pullout from the projects, were immediately and successfully filled by West European competitors. Indicative in this respect are data obtained in 1980, when the

USA launched a campaign of pressurising their NATO allies and Japan. At that time the USSR's foreign trade with West Germany increased by 36 per cent, Italy—41 per cent, France—43 per cent, Finland—49 per cent, while with Japan the increment was less than 5 per cent. Taking into account soaring foreign trade prices this, in fact, implied a physical decrease in trade between the USSR and Japan (p. 66).

An urge to reveal and give a detailed characterisation of the positive experience in the evolution of economic relations between the USSR and Japan, has been the motivating factor of the whole team of authors. They did not stop at a thorough examination of new perspective forms of mutually beneficial cooperation. Each of them is aware of the great untapped reserves, as he seeks ways and means to activate these reserves.

The reader will surely find in the book enough arguments in favour of the Soviet proposals for an inter-governmental agreement on the principles of economic cooperation and the joint elaboration of long-term objectives for such cooperation between the two countries. Similar Soviet proposals, the study indicates, have long since been put into practice in the trade and economic relations with a number of industrially developed capitalist countries. Long-term cooperation agreements on a governmental level, which have been concluded with France, Italy, Finland and many other Western countries for 10-15 or even 20 years, take into consideration the planned nature of the Soviet economy, and the interests of West European firms. These agreements "create most favourable conditions for broad and long-term economic cooperation between states with different social and economic systems" (p. 83). The solid contractual foundation, on which economic cooperation with the USSR rests, has enabled some West European capitalist countries to overtake Japan as the chief USSR trade partner (which it had been since the early 1970s).

Once again basing itself on the principle of mutual benefit, the book substantiates alternative constructive proposals, made to ensure a steady advance of economic ties with Japan. These proposals, in part, include the opening of affiliated Soviet and Japanese banks, in each other's country (p. 166), the conclusion of a long-term inter-governmental agreement on credits which would open the way for one partner to obtain cre-

dits without unnecessary formalities, and for the other—to get major export orders (p. 169).

Several chapters give a pithy account of what is being done in this country to expand economic cooperation with Japan. Great vistas will open with the implementation of grandiose plans for developing the economy of the USSR's eastern regions. Even now "purely Siberian and Far Eastern commodities (and this is an incomplete figure) account for about 80 per cent of the total value of Soviet exports to Japan and cover approximately 25 per cent of all Japanese imports" (p. 186).

A review of the present state and prospects for improvement of the transportation system in the Far East also deserves much attention. This system is developing at a rapid pace and already now it helps Japan in its trade contacts with other countries (the Soviet railway carriages, sea vessels and aircraft chartered by foreign companies deliver their cargoes). A chapter dealing with the two countries' relations in fishing and fishing economy research, shows the concern for the preservation and increase of biological resources in the Far Eastern sea area, and their rational use on the basis of international agreements.

This study can in fact be used as a guide book on trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan, since it contains the most necessary information on the fundamental joint documents, specifying terms in present-day trade and economic contacts as well as statistics pointing to the dynamics and structure of foreign trade. It also gives detailed coverage of the present conditions of economic cooperation, including the general agreements which have been implemented and those in force now. It has a comprehensive analysis of scientific and technological exchange, fishing, transport, finance and credit relations. Most importantly the compilers managed to include in the supplement several documents relating to Soviet-Japanese cooperation, as well as a wealth of statistical data.

The book is well edited, and its scientific value is ever more heightened by the inclusion of references to the sources used and a bibliography index. The author of this review could find only a small number of minor slips in this multifaceted monograph. I would like to draw attention to just one such slip, so as not to mislead the reader: the undersea tunnel between Honshu and

Hokkaido islands is claimed by the authors to be functioning (p. 198), whereas in reality, although constructed, it has not been commissioned and the prospects for its opening are as yet unclear.

In conclusion, I wish to say that the publication of this book is a successful be-

ginning of the series of monographs called Trade and Economic Relations Between the USSR and Capitalist and Developing Countries, which is now being prepared by Soviet researchers.

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SOVIET DIPLOMAT'S MEMOIRS ABOUT BEIJING, UN POSTS REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 84 (signed to press 23 Nov 84) pp 194-197

[Review by F. F. Lappo of book "Ot Pekina do N'yu-Yorka. Zapiski sovetskogo uchenogo i diplomata" [From Beijing to New York. The Memoirs of a Soviet Academic and Diplomat] by L. N. Kutakov, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 271 pages]

[Text] The collection of Soviet memoirs about China has been supplemented by a new book--the memoirs of Leonid Nikolayevich Kutakov, a prominent Soviet academic who was once the pro-rector in charge of scientific affairs at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the author of several studies of the history and theory of international relations and a prominent diplomat, serving in an official capacity at the Soviet Embassy in Japan and later as under secretary general of the United Nations.

First of all, it is important to note that L. N. Kutakov's book belongs to the genre of scientific memoirs. It is not merely a description of his personal experiences at work in China and the United Nations and not only a report of the author's meetings with famous leaders of the PRC, Chinese diplomats, workers in the personnel training system of the Chinese foreign policy establishment, organizers and instructors and with prominent international figures and UN officials. Furthermore, it is not merely a description of his personal impressions of events and developments in China (L. N. Kutakov toured the country extensively) or of international events and the affairs of the United Nations and its various institutions. "Documented reports of conversations in the PRC, the proceedings of sessions of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and other UN agencies and international organizations, official documents and publications, the media and memoirs allowed me to clarify and verify my memories of those years and give my writings documented authenticity," the author writes.

Some readers might find the structure of the book unusual. Excursions into past history can be regarded as deviations from the genre, but the documented basis of L. N. Kutakov's narration and his emphasis on historical corroboration attest to his desire to analyze events in depth and in great detail, and this is the connection between this type of memoir and a scientific work. This is the reason for the authenticity of his descriptions, the authenticity of the observations of an individual who witnessed and took part in these

events, and the scientific cogency and methodological accuracy of the appraisals and conclusions pertaining to social events and political figures. The very structure of the book represents a scientific combination of historical and logical principles. It is not only a chronicle of events, but also a logical series of processes and events. It is not merely a list of facts, but also of their relationships and their natural implications, the connections between facts and social trends. This is exactly what V. I. Lenin taught the observer of social events to do.

Four of the ten chapters in the book deal with the author's work and life in China (1955-1957) and the events preceding this period and continuing in subsequent years. Here L. N. Kutakov successfully evades the temptation to which the writer of superficial memoirs is prone, the temptation to merely describe his own experiences. The reader sees and knows that the author is motivated by something else--deep and sincere sympathy, concern about the future of the Chinese people and the Chinese revolution, a sense of personal responsibility for this future and a sincere humanitarian wish to perform a social and international duty.

L. N. Kutakov worked in China as the main adviser of the director of the Beijing Diplomatic Institute and also headed a group of Soviet specialists. He arrived in the PRC at a time when the Soviet people's friendly feelings for the Chinese people had already been fully displayed and when they were expressed to their fullest in the enthusiastic cooperation by our countries with one another and in international relations in general. One area of this inspiring work was the training of socialist diplomats for the People's Republic of China. But this was also a period of gradual changes in the politics and ideology of the PRC leadership, changes which later led to a radical change in Beijing's attitude toward the USSR, the Soviet experience and the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism. Only the first, scarcely noticeable symptoms of this were present at that time. L. N. Kutakov presents a thorough and balanced description of the complexity of many events in China and the personal characteristics of the officials with whom he worked or communicated.

During the first decade more than 10,000 Soviet specialists worked in the PRC, more than 8,000 Chinese specialists were trained and worked in the USSR and more than 11,000 students graduated from Soviet VUZ's, including the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The author met several of the graduates of this institute in the performance of his diplomatic functions. At that time the Chinese leaders placed a high value on the experience and assistance of the USSR and the Soviet people and objected to the underestimation of the friendship between our peoples (p 15). The value of this assistance was corroborated by the successful fulfillment of the first five-year plan in the PRC (1953-1957) in the area of economics and culture. At the same time, L. N. Kutakov was amazed by some "minor points" which many regarded as temporary phenomena: Sometimes an official would start talking about the "great Chinese civilization" or stress that Chinese art was superior to any other, sometimes the Latin alphabet was considered as the basis of language reform in China to the surprise of many specialists, and sometimes shots were fired at the vehicles of Soviet specialists.

These complexities were even more noticeable in the field and milieu in which L. N. Kutakov worked, in his services as consultant and lecturer (the author taught a general course in contemporary international relations to the professors, instructors and graduate students of the abovementioned institute). An efficient curriculum and organizational structure for the institute were developed and the content of instruction was updated with the aid of Soviet comrades. The composition of the student body and faculty was an interesting one. Almost half of the students came from bourgeois families (less than 20 percent were from the laboring strata). Almost two-thirds of the students were members of the CCP and Komsomol, and just over 20 percent of the instructors were party members, while the majority were followers of Arnold Toynbee and Hans Morgenthau. There were virtually no personnel with a fundamental Marxist-Leninist background. With great warmth and objectivity, the author describes the professional and personal characteristics of the official director of the institute, PRC First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian, alternate member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, who consistently promoted the training of specialists with a Marxist-Leninist education. And there is another feature from another portrait--of a severe man with a severe point of view: Mao Zedong expresses the opinion that the time would soon come when "all countries will ask us to take part in solving world problems."

Those were the years when China was working on the production of nuclear weapons. More than 100 outstanding scientists of Chinese origin--physicists and mathematicians--moved from the United States to the PRC in some "incomprehensible" manner. Later the author of the memoirs asked Harvard University Professor M. Halperin how the PRC was able to develop its own nuclear bomb without the necessary scientific and technical foundation. Halperin replied: "We can assume that a Chinese scientist who worked in the United States, at the university in Berkeley, somehow got to China and helped his country."

President Sukarno and his attempts to mediate in the Sino-Indian conflict, the "Amerasia" affair and the metamorphoses of J. Service's biography¹--these and many other episodes are described in the most exciting terms in the memoirs. There is also an alarming tone to the narrative, particularly when the author lists the main theses of Qiao Guanhua's report on the state of affairs in Southeast Asia: the rising number of marriages between Chinese and Khmers; the Chinese blood in Sihanouk's veins; the good relations with Southeast Asian countries on the strength of the large Chinese communities there; the assistance of the Vietnamese people in the form of equipment for the textile and match industries; difficulties only with Muslim countries in the region. Even then Beijing was taking a "unique" approach to Southeast Asian affairs, and this was only late 1956. Even then the "series of historical injustices caused by imperialism" served as justification for territorial claims on almost all of the PRC's neighbors--an unprecedented event in the history of international relations (pp 43-53).

Almost 30 years have gone by, years during which the Sino-Indian conflict flared up again and again, the "strange assistance" of the DRV turned into a "strange war" with socialist Vietnam, the "Chinese experiment" in Cambodia put the country on the verge of nationwide catastrophe, the real assistance of Afghan counterrevolutionaries "replaced" the Sino-Soviet border provocations

of the not too distant past, and the "normalization" and "declaration of Sino-American friendship" coincided with Sino-Soviet negotiations and the latest propaganda campaign about "seized territories." All of this will naturally be on the mind of the Soviet reader of L. N. Kutakov's memoirs. The "theory of the single Chinese nationality," invented in the late 1960's, has been revived: China has always existed as a multinational state-conglomerate, regardless of changes in dynasty and ruling nationality, and this is why all of the non-Han peoples of China and some of the peoples of neighboring countries are part of the "single Chinese nationality," their territories are part of China's state territory, and the lands which are not now within the PRC's borders are "lost" Chinese lands. According to this line of reasoning, the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Tajiks have always lived in China.² Now, as they write in Beijing, all of these peoples are "transcending the bounds of ethnic and class interests...for the unity and benefit of the single Chinese nationality."³ The "issue" of the Soviet Far East and Central Asia has been put on the same level as the issue of Taiwan and Hong Kong.⁴ L. N. Kutakov takes a historical approach to the phenomenon of great-Han nationalism (pp 56-57). The conclusion that Mao Zedong was not its "inventor" makes this phenomenon more significant and makes the problem more serious.

In addition, many pages in L. N. Kutakov's work describe friendly relations between Soviet and Chinese specialists at work and at their leisure, in Beijing and during a tour of the country, which the author describes with the greatest humanitarian enthusiasm and affection in the interesting chapter "Journey Through China." The reader will be profoundly affected by the description of Port Arthur; the rich kaleidoscope of images; Pu Yi and the Russians from Dongbei who returned to their motherland; the fascinating interweaving of events and lives, such as the experiences of the diplomat from Taiwan during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan and the revolution in Russia (pp 197-198).

In the chapter "At the Crossroads," L. N. Kutakov describes the final stage of his work in Beijing and the events that caused the author and his Soviet colleagues to decline the invitation to continue working in the PRC. In 1958 the Renmin Ribao Publishing House published L. N. Kutakov's book on "The Contemporary History of International Relations." It was used as a textbook in Vietnam and other countries as well as in China. When the directors of the Diplomatic Institute summed up the results of the specialists' work, they remarked that within just 2 years their assistance had led to the essential renewal of the institute administrative system, the organization of highly effective instruction of high standards, a new and truly serious approach to work on the part of professors and students, and so forth (pp 101-102). On behalf of the premier of the PRC State Council, L. N. Kutakov and his colleagues (including well-known Sinologist A. M. Dubinskiy, who subsequently worked at the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences) were awarded the "Sino-Soviet Friendship Medal." In July 1957, however, the same Zhou Enlai ordered the cancellation of institute courses in Marxist-Leninist theory. The institute was virtually closed down during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," Zhang Wentian was persecuted and died soon afterward, and all PRC ambassadors abroad were recalled (with the exception of Huang Hua, Zhou Enlai's former assistant). In 1970 the institute resumed its activity in quite a different capacity....

L. N. Kutakov worked in the United Nations from 1965 to 1973. The history of this organization, reflecting profound changes in the world, the people he met in America and the discussions and essence of the major events of those years are described by the author with the fascination of an observer and the accuracy of a scientist. For most of this period, the author was UN Secretary-General U Thant's under secretary general for political and Security Council affairs and the head of the corresponding UN Secretariat department.

The conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the events in Africa and Latin America were not simply objects of observation, but also objects of work. This is the subject matter of three chapters of the memoirs. But the author retained his interest in China, particularly in view of the fact that the restoration of the PRC's legal rights in the United Nations was one of the most vital UN issues of those years. Colossal changes in the world, the growth of progressive forces, the reinforcement and development of the socialist community and the Soviet Union's tremendous efforts on the international scene led, the author stresses, to something that seemed incredible to many in the 1950's and even in the 1960's--the downcast representatives of Taiwan had to leave a session of the UN General Assembly and give up their place to diplomats from the PRC. Justice prevailed. But did the behavior of the PRC representative in the United Nations correspond to this justice and to public expectations? This question did not arise in 1971, but much earlier, and L. N. Kutakov provides informed and convincing testimony as a direct participant in these events.

In the Peking Hotel on 7 November 1956, the Chinese enthusiastically congratulated their Soviet guests on the triumph of Soviet diplomacy in stopping the imperialist aggression against Egypt. But on 7 June 1967, Huang Hua, the ambassador in Egypt, was instructed by Mao Zedong to advise Nasir not to agree to the cease-fire the USSR was insisting on in the United Nations. Nasir rejected this advice. Later Chinese diplomats avoided any condemnation of Israel and actively spread the propaganda about the "conflicting interests of the superpowers" and about the "Soviet expansionism" in the Middle East. It was not until summer 1979 that China acknowledged the need for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories, supported the legal rights of the Palestinian Arabs and declared the need for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. But the idea of the "struggle between the superpowers" remained Beijing's main thesis. In March 1965 China refused to accuse the United States of violating the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, to take specific actions to defend the DRV and to participate in the summit-level meeting on this matter by representatives of the DRV, USSR and PRC. This was not even a case of neutrality, as the PRC was interfering with Soviet deliveries to Vietnam, and Soviet ships had to sail around Africa to get to Haiphong. At a session of the UN Security Council in Panama in 1973, Chinese representative Huang Hua literally tormented the representative of that country with panic-stricken demands for extraordinary means of personal protection but then essentially refused to support the Panamanian people's struggle against Yankee imperialism (p 193).

China became a member of the United Nations on 25 October 1971. For 21 years China's friends, progressive, anti-imperialist and patriotic forces, especially

the USSR, had been fighting for this. The logic of history, the tactical need to strengthen the United States' waning international influence and the U.S. attempts to play the "China card" of anti-Sovietism demanded a change in American behavior toward Beijing. Was it a coincidence that the liquidation of the "Lin Biao group" coincided with the revival of contacts between Beijing and Washington? Was it only an ironic twist of fate that the U.S. representative in the United Nations, G. Bush, who had fought hardest of all against the restoration of China's rights in the United Nations, later became the U.S. representative in the PRC--the same Bush who is now the American vice-president? The results of the vote on 25 October 1971 were the following: 76 votes for the restoration of the PRC's rights and 35 votes against. A delegation from the PRC arrived in New York (L. N. Kutakov provides an intriguing analysis of its composition). China's friends at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly heartily greeted this delegation, and the first to do so was the representative from the USSR. The "response" of the PRC representative, however, astounded the majority of those present.

In China they celebrated this entry into the United Nations by setting off a nuclear bomb.

Then there were the "working breakfasts." The author describes the way things were done in the PRC's UN mission and the peculiarities of Chinese diplomatic behavior in the United Nations. For example, by the beginning of 1972 Huang Hua was already insisting that the PRC be granted the office occupied by the USSR representative. K. Waldheim logically denied this request.

The author recalls the words of Panamanian representative Boyd: "We are amazed by the Chinese delegate's statements. We did not expect this. We were hoping for the reinforcement and expansion of the anti-imperialist front. What is going on? What has happened to the Chinese?" (p 217). And another remark was made by D. Rockefeller: "China will become a country open to the entire Western world" (p 252).

What is happening in the United Nations today? What line of behavior have Chinese diplomats chosen? At the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly the PRC abstained from voting on half of all the resolutions on international security and disarmament issues put to a vote. The Chinese delegation objected to the recommendations of the GDR and other countries with regard to the cessation of nuclear tests. On the other hand, China voted with all of the socialist countries for the creation of nuclear-free zones, nuclear-free space and peaceful cooperation in space.⁵ The PRC delegation's statement in the United Nations last September can probably be viewed as a policy statement: "The Chinese Government is prepared to play its role in the struggle against hegemonism and for the consolidation of international security, the establishment of friendly relations between states and the guarantee of peace throughout the world." Just as in the past, the top of the list is occupied by "struggle against hegemonism," by which Beijing is known to mean the Soviet Union ("regional hegemonism" refers to socialist Vietnam).

As we can see, words and deeds in Beijing and in New York have not become any simpler and they are still ambiguous in many cases. L. N. Kutakov's book is a serious study of this complexity of words and deeds in Beijing and New York.

FOOTNOTES

1. This has already been discussed in our journal; also see the article by Professor M. F. Yur'yev in this issue.
2. XINJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO, 1983, No 1-2, p 18.
3. HONGQI, 1984, No 3, p 23.
4. JINDAISHI YANJIU, 1983, No 2, pp 55-56.
5. BEIJING REVIEW, 1983, No 45, p 10.

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BOOK ON USSR-CHINA BORDER DISPUTE IN AMUR REGION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 85 pp 166-168

[Review by V. M. Kabuzan, doctor of historical sciences, and N. Yu. Novgorodskaya of book "Priamur'ye v sisteme russko-kitayskikh otnosheniy. XVII-seredina XIX v." [The Cis-Amur Region in the System of Russo-Chinese Relations from the 17th to the Mid-19th Centuries] by Ye. L. Bezprozvannykh, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 206 pages]

The relations between Russia and China have been the subject of numerous studies undertaken by Russian, Soviet, and foreign historians. E. Besprozvannykh's monograph is a novel interpretation on this subject, offering extensive factual material from a variety of sources.

In his work, the author singles out an important feature in the establishment and development of Russo-Chinese relations—the problem of territorial demarcation in the Amur Region. Over a long period of time, this problem greatly influenced the state of relations between the two nations and occupied the attentions of more than one generation of Russian diplomats and Qing politicians, who struggled to solve it.

The creative use of Marxist-Leninist methodology has enabled E. Besprozvannykh to draw a comprehensive historical picture of the Amur Region over nearly two centuries, starting from the time when the region

began to be developed and the first Russian settlements appeared in the 17th century, up to its final incorporation into Russia in the 1850s. Only such an all-embracing study of the entire record of the Amur issue, can be acknowledged as genuinely scientific, and can offer the key to an understanding of the history of the Russian Far East. A disregard of the historical method, in the analysis of the formation of tsarist Russia's and the Qing Empire's possessions in the Far East, inevitably leads to an erroneous interpretation of events. One instance of this is the study by R. Quested which fails to say anything about such an important historical period as the China's aggression against Russia in the late 17th century.¹

E. Besprozvannykh provides a convincing evidence that in the course of the opening up of Siberia and the Far East by Russia, in

¹ R. K. I. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857-1860*, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.

the 17th century, the friendly relations between Russian workers, peasants in the first place, and the indigeneous population favourably contributed to the joining of those territories to Russia.² The native population recognized the authority of new administration and paid the *yasak* (tribute) to the Russian tsar. Many agricultural settlements were founded in the Region, which from 1665 had its administrative centre in the stockaded town of Albazin (p. 30). The dates cited in the monograph testify to a significant role played by the Russian people in the economic development of the Far East and in defence of the country's borders.³

The interaction of a range of objective and subjective factors, arising from the internal development of both Russia and the Qing Empire and the evolution of interstate relations determined the foreign policy pattern of the two countries. Underlying the Moscow court's desire to establish friendly relations with the Qing Empire in the 17th century, were the endeavours of Russia, in her Far Eastern foreign policy, to create favourable conditions for mutually beneficial trade with China. The stand of Qings, however, was radically different. Instead of seeking to ensure the security of China's borders, they pursued a policy of expanding their empire, at the expense of their neighbours' territories. In the 1660's the Qing rulers sanctioned the opening of aggression against Russia, aimed at the occupation of the Russian Amur Region (pp. 33-50).

Pursuing this aim, the Qing government resorted to diverse tactics in its handling of "recalcitrant neighbours". When lavish promises failed to persuade them to vow obedience to the "Son of Heaven", threats and arms came into play.

Chapter One of the monograph provides convincing evidence that during the signing in 1689 of the first Russo-Chinese treaty, gross political pressure was exerted on the Russian delegation headed by F. A. Golovin.

² The article "The Discovery and Development of the Amur Region and Maritime Area by the Russians" by G. V. Melikov and A. I. Alekseyev points that in compliance with the principles of international law in the second half of the 17th century "Russia was not slow in transforming its initial legal right in the Amur Region and Maritime area into a practical one". See *Voprosy istorii*, 1984, No. 3, p. 71.

³ See O. I. Sergeyev, *The Cossacs in the Russian Far East in the 17th-19th Centuries*, Moscow, 1983.

Under pressure of the situation the head of the Russian delegation was obliged to make concessions, as a result of which, the Qing Empire annexed a portion of Russian lands on the left bank of the Amur and on the right bank of the Argun, thus tangibly undermining the position of Russia in the Far East (pp. 54—55).

A thorough examination of the terms of Treaty of Nerchinsk signed on August 29 1689, has led E. Besprozvannykh to the valid conclusion that the Treaty "neither actually nor legally fixed the Russian-Chinese border in the Amur Region. An agreed border was established only along a comparatively limited stretch along the Argun and the Gorbitsa rivers, whereas the question of a border for a substantial part of the Amur Region (south of the Uda River) was officially set aside for some future date. Thus the status of a vast area of the Amur Region remained actually uncertain" (p. 57).

Throughout the period that the Amur issue remained unresolved, representatives of various circles of the Russian public put forward suggestions for its resolution and suggested projects for the utilization of Amur.⁴ However the tsarist government wary of complicating relations with China, refrained from implementing them. The author correctly notes, how the Russian administration's stand on the Amur issue, was tied up with the economic development of Russia, and the general political situation existing at that time. In the second quarter of the 18th century "the balance of forces between the two Empires", specified by the 1727 Treaty of Kyakta, and the favourable political situation created by the Sino-Dzungar war gave the Russian "government an opportunity to alter the status of the Amur region in its favour". However, for "political motives" and considering "there were no urgent economic need for the Amur", it took a passive stand on the Amur issue (pp. 87, 182).

The colonial expansion of Western powers in China and the Far East in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, aggravated the situation still further (Chapter 4). In the mid-19th century "the Amur problem reached a critical point" (p. 183). The destiny of the Russian Amur Region was jeopardised. Rus-

sian possessions were in imminent danger of Anglo-French invasion. The political situation forced the tsarist government to abandon its plans for a partial solution of the Amur issue, and take more resolute steps. In order to protect the Pacific coast, Russian troops were sent down the Amur, thereby preventing British intervention. Meanwhile, the Russian side again lodged a claim with the Qing government for the return of the Russian Amur territories. Following negotiations on this issue two treaties were signed: the Aighun Russian-Chinese Treaty of 1858 and the Peking Treaty of 1860—providing for the return of the territory to its rightful owner, i. e., Russia (Chapter 5).

The monograph analyses at length the development of Russo-Chinese negotiations on the Amur Region issue. Most valuable in this respect are the sections dealing with the numerous negotiations held during the 18th century, which did not receive enough coverage in preceding studies. The author graphically shows that Russian officials, albeit in disadvantageous position, managed to handle the artificially raised Amur issue successfully avoiding the attempts by the Qing government, to press on Russia a solution which would have infringed upon its legitimate interests. The efforts of Russian diplomats were always directed at establishing the frontier between the two states along the natural geographic boundary, that is the Amur River. It was the only solution which would have returned to Russia, its formerly developed and populated territories, and which would not have infringed upon the interests of either Russia or China.

The monograph also gives an interesting account of the activities of those Russians who were closely associated with the Amur Region's history. Among them were the fearless pioneers I. Moskvitin, V. Poyarkov, S. Dezhnev and E. Khabarov, the explorers of the Far East V. Bering, M. Shpanberg, G. Shelikhov, P. Skobeltsyn, V. Shetilov and Russian diplomats F. Golovin, N. Bratishchev, N. Muravyov and N. Ignatyev who wanted to solve the Amur problem by peaceful means.

The data cited in the monograph testifies that during the period from the late 17th to the mid-19th centuries, when Russia temporarily lost control over the Amur territories, they did not in fact belong to, or were developed by China. The Qing government which had neither desire, nor the potentialities to inhabit and develop this region,

⁴ Among those active in elaborating those projects and directly engaged in the development of the Amur Region were the Decembrists. See V. Barayev, "Achievement Continued", *The Communist*, 1984, No. 5, pp. 70-81 (in Russian).

wanted to preserve as virgin land to become a "specific buffer zone" between the two states (p. 114).

The author has every reason to maintain that until the 1850s, when the Amur Region was finally incorporated into Russia, with the exception of several Manchurian-Chinese settlements in the so-called "Manchurian wedge" in the Lower Zeya, not a single administrative post was built by the Qings. The majority of the local population inhabiting this region remained independent of the Qing China. In addition, many nomadic Tungus, who were Russian subjects, migrated to the Amur in search of fur-bearing animals, and continued to pay tribute to the Russian tsar.

Evaluating the book on the whole, it can be said that the author has managed to produce a serious and well-substantiated study. His study of a 200-year period of the Amur Region's history is based on an in-depth analysis of a most extensive number

of sources and critical assessments, taken from a variety of Soviet and foreign studies.

The main conclusion deduced in the monograph is that the Aighun and Peking Treaties, in the mid-19th century were neither a gain nor an annex of Qing China's Amur Region and Maritime Territory for Russia, but only a reestablishment of its rights over the territories temporarily lost in the late 17th century.

This book is important in so far as it is an unbiased picture of the formation of Russia's Far Eastern boundaries and because it exposes the wrong concepts advocated by both bourgeois and Chinese authors.⁵

⁵ See V. Yasenev, "What Is Behind the 'History Studies'", *New Times*, 1984, No. 15, pp. 23-25.

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CHINESE JOURNAL PUBLISHES BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET ARTICLES ON CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 84 (signed to press 23 Nov 84) p 202

[Article by I. L. Karmanovskaya: "Bibliography of Works by Soviet Sinologists in JINDAISHI YANJIU"]

[Text] The journal JINDAISHI YANJIU is the organ of the Contemporary History Institute of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences and has been published quarterly since 1979. In 1984 the journal began to be issued six times a year. A bibliography of works on modern and contemporary Chinese history, published in the Russian, Japanese and West European languages, has been published in each fourth issue of the journal in the past 2 years. The works are divided into categories, including politics, economics, culture, special literature and others.

Works by Soviet Sinologists published in 1981 and 1982, as well as many works from 1978 to 1980, are represented quite well in the lists of books and articles. In addition, reviews of these works in various periodicals are also listed. This makes the lists much more informative. The collections of documents on Russo-Chinese relations and on the revolutionary process in the East and articles from various Soviet periodicals, particularly PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, listed in the bibliography include the following: T. N. Akatova's "Deng Zhongxia--Prominent Figure in the Chinese Labor Movement" and A. N. Zhelokhovtsev's "Lu Xin in American Sinology" in No 3 for 1982, R. A. Mirovitskaya's "Great October and the Development of the Revolutionary Movement in China" (1982, No 4), several works by M. I. Sladkovskiy, including the article "The Significance of Proletarian Internationalism in Education and the Activity of the CCP" (1981, No 2), S. L. Tikhvinskiy's article "Great October and the Revolutionary Movement in China" (1982, No 1) and others.

The journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA is represented most fully (up to 65 percent of all Soviet articles). The bibliography also includes articles from KOMMUNIST, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, VOPROSY ISTORII, MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, VESTNIK Leningradskogo Universiteta. SERIYA 'ISTORIYA--YAZYK--LITERATURA,' VESTNIK Moskovskogo Universiteta. SERIYA 13. 'VOSTOKOVEDENIYE,' IZVESTIYA AN Kazakhskoy SSR and IZVESTIYA SO AN SSSR. SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK. The compilers of the lists have selected not only articles dealing directly with modern and contemporary Chinese history, but also reports on various

symposiums and conferences: S. R. Kuchera's "Zurich Sinologists Congress" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1981, No 3, pp 156-162), V. F. Sorokin's "At the 17th European Sinologists Congress" (PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1981, No 2, pp 193-195) and others.

In spite of the thoroughness of entries pertaining to Russian-language publications, the compilation displays relatively low professional standards. The descriptions of book reviews are incomplete. For example, the bibliography tells where the review of A. S. Kostyayeva's "Krest'yanskiye soyuzy v Kitaye (20-ye gody XX v.)" [Peasant Unions in China (1920's)] is located, but the title of the review is not given. The shortcomings also include inaccurate citations of the place of publication and the absence of quantitative descriptions and subcategories; the information that bibliographical entries were precis of dissertations was omitted in nine cases. It was not mentioned, for example, that S. A. Gorbunova's work "CCP Policy in the Labor Movement Under the Conditions of the United National Front of 1921-1927" is a precis of a dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences.

The section entitled "Literature in the West European Languages" includes articles by Soviet Sinologists published in the English-language edition of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, but without any reference to the place of publication. In this case the notation "FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS--Moscow" should have been included.

There are omissions. The lists do not include "Vzaimootnosheniya Rossii so stranami Vostoka v seredine XIX-nachale XX veka" [Russia's Interrelations with Eastern Countries from the Middle of the 19th to the Beginning of the 20th Centuries] (Irkutsk, 1982), "Vidnyye kitayskiye demokrati i kommunisty o Sovetskom Soyuze" [Prominent Chinese Democrats and Communists Discuss the Soviet Union], an anthology compiled by A. M. Ledovskiy, A. M. Malukhin, R. A. Mirovitskaya and Wang Danzhi (Moscow, 1981), "Rabocheye dvizheniye v Kitaye: nankinskiy gomin'dan i rabochiy vopros, 1927-1931" [The Labor Movement in China: The Nanking Kuomintang and the Labor Issue, 1927-1931] (Moscow, 1982) and several other works. Another overlooked work is M. Ye. Shneyder's interesting article "Unforgettable Evidence of International Solidarity (The International Contacts of the Chinese League of Leftist Writers, 1930-1936)," published in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA (1981, No 1).

In general, the bibliographical lists provide indisputable proof of the Chinese historians' great interest in works by Soviet scholars. The isolated shortcomings do not diminish the significance of the very fact that these lists have been published. This work will promote a more thorough awareness among Chinese specialists of studies of Chinese modern and contemporary history in the USSR.

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REPORT ON SEP 84 EUROPEAN CONGRESS OF SINOLOGISTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 84 (signed to press 23 Nov 84) pp 203-204

[Report by Professor V. F. Sorokin on 29th European Sinologists Congress in Tuebingen in September 1984]

[Text] The latest, 29th European Sinologists Congress was held in the West German city of Tuebingen from 1 to 15 September 1984. At the request of the European Sinologists Association (ESA), the congress was organized by the Tuebingen University East Asian Seminar staff under the supervision of Professor G. Grimm.

The congress was attended by a Soviet delegation made up of the following members: Professor L. M. Gudozhnikov, doctor of juridical sciences; Candidate of Economic Sciences S. A. Manezhev; Professor V. M. Solntsev, doctor of philological sciences; Professor V. F. Sorokin, doctor of philological sciences; and Professor V. I. Shabalin, doctor of economic sciences.

This time the total number present, including delegates, observers and guests, was around 120, which is slightly lower than the number attending the last congress in Cambridge. Sinology in the socialist countries of Europe was represented more widely than in Cambridge. Academics from the PRC, represented by five observers, participated more actively in the work of the congress.

According to a decision of the ESA Board, this time the representatives from the PRC did not have the status of "guests of honor" but were mere observers (although it is true that all of their expenses were paid by the organizers of the congress). The delegates from the PRC--People's University Professor and Chairman of the Beijing Municipal Association of Historians Dai Yi and Director Yu Shenwu of the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences--presented three reports on the study of sources: "Diaries as Valuable Material for the Study of Chinese History" (Dai Yi), "The Diaries of Chinese Diplomats in the West at the End of the Qing Dynasty" (Yu Shenwu) and "The Compilation of the 'Rough Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty'" (Dai Yi). Their purpose was to underscore the Chinese authorities' efforts to collect and study the most diverse sources of information about their country's past and to demonstrate the broad range and thoroughness of historical research in the PRC.

There were some differences in the organization of congress proceedings this time. Almost all of the reports were presented at plenary sessions, and participants were divided only once into two discussion groups--on literature and contemporary history (the number of discussion groups reached five or six at previous congresses, arousing complaints from Sinologists specializing in more than one field). Besides this, lectures of 45-60 minutes were presented by invited guests (mainly from the FRG) in addition to the 20-minute reports. The congress began with one such lecture: President G. Frank of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, a well-known Sinologist, presented a lecture on "Medieval China Under Barbarian Rule: Some Institutional Questions."

The proceedings testified that Sinologists in Western Europe are taking much more interest in current Chinese affairs: 20 of the 41 reports and lectures dealt completely or partially with current events. This is due not only to the understandable interest in events in China but also to the West European Sinologists' increasing involvement in the political, commercial, scientific and other contacts between their countries and China.

The session dealing with "Chinese Law," at which four speeches and one news report were presented, dealt exclusively with current affairs. Italian I. Dondola reported on "The Sources of the PRC Criminal Code." He stated that most of the PRC criminal code was taken from a similar document of the Kuomintang regime with a total or partial disregard for the criminal legislation of liberated regions, judicial proceedings in the PRC and the criminal law of socialist states. This statement evoked justifiable objections from a Soviet delegate. The Marxist view of the development of law in China and the PRC was presented in the report by L. M. Gudoshnikov (Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) on "The Distinctive Origins of the Legal System in the PRC" (the basic premises of the report were set forth in the author's article in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 2, 1984). Labor and social security legislation in the PRC was the subject of a report by Susanna Burger (FRG). Professor P. Corradini from Rome presented a report in which he discussed the issue of human rights in the PRC in relation to its latest constitution; he concentrated on the place and role of religion in today's China.

Two sessions were set aside for historians, one called "Early and Pre-Contemporary History" and the other called "Contemporary History and Historical Research." Most of the reports dealt with extremely specialized topics.

The report by Professor W. Lippert (FRG) on "The Comintern, the CCP and the Movement for a United Anti-Japanese Front in China in 1935-1936" aroused debates. Several participants, particularly M. Kubeshova (CSSR) and N. Ananiyeva (PRB), discussed the need for a differentiated approach to various currents in the CCP leadership of that time.

The academics from the socialist countries who addressed the history discussion group were Professor R. Felber (GDR), who reported on "The Renewed Debates on the Asian Method of Production in the PRC," and M. Saje (Ljubljana), who reported on "Suzhou Market Conditions in the Ming Era."

The PRC's most urgent socioeconomic problems were discussed at a special session of the congress, where three reports were presented: "Some Problems

in the Modernization Process" by O. Juhasz (Hungary); "Foreign Entrepreneurial Capital in the PRC Economy" by S. Manezhev (USSR); and "Economic Reform in the PRC" by B. Talas (Hungary). All of these reports aroused interest and lively discussion.

In his report, S. Manezhev analyzed the economic role of foreign entrepreneurial capital in present-day China and concluded that its influence on PRC economic development has produced conflicting results.

Three reports were presented at the session on Chinese literature--one on classical literature and two on modern. All of them were presented by West German Sinologists.

The discussion of linguistics at the congress was limited. Two reports were presented at a plenary session: "Alexandria and Chinese Liquid Sounds" by G. Wittaker (Tuebingen) and "The Change in Morphological Systems in the Chinese Language" by V. M. Solntsev. The first report dealt with the reconstruction of ancient Chinese sounds and the second dealt with the Chinese language's evolution from ancient times to the present day.

A session on "China and the European Countries" was held for the first time in the history of these congresses. The original intention was to elucidate the period of the late Qing Dynasty and Xinhai revolution, when China's contacts with Europe became diversified, but the speakers did not confine themselves to this framework: Several reports dealt with the 17th and 19th centuries as well as the present day.

In his report on "Russian Literature in China on the Eve of the Xinhai Revolution," V. F. Sorokin demonstrated the great interest of the progressive Chinese public of that time in Russian culture, which the speaker attributed to the similarities of the revolutionary situation in the two countries and the social-humanist tenor of Russian literature.

It is noteworthy that all of the reports by Soviet delegates aroused great interest and evoked positive responses from foreign participants.

In view of the participants' great interest in the subject of "China and Europe," a decision was made to continue this discussion at the next congress.

A meeting of the ESA Board was held on the first day of the congress. In the absence of association President P. Van der Loon (England), the meeting was called to order by ESA Vice President V. F. Sorokin. The proceedings of the congress were discussed at the meeting and new board members were nominated. In view of the fact that 24 candidates were nominated for 24 seats, the board membership was ratified by the general assembly without a vote. Michael Lowe (England) was elected the new president of the association, and V. F. Sorokin (USSR) and T. Grimm (FRG) were elected vice presidents.

On behalf of the president of the recently founded All-Union Sinologists Association, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, the Soviet delegation reported on the aims and methods of

association work and distributed English-language informational notices. This report aroused considerable interest.

At the suggestion of the Italian Sinologists Association, the next congress (in 1986) is to be held in Turin. The next meeting of the ESA Board will be held in Rome in November 1985.

The work of the congress was performed in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. There were many discussions at sessions and in hallways about the desirability of broader cooperation by Sinologists in the European countries and their national organizations and about the exchange of research findings.

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